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Literature suggests that individuals have endogenous preferences for accounting conservatism 
as compared to neutrality due to intrinsic loss aversion. However, no empirical evidence for 
this claim exists. This thesis provides first experimental insights on individuals’ endogenous 
preferences for conservative compared to neutral accounting. Results show that in a judgment 
context based on innate loss aversion, individuals value conservatism more highly than 
neutrality in accounting. The thesis further investigates if individuals also show explicit 
preferences for conservative vs. neutral accounting by implementing a choice setting. Results 
provide evidence that individuals prefer conservative to neutral accounting when presented with 
both options. The study contributes to the ongoing discussion on accounting conservatism by 
establishing that a disregard for peoples’ endogenous preferences for conservatism associated 
with neutral accounting can have detrimental economic consequences, such as a lower 
willingness to invest.  
The following chapter presents the motivation and the objective of this thesis. 
1.1 Motivation and Objective 
This thesis investigates whether individuals have endogenous preferences for conservatism 
compared to neutrality in accounting due to intrinsic loss aversion. Prior literature rationalizes 
that conservative accounting is a prudent reaction to uncertainty demanded by the firm’s 
stakeholders (Watts, 2003a). Recent literature argues that individuals have endogenous 
preferences for conservatism in accounting (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009; Nagar et al., 2016). 
Accounting conservatism is characterized by demanding higher verification requirements for 
gains than losses (Watts, 2003a), resulting in a more timely recognition of losses than gains 
(Basu, 1997). Future losses are anticipated when they are probable, whereas future gains are 
only recognized when realized. By considering potential future losses up-front, users of 
accounting information are protected from future disappointment, thereby accounting for 
individuals’ intrinsic loss aversion (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). This study examines 
individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism and the consequences of a possible 
mismatch between accounting methods and individuals’ preferences. Based on loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the underlying expectation is that conservatism results in 






Although being a fundamental accounting concept, conservatism has increasingly become a 
controversial issue. Literature argues that the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is 
beneficial for bondholders due to increased contract efficiency (e.g., Watts, 2003a; Kothari et 
al., 2010), as well as for shareholders due to constraining earnings management and thereby 
providing more reliable information to users (e.g., Francis et al., 2013; García Lara et al., 2014). 
However, opponents find that conservatism results in biased information, concealing true 
performance. In recent years, standard setters have followed this critical view and currently 
give preference to neutral accounting (IASB, 2010, CF; IASB, 2015, CF ED) with the objective 
of providing accounting information that is more useful to users, leading to a symmetric 
treatment of gains and losses.  
Until recently, conservatism has mostly been examined from an agency-theoretic or decision 
usefulness perspective. Nagar et al. (2016) analyze conservatism from an evolutionary point of 
view and argue that conservatism originated from humans’ psychological bias of intrinsic loss 
aversion that developed through human evolution. Research has found that even very young 
children (Harbaugh et al., 2001) as well as primates (Chen et al., 2006) show loss aversion. This 
bias is considered to be deeply rooted in human beings and seems to be rather innate than 
learned (Chen et al., 2006). If loss aversion is innate, people are not necessarily aware of being 
biased by this phenomenon. Consequently, users of accounting information who dislike being 
disappointed may find conservatism attractive without being aware of the fact and the reason 
for it (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009).  
This study applies the case of the accounting for research and development (R&D) expenditures 
as an example for variants of different degrees of conservatism. Immediate expensing of R&D 
expenditures is a typical example for conservative accounting (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). 
Capitalizing R&D1 expenditures, on the other hand, represents neutral accounting by 
symmetrically matching the investment outlay with the future benefits derived from the 
investment. Other examples of conservative accounting would be the accounting for provisions 
or the impairment of assets. 
Rationally, applying conservative or neutral accounting does not make a difference in overall 
results, but it influences the timing of loss recognition. In the short-run, conservatism and 
neutrality frame a situation differently. The immediate expensing of R&D expenditures 
separates the initial investment from future project outcomes. Thus, in a conservative setting, 
                                                 
1 It is important to underline that the IFRS only allow for capitalization of development expenditures and forbid 
capitalization of research expenditures. Nevertheless, in this thesis, in the interest of a good and fluent readability, 





individuals do not face a loss in later periods when the project is unsuccessful. Because potential 
losses are anticipated, future disappointments are avoided. In contrast, in the neutral setting 
there is no negative impact on profits at inception but in later periods when the potential loss is 
realized. The neutral setting thus creates disappointment that is avoided in the conservative 
setting.  
Literature provides evidence that due to limited cognitive capacity individuals process 
information in the form in which it is presented without reframing it (Slovic, 1972; Payne, 
1982). Framing, that is presenting logically identical concepts or situations differently (e.g., 
formulated as gains vs. losses), can impact users’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998). According to Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), individuals are more hurt by losses than they are thrilled by 
equivalent-sized gains relative to the relevant reference point. Losing a certain amount of 
money nearly hurts twice as much as gaining the same amount of money provides pleasure 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; 1992). If conservatism helps avoiding such loss experiences, 
individuals should show a preference for conservative relative to neutral accounting. This thesis 
provides a novel experiment to investigate if (1) individuals do have such preferences and if  
(2) they actively prefer to invest in firms that apply conservative accounting. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009, p. 1075) suggest for future research ‘to perform field or laboratory 
experimental testing to see whether and when people have an irrational preference for 
conservative reporting’. This thesis follows this suggestion and aims at providing insights on 
individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative accounting. The corresponding 
experimental study was conducted at the University of Augsburg, Germany and the University 
of St. Gallen, Switzerland from January to March 2017. The study’s main results, its 
implications, and contribution are presented in the next chapter. 
1.2 Main Results and Contribution 
In the experiment, subjects are in their investor role. They are endowed with an equity stake in 
a company that they are subsequently allowed to hold or sell at any time. The company conducts 
R&D projects that influence its future performance (equity) and hence also the value of 
subjects’ equity stake. The experiment consists of a 2x2 between-subjects design which 
manipulates the accounting method applied for R&D expenditures (neutral vs. conservative 
accounting) as well as R&D projects’ outcome (success vs. failure). R&D expenditures are 
either capitalized or expensed and the probability of R&D project success or failure is 0.5 





preferences are operationalized by eliciting subjects’ evaluation of firm performance via a 
second price auction procedure adapted from Becker et al. (1964). This auction procedure 
measures subjects’ willingness to accept (WTA) a buy offer for their equity stake. By 
comparing investors’ WTA across treatment groups their differential willingness to invest in 
the firm is evaluated. To examine if individuals also show explicit conscious preferences for 
conservatism relative to neutrality in accounting, the study switches to a within-subjects design 
to let subjects make an investment choice between both accounting methods. Subjects’ 
deliberate choice between the conservative and the neutral investment option provides data 
regarding individuals’ explicit conscious preferences for one or the other accounting method. 
Combining a between- with a within-subjects design is one method to shed more light on 
subjects’ unintentional biases (corresponding to what is understood in this study as 
‘unconscious’ preferences) and subjects’ intentional judgments (called ‘conscious’ preferences 
in this study) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Libby et al., 2002). 
Results support the expectations: individuals show both unconscious and conscious preferences 
for conservative relative to neutral accounting – especially after prior loss experiences. Subjects 
are willing to sell their shares at lower prices under neutral than under conservative accounting. 
Individuals with higher levels of loss aversion more strongly prefer conservative relative to 
neutral accounting compared to subjects’ with lower levels of loss aversion. The results are 
consistent with the interpretation that loss aversion causes investors to have a lower willingness 
to invest in the neutral accounting condition. Conservatism seems to better address individuals’ 
loss aversion. Mentally processing potential losses is more comfortable under conservative than 
under neutral accounting.  
This thesis addresses a call for more research on ‘whether and when people have an irrational 
preference for conservative reporting’ (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009, p. 1075). While several 
rational explanations for conservatism have been proposed (e.g., Watts, 2003a), psychological 
bias has not yet been analyzed. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by providing first 
experimental evidence for investors’ endogenous preferences for conservative relative to 
neutral accounting.  
Understanding individuals’ endogenous preferences and its related effects is important in 
assessing the costs and benefits of conservatism from a behavioral, evolutionary and 
endogenous perspective and informs the debate on the role of conservatism in financial 
accounting and reporting. The study’s results show that it is important to consider endogenous 





neutrality in accounting because intrinsic and unconscious human coding can have substantial 
influence on individuals’ perception of and reaction to different accounting methods. From a 
manager’s or company’s point of view it can often be economically more efficient to defer 
losses to the future due to discounting effects. To the contrary, from an investor’s point of view, 
considering losses up-front better addresses individuals’ intrinsic loss aversion. The study 
contributes to the ongoing discussion on conservative vs. neutral accounting by highlighting 
that disregarding peoples’ endogenous preferences for conservatism can have negative 
economic consequences, such as investors’ lower willingness to invest in firms applying neutral 
accounting.  
This thesis also contributes to the literature on R&D accounting. There is an ongoing debate 
about the usefulness of capitalizing intangible (R&D) investments. For example, individuals’ 
judgment performance when using information on intangibles expenditures for predicting 
future profits is shown to be more accurate in the capitalizing than in the expense condition 
(Luft and Shields, 2001). This study’s results suggest that from an individual’s endogenous 
preference perspective expensing is more beneficial than capitalizing R&D expenditures 
regarding individuals’ investment decisions – contrary to the trend in current standard setting. 
By applying different instruments for measuring loss aversion and risk attitudes that are 
commonly used in research, this study further contributes to prior literature examining these 
instruments’ validity. It is documented that correlations between the loss aversion measures 
applied are low and mostly even insignificant. Correlations of risk aversion measures are mostly 
significant but correlation coefficients are at low levels. Based on this study’s results, the 
respective instruments do not seem to consistently capture the same concepts and hence their 
application can lead to divergent and even opposing results. 
1.3 Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review on 
prior insights on benefits and costs of conservatism and neutrality in accounting from a financial 
statement user’s as well as from a company’s perspective. The literature review further 
comprises current research that argumentatively links individuals’ endogenous preferences for 
conservatism in accounting to the co-development of human evolution and record keeping. The 
literature review builds the basis for identifying existing research gaps. Section 2 ends with the 
derivation of research questions that are addressed in this thesis and points out the contribution 





Section 3 presents the hypotheses development. Loss aversion is considered the nucleus of 
individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism in accounting. Chapter 3 first provides 
an overview of psychological behavioral phenomena that are all strongly related to or even 
directly stem from individuals’ loss aversion before afterwards drawing on literature that 
provides evidence that loss aversion is endogenous to every human being. The chapter ends 
with arguing how and why conservatism better addresses individuals’ loss aversion than 
neutrality in accounting. Based on these deliberations the hypotheses are derived and the 
corresponding research model is developed.   
Section 4 addresses the experimental study that has been conducted to collect data for testing 
the hypotheses derived. In a first step, the general use of experiments as a method of data 
collection in accounting is briefly described by focusing on specific strengths and 
characteristics of this data collection method. In a second step, the experiment conducted in this 
thesis is presented in detail by explaining how the constructs that build the research model are 
operationalized. Finally, the implementation of the experiment is described.  
Section 5 documents the study’s results. First, pre-test results are presented, before afterwards 
describing the main study’s results. This section further contains robustness check analyses and 
also addresses potential limitations of the experiment which should be considered when 
interpreting the study’s results.  
This thesis ends with section 6 that presents a conclusion on the study’s main findings and 






 Literature Review on Accounting Conservatism and Derivation of Research 
Questions 
This chapter first provides an overview of the concept of accounting conservatism and outlines 
how prior conceptual papers as well as empirical studies evaluate its usefulness in financial 
reporting. In a second step, this chapter differentiates conservative from neutral accounting and 
summarizes the ongoing debate on the tradeoff between both concepts. The last part of this 
chapter relates to prior literature arguing that individuals have endogenous preferences for 
conservatism in accounting. The section closes by presenting the research questions that are 
derived from research gaps identified from the literature review.   
2.1 Conservatism in Accounting 
The concept of conservatism is deeply rooted in financial reporting standards and practice and 
serves as a tool to enhance efficient capital allocation (Basu, 1997). Its impact and implications 
have received major attention in prior accounting research. Several rational explanations for 
conservatism in accounting have been proposed (e.g., Watts, 2003a), whereas human 
psychological bias has not yet been considered in depth. This study focuses on evaluating 
accounting conservatism from an individual investor’s endogenous preferences perspective. 
The following literature review first concentrates on previous insights on ‘rational’ benefits and 
costs of conservative accounting for equity and debt market participants before, in a second 
step, presenting literature related to individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism in 
accounting, which is the point of interest of this study.  
2.1.1 Definition of Accounting Conservatism 
As pointed out by Basu (1997), the concept of conservatism has influenced accounting theory 
and practice for hundreds of years and can be traced back at least to the 15th century. Since then, 
it is deeply rooted in financial reporting standards affecting recognition and measurement of a 
company’s assets and liabilities with the aim to contribute to an efficient capital allocation. 
Despite its long history and an extensive body of research, up to now, no common definition of 
accounting conservatism exists (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Rajan et al., 2007). Several 
researchers refer to accounting conservatism as an on average understatement of book values 
relative to the corresponding market values when characterizing accounting conservatism (e.g., 
Feltham and Ohlson, 1996; Zhang, 2000; Beaver and Ryan, 2005). According to this approach, 
conservatism thus relates to the existence of an ‘expected unrecorded goodwill’ (Beaver and 





of gains and losses (e.g., Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). These researchers argue that in a 
conservative accounting system the verification requirements for gains are higher than for 
losses. Following this line of argumentation, Basu (1997, p. 4) states that conservatism captures 
the ‘accountants' tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news 
than bad news in financial statements’. Financial statements hence capture bad earnings news 
earlier than good earnings news. This understanding of accounting conservatism focuses on 
timeliness in loss recognition.  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) point out that these two characterizations of conservatism are 
related but yet distinct. The authors state that both definitions describe accounting conservatism 
as a reporting bias: The first definition comprises an ‘accounting bias toward reporting low 
book values of stockholder equity’ and the second definition ‘is an equivalent bias conditional 
on firms experiencing contemporaneous economic losses2’ (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, p. 89). 
Departing from these two related but different approaches, conservatism in its entirety is 
commonly described as accounting tendencies that result in downwardly biased accounting net 
asset values relative to the corresponding economic net asset values. The underlying rationale 
is ‘the old and conservative rule of accounting and business practice [that companies should] 
anticipate no profits and provide for all probable losses’ (Bliss, 1924, p. 110). Overall, 
conservatism results in reporting the lowest possible value for assets and revenues and the 
highest possible value for liabilities and expenses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004).  
This thesis addresses conservatism in its entirety mainly focusing on the fact that conservatism 
considers potential gains and potential losses asymmetrically.  
2.1.2 Types of Accounting Conservatism 
Initially, conservatism was considered an accounting concept that results in prudent financial 
numbers (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Beaver, 1998; Watts, 2003a) without 
differentiating between different degrees of conservative accounting. More recently, 
                                                 





researchers commonly distinguish between two types of accounting conservatism: 
unconditional and conditional conservatism3 (e.g., Beaver and Ryan, 2005). 
Under unconditional conservatism, accounting results in the creation of ‘accounting slack’ 
(Beaver and Ryan, 2005, p. 270) and hence unrecorded goodwill at the inception of assets and 
liabilities since losses are recognized more timely than gains leading to an understatement of 
net assets (Penman and Zhang, 2002). Unconditional conservatism materializes in recognition 
and initial measurement rules that predetermine assets (liabilities) to be carried out at a lower 
(higher) book value of equity relative to the present value of future cash inflows (outflows) in 
subsequent periods. An extreme form of unconditional conservatism leads to recognizing 
investments as expenses rather than as assets (Pope and Walker, 2003). Unconditional 
conservatism thus biases accounting numbers irrespective of current news and can be described 
as an ex-ante conservative behavior (Pope and Walker, 2003). One example for unconditional 
conservatism taken from accounting practice is the accelerated depreciation method (e.g., 
declining balance method). It is important to underline that the economic depreciation itself is 
not unconditional conservative because it matches an actual loss of value. The conservative 
behavior is the accelerated depreciation method leading to declining depreciation amounts over 
the respective asset’s useful life. Other examples are immediately expensing the costs of 
internally generated intangible assets and applying historical cost accounting for positive net 
present value projects (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).  
In contrast, conditional conservatism refers to an asymmetric recognition of economic 
developments conditional on current news, with bad news being recognized more quickly as 
losses than good news as gains. In the case of conditional conservatism ‘the reduction in 
accounting income reflects a contemporaneous economic loss’ (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005,  
p. 90) which is not the case when expensing early or when understating book value independent 
of bad news. Thus, conditional conservatism is an ex-post behavior. One example of conditional 
conservatism is the impairment approach for long-lived tangible or intangible assets which are 
written off upon bad news. In fact, the impairment itself is not conditional conservative but the 
fact that assets are not symmetrically written up upon good news (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).  
                                                 
3 Researchers apply different terms for the two types of conservatism. If conservatism is triggered via a mechanical 
rule without any accounting discretion it is defined as unconditional (Beaver and Ryan, 2005), news-independent 
(Chandra et al., 2004), ex ante (Pope and Walker, 2003) or balance sheet conservatism (Ball et al., 2000). The 
notions of conditional, news-dependent, ex post or income statement conservatism imply that the accounting 
treatment is discretionary and a reaction to changing external or internal factors (‘news’). These different terms 
refer to the same concepts. For clarity and readability purposes, the notions unconditional and conditional 






Although the two types of conservative accounting are closely linked, a trade-off exists: the 
application of unconditional conservatism precludes applying conditional conservatism (Pope 
and Walker, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Qiang, 2007). Pope and Walker (2003) explain 
that if a company applies unconditional conservatism by, for example, immediately expensing 
the costs of internally generated intangible assets, there is neither the possibility of impairment 
testing nor recognizing the assets’ economic values in accounting income. In this case, an 
application of conditional conservatism is thus not possible. They find supportive evidence that 
companies with higher levels of unconditional conservatism show relatively lower asymmetric 
timeliness in earnings and lower sensitivity of earnings to bad news, that is, they show lower 
levels of conditional conservatism. Beaver and Ryan (2005) see a sequential relation of 
unconditional and conditional conservatism. They argue that unconditional conservatism 
generates unrecorded goodwill and limits the application of conditional conservatism until bad 
news lead to using up the created slack. Under this perspective, unconditional conservatism is 
determined at the generation of assets and liabilities and thus precedes conditional conservatism 
(Beaver and Ryan, 2005). Ball et al. (2000) reason that conditional conservatism (income 
conservatism) implies unconditional conservatism (balance sheet conservatism) but this does 
not hold vice-versa. They explain their reasoning by an example taken from code-law 
companies: these companies tend to report conservative book values of assets and liabilities but 
at the same time, they tend to ‘boost income in bad years’ (Ball et al., 2000, p. 20). This bad 
year approach thus diminishes the asymmetry of potential gains and losses that would be 
reflected in accounting income under unconditional conservatism and illustrates that 
unconditional conservatism does not necessarily imply conditional conservatism.   
According to Ball et al. (2008), it is important to analyze the two types of conservatism 
separately because they can have different effects and implications. Relatedly, Qiang (2007) 
shows that the setting under investigation influences which type of conservatism comes into 
play. Nevertheless, separating unconditional and conditional conservatism is difficult (Beaver 
and Ryan, 2005; Ryan, 2006). Empirical measures that clearly distinguish between the two 
forms of conservatism are rare (Ryan, 2006). Both types of conservatism lead to an 
understatement of net assets. Hence, a conservatism measure4 such as the market-to-book ratio 
rather captures overall conservatism than differentiates between the two types (e.g., 
Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). Ball and Shivakumar (2005, p. 91) state that these apparent 
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difficulties to differentiate between the two types help ‘explain why conservatism is a 
controversial property of accounting, despite its long-standing influence on practice’.  
This thesis relates to accounting methods for R&D expenditures set out in IAS 38 to 
differentiate between conservative and neutral accounting. IAS 38 prescribes the accounting 
treatment for intangible assets. In case an asset is identified as an intangible, i.e., ‘a non-
monetary asset without physical substance’ (IAS 38.8), its related expenditures are recognized 
as expenses, unless it is probable that the intangible asset generates future benefits and its costs 
can be reliably measured (IAS 38.21). The standard prescribes that the costs related to the 
generation of an internally generated intangible asset must be classified as belonging to a 
research or a development phase (IAS 38.52). All expenditures that arise in the research phase 
are recognized as expenses while expenditures arising in the development phase that fulfill 
specified criteria linked to future economic benefits from the asset are recognized as the cost of 
the intangible asset (IAS 38.54-71). This is contrary to US GAAP that prescribes immediate 
expensing of research and development expenditures (ASC 730-10-25-1). Based on the 
prescriptions specified in IAS 38, expensing or capitalizing development expenditures is 
depending on information (as, e.g., the probability of future benefits generated through the 
asset). In case managerial judgment regarding the fulfillment of the specified criteria is not 
influenced by earnings management purposes but truthfully made, both accounting treatments 
contain information making it difficult to directly assign them to the two types of conservative 
accounting (also see chapter 4.2.2.1). 
2.1.3 Benefits and Costs of Accounting Conservatism for Financial Statement Users  
In general, financial reporting is designed and shaped within the aim to enhance efficient capital 
allocation (Kothari et al., 2010). Against this background, (international) financial reporting 
and standard setting serves two different functions. On the one hand, it aims at providing 
decision useful information to financial statement users in order to facilitate the evaluation of 
investments’ return potentials (valuation or informational function of financial reporting). From 
a valuation perspective, the main function of accounting thus is to enhance investment decision 
making. On the other hand, financial reporting should enable users to monitor the use of their 
invested capital (stewardship function of financial reporting) (Beyer et al., 2010). From a 
contracting perspective, accounting information should thus primarily serve to facilitate the 
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of a company’s contracts (e.g., debt or 





concept incorporated in international financial reporting standards, should hence provide 
valuation relevant information and enhance contract efficiency.  
When looking at benefits and costs of accounting conservatism it is important to have in mind 
that financial reporting addresses different groups of users (e.g., creditors, debtors and analysts 
amongst others) which have heterogeneous informational requirements (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; 
Beyer et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 2010; Coenenberg et al., 2016). It is thus very unlikely that 
conservatism, its consequences and implications, are judged equally across different decision 
contexts. Each stakeholder has his own view on the ‘quality’ of a company’s financial reporting: 
creditors, for instance, primarily demand information that is relevant for contracting purposes 
whereas investors demand information that is relevant for the evaluation of investment 
opportunities (Beyer et al., 2010; Ruch and Taylor, 2015).  
It is examined and controversially debated in literature to what extent conservatism enhances 
both the stewardship (contracting) and the informational (valuation) function of financial 
reporting (e.g., Watts, 2003a, b; Ruch and Taylor, 2015).5 Watts (2003a) defines conservatism 
as asymmetric verification requirements for gains and losses and does not explicitly address the 
two different types. Other researchers attach greater importance to different shades of 
conservative accounting and argue that depending on the context (e.g., considered criteria of 
earnings quality) one type of conservatism can be more beneficial than the other (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Ruch and Taylor (2015) provide a review of related studies on how 
conservatism affects financial statements and their users. The following chapters build on and 
further extend their literature review by focusing on benefits and costs of conservative 
accounting for financial statement users from a stewardship as well as from an informational 
perspective. 
2.1.3.1 Stewardship Perspective 
Following the nexus of contracts theory, several researchers define a company as a collection 
of contracts between agents (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sunder, 1997). From this 
perspective, conservatism is considered as being an accounting tool to enable and ameliorate 
the generation of contracts and enhance contract efficiency within a company. The idea is that 
certain types of contracts, as debt contracts and executive compensation contracts, result in 
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asymmetric payoffs to the contracting parties (i.e., borrowers and lenders or managers and 
owners respectively) due to information asymmetries as well as the separation of ownership 
and control potentially leading to divergent interests between agents (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, contracting parties demand a timely recognition of 
financial information that most strongly affect their own interests and goals (Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Watts, 2003a). In this context, conservatism serves as a tool to mitigate agency problems 
(Watts, 2003a, b; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The next two chapters explain the use of 
conservatism in debt contract as well as executive compensation contract settings in more detail. 
2.1.3.1.1 Debt Contracts 
One type of company contracts that could lead to asymmetric payoffs to contracting parties are 
debt contracts. If lenders provide funds to a borrowing company they bear the risk that the 
manager expropriates the value of the investment by, e.g., paying out dividends or investing in 
high risk projects reducing the likelihood ‘that there will be sufficient resources available to 
fully repay existing or lower priority debt in the event of financial distress, benefiting the 
entrepreneur’ (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p. 409). Debt contracts serve to assure repayment of 
funds to the lender. To enhance debt contracting efficiency, accounting information should be 
relevant for creditors’ lending decisions and mitigate information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. Information asymmetries between debt-contracting parties influence the 
debt-contracts’ design (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997). Debt-contracting literature shows that lenders anticipate agency problems and 
demand higher levels of (especially conditional) conservatism as a precondition to lending 
(Kim and Pevzner, 2010; Kothari et al., 2010). As Watts (2003a) argues, the concept of timelier 
loss recognition fits lenders informational needs: debtors’ losses are more relevant to creditors 
than debtors’ gains. This is the case because lenders’ claims are restricted to the amount of 
credit given plus the corresponding stipulated interest payment. Lenders do not participate in 
borrowers’ gains but they fear contract violation in case of borrowers’ losses. Zhang (2008) 
documents that borrowers’ conservatism serves lenders as default-risk alarm because 
conservatism leads to timelier loss recognition and accelerated debt covenant violation by the 
debtor. In this case, lenders can more quickly exercise their contractual rights and protect the 
credit amount provided to the borrower by limiting or influencing managerial activities. 
A variety of prior studies provides evidence that conservatism is beneficial in borrower-lender 
contract settings because it decreases information asymmetries between these parties (cf., e.g., 





Wagenhofer, 2010; Nikolaev, 2010; García Lara et al. 2016). Ahmed et al. (2002) highlight that 
in a debt-contracting setting conservatism can restrict wealth transfers from bondholders to 
shareholders. They find that companies applying conservatism benefit from lower cost of debt 
as, in their opinion, bondholders reward restrained dividend overpayment. Relatedly, Brockman 
et al. (2015) find that conservatism can mitigate lender and shareholder asset substitution 
conflicts by reducing managerial incentives to invest in risky negative net present value (NPV) 
projects.6 Thus, from a creditor’s perspective, conservatism serves as a mechanism to reduce 
the risk of asset substitution and bondholders’ risk of credit default. Creditors seem to demand 
conservatism in accounting to ‘protect’ the loans they grant to borrowers. 
Cheng et al. (2017) find evidence that second-generation state anti-takeover laws (ATLs) are 
negatively associated with conditional conservatism. According to their interpretation of this 
finding, ATLs are a mechanism to mitigate shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts lowering 
the debtholders’ demand for conservatism. This reasoning suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms can substitute positive effects induced by conservatism thereby lowering creditors’ 
demand for conservative accounting. 
However, other researchers question the usefulness of conservatism for debt contracting 
efficiency. They reflect on the fact that conservatism can restrain managers from investing in 
risky projects even if they are highly promising regarding profitability (Roychowdhury, 2010). 
Kravet (2014) provides evidence that under more conservatism managers prefer less risky 
acquisitions and restrain from riskier but still positive NPV acquisitions even if their 
profitability increases. The authors reason that debt-covenant violation risks drive this behavior. 
Conservatism can hence result in managerial underinvestment being detrimental to a company’s 
stakeholders. 
Other researchers as Gigler et al. (2009) criticize conservatism for not serving as an efficient 
default-risk-alarm but rather leading to low signals in times of economic downturns and 
uncertainty. The authors argue that under conservatism, due to timely loss recognition and 
delayed gain recognition, the disclosure of gains will occur less frequently than the disclosure 
of losses. If a gain is disclosed the information content will be higher than in the loss case 
because the higher verifiability standards for gains than losses relates to a high probability of 
actual occurrence of the respective gain. In contrast, loss disclosures appear more frequently. 
Due to lower verifiability standards for losses than gains, the information content should be 
                                                 






lower because the probability that the loss actually appears is also lower. One problem the 
authors mention is that if conservatism also leads to low signals in times of economic upturns, 
as it is suggested by timely loss recognition, the probability of false default-risk-alarms would 
increase leading to inefficient contracting.  
According to Ball et al. (2008), in debt contracting settings, it is important to differentiate 
between the existing two types of conservative accounting. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue 
that unconditional conservatism introduces a bias of unknown magnitude in accounting 
numbers. The authors explain that if companies report ex ante low book values of equity, 
rational financial reporting users would consider this accounting bias. These users would 
‘realize that assets are unconditionally understated, and would set leverage covenants 
appropriately’ (Ball et al., 2008, p. 194). If the accounting bias, however, is not recognized, 
unconditional conservatism can lead investors to make ‘erroneous’ decisions (Jenkins et al., 
2009, p. 1044). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) reason that only conditional conservatism can 
ameliorate contracting efficiency by limiting managerial aggressive reporting when economic 
losses occur and timely triggering debt covenant violations. Unconditional reporting is judged 
as ‘contracting-neutral at best’ (Ball et al., 2008, p. 194). 
2.1.3.1.2 Executive Compensation Contracts 
Another type of company contracts potentially resulting in asymmetric payoffs to the 
contracting parties are executive compensation contracts. In this context, the demand for 
conservatism stems from the aim to align capital providers’ and executives’ interests. Prior 
research shows that the design of compensation contracts influences managers’ incentives  
(e.g., Healy, 1985; Lambert et al., 1991) and can induce managers to make investment 
decisions, which are in their own interest (e.g., increasing their amount of compensation) but 
not in line with the interests of a company’s capital providers (e.g., receiving interest or 
dividend payments). If management compensation is for example dependent on earnings 
figures managers have incentives to apply earnings management to hit the earnings level 
defined in the compensation contract. By demanding higher verification requirements for gains 
than losses, conservatism can limit managers’ ability and reduce managers’ incentives to bias 
accounting information upward (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003a). Conservatism thus mitigates 
inappropriately high managerial compensation (Watts, 2003a) as well as unfavorable effects of 
negative NPV projects (Ball, 2001). Ball (2001, p. 139) explains that due to the fact that 
conservatism considers potential losses upfront ‘there is no incremental income penalty to 





thus enables capital providers to more easily identify negative NPV projects and hinders 
managerial overinvestment.  
Agency literature (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) argues that managerial risk taking behavior 
can induce a shareholder - bondholder conflict when managers are prone to invest in riskier 
projects with negative NPVs. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) reason that managers are less likely 
to invest in negative NPV projects serving as ‘trophy’ acquisitions when conservatism is 
applied and losses have to be recognized timely, hence within managers’ own tenure period. 
On the contrary, if losses can be deferred to future periods and thus passed on to subsequent 
managers, current managers are more prone to invest in negative NPV projects (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). Furthermore, such loss deferral to future periods incentivizes managers to 
continue investing in ex-post negative NPV projects. They thus avoid reporting losses due to 
project abandonment during their own tenure period (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Iyengar and 
Zampelli (2010) find that conservative accounting increases the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to accounting performance (i.e., earnings changes) because conservatism 
restrains the probability of managerial earnings manipulation improving the reliability of 
accounting performance measures. This allows companies to design compensation contracts 
that link managerial compensation more strongly to accounting performance.  
In summary, although prior arguments and findings are mixed, the prevalent reasoning in 
literature is that in a contracting setting, from a financial statement users’ perspective, benefits 
of accounting conservatism outweigh its costs. Especially lenders benefit from conservatism 
because it serves as a default-risk alarm in debt contract settings and reduces managerial 
earnings management (e.g., overinvestment in negative NPV projects) in compensation contract 
settings.  
The next chapter discusses benefits and costs of conservative accounting from an informational 
perspective. The corresponding insights are related to those provided by research focusing on 
the stewardship perspective.  
2.1.3.2 Informational Perspective 
Literature investigates if conservatism not only provides benefits to creditors (see the previous 
chapter) but also to equity-holders. Researchers examine conservatism from an informational 
valuation perspective complementing the more established contracting based explanation. The 
focus is to examine whether conservative accounting provides decision useful information to 





between investors and managers are presented, before second, presenting literature on the 
impact of conservative accounting on value relevance of accounting information provided to 
(potential) investors.  
2.1.3.2.1 Information Asymmetries  
From an investor’s perspective, decision useful reporting information enhances and facilitates 
valuation of investment opportunities (Beyer et al., 2010). Information asymmetries between 
company in- and outsiders reduce decision usefulness of accounting information for (potential) 
investors. This is for example the case when managers withhold valuation relevant information 
with the aim to avoid that potential investors restrain from investing in the respective company 
or that current investors sell their company stake. Agency conflicts are hence not only 
observable between managers and creditors but also between managers and equity capital 
providers. Under this perspective, informational benefits of accounting conservatism mainly 
stem from reduced information asymmetries between informed and uninformed parties (Kim 
and Pevzner, 2010).  
Based on private information, managers are tempted to overstate financial performance to 
maximize their own wealth to the detriment of shareholders (LaFond and Watts, 2008). LaFond 
and Watts (2008) describe conservatism as a governance mechanism helping to reduce 
managerial earnings management by implementing higher verification requirements for gains 
than losses leading to an increase in firm value. They find empirical evidence that information 
asymmetry is significantly positively associated with conditional conservatism. Following their 
interpretation, equity market participants demand conservatism in accounting to alleviate the 
negative effects of information asymmetries. Complementarily, García Lara et al. (2014) 
provide evidence that conservatism reduces information asymmetries between firm insiders and 
outsiders via limiting earnings management. Conservatism thus seems to mitigate managerial 
benefits derived from earnings management. Chen et al. (2007) develop a theoretical model 
showing that conservative reporting can reduce incentives for earnings management and hence 
reduces managerial biases in accounting information and disclosures. Guay and Verrecchia 
(2007) theorize that if managers commit to and credibly apply conditional conservatism they 
report negative realizations in a timely manner. According to the authors, managers also have 
strategic incentives (e.g., compensation related) to provide good news in time. Based on 
disclosure literature, people value a company at a discount in situations of uncertainty. Full 
disclosure can mitigate the applied valuation discount. A conservative reporting system coerces 





Conservatism can thus lead to full information disclosure resulting in higher firm prices. Hui et 
al. (2009) find a negative relation between conservatism and voluntary disclosure of financial 
information represented by the number of quantitative management earnings forecasts. They 
provide evidence that conservative accounting leads to a decrease in need to preempt bad news 
by voluntary disclosure (i.e., issuing a forecast). The authors state that their results lead to the 
assumption that conservatism can serve as a substitute of management forecasts by reducing 
information asymmetries in the market. Kim and Pevzner (2010) empirically confirm that 
higher levels of conditional conservatism are associated with lower levels of future negative 
news. The authors further analyze if the market perceives this relation as economically 
meaningful, in the sense that ‘the market rewards more conservative firms with more positive 
(less negative) reaction to good (bad) news earnings announcements’ (Kim and Pevzner, 2010, 
p. 312). However, they provide but only weak evidence for this prediction. 
Further literature finds that conservatism can mitigate negative market reactions to 
economically bad news by alleviating information asymmetries. Francis et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of both types of accounting conservatism on shareholder value. 
Investigating the financial crisis of the years 2007 and onwards, the authors empirically show 
that firms following a more conservative way of accounting prior to the crisis suffered less from 
losses in firm value than firms applying less conservative accounting methods (Francis et al., 
2013). The authors reason that information asymmetry between firm insiders and firm outsiders 
is especially high in times of a financial crisis because managers engage more in earnings 
management in situations of financial distress. Conservatism constrains managerial earnings 
management and thus leads to more reliable information for firm outsiders resulting in less 
value losses during periods of financial crisis. Accordingly, Jenkins et al. (2009) reason that the 
demand for accounting conservatism is higher during periods of economic recession due to an 
increasing uncertainty about future outcomes.  
Constrained earnings management in turn is beneficial for earnings quality. Prior research 
applies Basu’s (1997) measure of timely loss recognition to test for earnings quality7 (e.g., Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005). The Basu (1997) measure incorporates that economic losses are 
recognized timelier in financial reporting than economic gains. Timeliness of loss recognition 
(conservatism) is considered an attribute of earnings quality. In a survey study by Dichev et al. 
(2013), 59.28% of a subject sample of 169 CFOs think that the result from conservative 
recognition of assets and liabilities represents an important feature of high quality earnings. 
                                                 





Only 13.77% disagree to this statement. This is valid for both types of conservative accounting. 
‘One CFO emphasizes the traditional understanding of conservatism as a shield against 
uncertainty: “conservative accounting is the way to go because you have less of a worry when 
the market turns against you. You are better insulated against the unknown”’ (Dichev et al., 
2013, p. 15). 
Even though prior literature provides evidence that conservatism restricts earnings management 
(e.g., LaFond and Watts, 2008; Francis et al., 2013), there is conflicting evidence showing that 
conservatism is also applied for earnings management purposes. This is illustrated hereafter by 
referring to R&D accounting8. Under IAS 38, the capitalization of R&D expenditures is 
mandatory when certain criteria are met that jointly confirm the R&D project’s or product’s 
economic and technological feasibility.9 The application of these criteria demands managerial 
judgment and leaves space for discretion. On the one hand, discretion in accounting standards 
can reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside investors but on the other, it 
can also foster managerial opportunism (Healy and Palepu, 1993; 2001). In the context of 
capitalization of investments in intangibles there exists a trade-off between relevance and 
reliability of accounting information. Debt-contracts or management compensation contracts 
can generate incentives to commit earnings management via capitalizing R&D expenditures 
too early (cf. chapter 2.1.3.1). Markarian et al. (2008) find that managers use the capitalization 
of R&D expenditures for income smoothing purposes, thereby reducing earnings volatility. 
This finding shows that capitalization of R&D expenditures relates to earnings management 
purposes. Nevertheless, at the same time, it can enhance decision usefulness of the reported 
information by reducing the volatility of earnings thereby contributing to an increase in the 
predictability of future earnings. Dinh et al. (2016) document that R&D capitalization strongly 
relates to benchmark beating purposes, representing another type of earnings management. 
Their findings suggest that market participants associate capitalizing R&D with earnings 
management, leading to the application of valuation discounts. 
When earnings management is involved, the usefulness of reported information can decrease 
due to reduced reliability of the information provided. Correspondingly, researchers and 
standard setters favored expensing of R&D (i.e., unconditional conservatism) for a long time, 
because R&D activity and its future benefits are subject to high uncertainty. Kothari et al. 
(2002) confirm higher variability of earnings generated through R&D investments compared to 
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investments in property, plant and equipment. Based on their findings, the authors relate to the 
relevance-reliability trade-off in capitalizing R&D and argue that one could question the 
suitability of R&D expenditures for classifying as an asset due to the high uncertainty of future 
benefits. Amir et al. (2007) find confirming evidence that investments in R&D more strongly 
contribute to earnings variability than investments in physical assets – at least in R&D intensive 
industries. Dichev and Tang (2009) analyse the relation between earnings’ volatility and 
earnings’ predictability. Based on a prior paper (Dichev and Tang, 2008), they argue that poor 
matching of revenues and expenses increases earnings’ volatility. The authors further state that 
‘poor matching is also associated with poor earnings predictability because the matching noise 
in reported earnings obscures the underlying economic relation that governs the evolution of 
earnings over successive periods’ (Dichev and Tang, 2009, p. 162). In a R&D context, poor 
matching on the one hand could stem from mechanically expensing R&D although the 
expenditures actually qualify as assets or on the other from earnings management behaviour 
independent of the type of conservatism involved.  
Prior literature hence shows that conditional conservatism can serve as opportunistic earnings 
management via, e.g., capitalizing R&D expenditures for income smoothing or benchmark 
beating purposes. Unconditional conservatism has equal potential to support earnings 
management behavior because it can lead to reserves on the balance sheet (e.g., allowance for 
doubtful accounts) that can easily be converted into earnings when earnings targets have to be 
met (Jackson and Liu, 2010). Jackson and Liu (2010) argue that (stricter) limits of the amount 
by which firms are allowed to understate net assets may decrease this type of earnings 
management. The role of conservatism in limiting vs. enhancing earnings management and 
hence in affecting information asymmetries is thus unclear and context-dependent. 
Independent from earnings management, researchers criticize that the verification asymmetry 
for gains and losses applied under conservatism results in a persistent understatement of a firm’s 
balance sheet net assets. As described by Watts (2003a, p. 208), the effect of understating net 
asset values is one of the major objections to conservatism because it ‘can lead to overstatement 
of earnings in future periods by causing an understatement of future expenses’. Conservatism 
thus lowers information-quality (Penman and Zhang, 2002) and increases information 
asymmetry. Stakeholders may draw false conclusions from downwardly biased financial 
information. Conservatism thus results in inefficient decision making, inefficient resource 
allocation and reduced firm value (e.g., Penman and Zhang, 2002; Lev et al., 2005; Guay and 





because future positive firm prospects are concealed when accelerating bad news recognition 
and delaying good news recognition. Consistent with this reasoning, in the survey study 
conducted by Dichev et al. (2013), CFOs also question the usefulness of conservative 
accounting. One CFO stated that conservative accounting can lead to company misevaluation 
by investors: ‘in the absence of enough disclosure about conservative accounting, investors will 
undervalue our company as they cannot distinguish poor earnings from conservative earnings’ 
(Dichev et al., 2013, p. 15).  
This statement suggests that information disclosure plays an important role in supporting the 
usefulness of conservative reporting. Related literature argues that in a conservative accounting 
setting good news are often provided through other communication channels as, e.g., 
conference calls or press releases (Guay and Verecchia, 2007). Hence, to provide decision 
useful information to investors, managers could disclose them voluntarily when a timely 
recognition of gains in financial statements is not allowed due to a conservative accounting 
regime. In case of supportive voluntary disclosure, conservatism would again contribute to 
reduced information asymmetries.  
Nagar et al. (2016) theorize that in settings with lower information asymmetries the demand for 
conservative accounting should be lower. Kim et al. (2013) examine seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) and find that companies applying more conservatism have higher SEO announcement 
returns. Artiach and Clarkson (2014) document an inverse relation between conservatism and 
cost of equity capital that declines if the company’s information environment improves. These 
insights imply that investors value conservatism more in cases of higher information 
asymmetries. Francis et al. (2013) show that the impact of conservatism on firm value is more 
prominent for companies with poorer corporate governance and higher information risk. 
Literature examining the relation between different governance mechanisms and conservative 
accounting further supports the assumption that the demand for conservatism decreases with 
decreasing information asymmetry. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) find that conservatism is less 
prevalent in private companies. They reason that in the case of private firms the market does 
not extensively demand conservatism in accounting because information asymmetries are 
rather reduced by private communication than through financial reporting. Consistently, 
LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that conservatism is more prevalent in companies 
with higher information asymmetries, being mainly the case for public firms. Conservatism has 
also been found to be prevalent in companies with lower managerial ownership because lower 





(LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). The negative relation between managerial ownership and 
accounting conservatism suggests that corporate governance mechanisms and conservatism 
substitute each other. In contrast, García Lara et al. (2009) argue that adequate corporate 
governance mechanisms serve to better monitor a company’s management and are rather 
supported than substituted by conservative accounting. Stronger corporate governance should 
demand accelerated bad news recognition in earnings, i.e., an increase in conditional 
conservatism. The authors find confirming evidence. Although the empirical findings are 
contradictive, they consistently indicate that from an informational perspective conservatism 
seems to serve as a governance tool to monitor the respective company.  
2.1.3.2.2 Value Relevance 
From a valuation perspective, decision usefulness of accounting information is not only 
enhanced by reduced information asymmetries but also by increased relevance of the 
information provided. According to the IASB, relevance of accounting information is 
characterized by its predictive and/or confirmatory value (IASB, 2010, CF). The information 
provided should thus serve either to predict future outcomes or to reflect and confirm or change 
prior information or assumptions. Based on Basu (1997), the value relevance of conservatism 
is commonly examined by regressing accounting income on stock returns. It has been shown 
that conditional conservative information (earnings) has greater value relevance when news is 
bad than when it is good. A timely loss recognition leads to a stronger association between 
losses and stock returns as compared to gains. In times of good news, the value relevance of 
conditionally conservative earnings is weaker as gains are only recognized when they 
effectively occur.  
Unconditional conservatism is criticized for decreasing the value relevance of accounting 
information due to the up-front mismatch of costs and revenues. Researchers reason that by 
mechanically applying unconditional conservatism, companies deprive financial reporting 
users of value relevant information. This is found to be the case for immediately expensing 
R&D expenditures. Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that capitalizing R&D expenditures, 
representing an example of conditional conservatism, allows a better matching of costs and 
possible future returns, leading to reported earnings that better reflect a company’s 
performance, thus providing more information to shareholders. Capitalizing compared to 
expensing R&D expenditures allows managers to inform investors about expected future 
benefits of the respective project (Oswald and Zarowin, 2007). It offers the possibility to signal 





confirm value relevance of capitalized development expenditures (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis, 
1996; Lev, 2001; Healy et al., 2002; Ahmed and Falk, 2006). It is even suggested to capitalize 
‘all intangible investments with attributable benefits which have passed certain prespecified 
technological feasibility tests’ (Lev and Zarowin, 1999, p. 377).  
Findings by Luft and Shields (2001) support the assumption that the capitalization  
(i.e., conditional conservative) approach enhances decision usefulness of accounting 
information. In an experiment with M.B.A. and undergraduate students, the authors investigate 
the effect of capitalizing vs. expensing investments in quality improvement programs on the 
accuracy of individuals’ earnings forecasts. The authors found that individuals are not able to 
see through the dynamics of these investments. Subjects’ earnings predictions were more 
accurate, more consistent and of more consensus in the capitalization than in the expense 
condition. Even after having learned the expense-return relation via a learning data set, 
individuals were not able to allocate the expenses in intangibles with their future returns 
appropriately. These findings suggest that from a user perspective capitalizing intangibles’ 
expenditures instead of expensing them improves the explanatory power of the accounting 
information provided. 
On the one hand, unconditional conservatism might lower accounting discretion and thereby 
enhance the reliability of the information provided. On the other hand, limited discretion might 
lead to limited timeliness and reduced relevance of the information provided due to a mismatch 
of revenues and expenses insufficiently reflecting a company’s underlying economics. 
Empirical evidence is mixed. In their empirical analysis on the association between 
unconditional conservatism and value relevance, Balachandran and Mohanram (2011) do not 
find evidence that unconditional conservatism reduces value relevance of accounting 
information.  
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) examine the impact of conservative accounting on current 
earnings’ ability to predict future cash flows versus future earnings (i.e., earnings’ persistence). 
Their study provides insights on how conservatism is linked to a trade-off between relevant and 
reliable accounting information. Consistent with Kim and Kross (2005), earnings are 
considered as relevant if they have predictive value for forecasting future cash flows. Based on 
Richardson et al. (2005), earnings persistence is considered as a proxy for reliability of 
accounting information. If accounting accruals are biased by measurement error, this bias will 
translate into measurement error in the earnings measurement process leading to a lower 





prior findings by Kim and Kross (2005) and Richardson et al. (2005), Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2010) argue that conditional conservatism enhances cash flow predictability, which means that 
conditional conservative information is value relevant. At the same time, conditional 
conservatism is assumed to decrease earnings predictability, which is a sign for lower reliability 
of conditional conservative accounting information due to measurement error. In contrast, 
unconditional conservatism is commonly considered to enhance reliability of accounting 
information. While their reasoning focuses on conditional conservatism, the authors admit that 
in their empirical analyses they are not able to clearly separate conditional from unconditional 
conservatism. Hence, their results presumably capture the effects of both types of conservatism. 
In summary, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010) find that, on the one hand, conservatism contributes 
to a decrease in earnings usefulness due to its negative impact on accounting information 
reliability, but, on the other hand, it leads to an increase in the relevance of accounting 
information.  
Related literature confirms the negative association between conditional conservatism and 
earnings persistence (Chen et al., 2014). Richardson et al. (2005) further show that less reliable 
accruals contribute to lower earnings persistence. A decrease in earnings persistence can have 
economic consequences. Investors are not able to anticipate this effect leading to securities 
mispricing. Based on these findings, opponents criticize conservatism for contributing to a 
decrease in earnings usefulness due to its conflicting effects on earnings persistence and future 
cash flow predictability.   
In summary, prior literature provides mixed evidence on the value relevance of conservative 
accounting information. In general, the overview on benefits and costs of conservatism for 
financial statement users shows that the usefulness of conservative accounting strongly depends 
on the type of conservatism applied, the setting and the respective users’ requirements. As Ruch 
and Taylor (2015) assume, the different operationalization of conservative accounting applied 
in empirical studies could also be responsible for the mixed and partially conflicting results. 
Nevertheless, the literature on conservatism provides several reasons why this concept is deeply 
rooted in financial accounting. If financial statement users benefit from accounting 
conservatism, they will probably acknowledge its application, which in turn benefits the 
companies applying conservative accounting themselves as is described in the next chapter.  
2.1.4 Economic Effects of Accounting Conservatism for Financial Statement Preparers 
Several researchers find that the use of conservatism influences companies’ cost of equity and 





by limiting earnings management leading to more reliable information disclosure (cf. chapter 
2.1.3.2.1). If investors perceive a reduced information risk, they may acknowledge the 
application of conservative accounting by providing capital at a lower cost. The required rate 
of return on the invested equity capital should hence be lower. Several authors empirically 
confirm a negative relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital  
(e.g., García Lara et al., 2011; Artiach and Clarkson, 2014; García Lara et al., 2014). Other 
papers find mixed results. Chan et al. (2009) provide confirming evidence for unconditional 
conservatism leading to a decrease in cost of equity capital but find opposite results for 
conditional conservatism. The authors reason that conditional conservatism provides more 
managerial discretion and hence more space for earnings management leading to higher cost of 
equity capital. Biddle et al. (2016) also document that conditional conservatism is positively 
related to cost of equity capital. They argue that conditional conservatism results in greater 
precision about bad news decreasing expected payoffs and hence increasing cost of equity 
capital. They further reason that conditional conservatism can increase information asymmetry 
among analysts and investors by ‘inducing unexpected negative information shocks’ (Biddle et 
al., 2016, p. 70) also leading to higher cost of equity capital. They provide evidence that the 
positive relation between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital can be mitigated 
by governance mechanisms as the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 whose 
regulations decreased information asymmetries between parties.  
As explained earlier, Ahmed et al. (2002) document that conservatism mitigates agency 
conflicts between bondholders and shareholders by limiting disproportionate dividend 
payments to shareholders. They show that this mechanism leads to lower cost of debt. 
Regarding agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders, Zhang (2008) finds that 
conservatism serves lenders by accelerating signals of debt covenant violation. In this context, 
lenders acknowledge the application of conservatism by offering lower interest rates, thus lower 
cost of debt. Brockman et al. (2015) document a positive association between CEO 
compensation risk and borrowing costs. If CEO compensation is at high risk, CEOs will more 
easily engage in risk-seeking behavior, as, for instance, investing in high risk projects. This 
behavior could increase the problem of asset substitution between debtholders and 
shareholders. The application of conservative accounting reduces the positive relation between 
CEO compensation risk and cost of debt because conservatism reduces managerial 
overinvestment in negative NPV projects and is thus perceived ‘as a risk-reducing mechanism’ 





Prior literature further shows that conservatism can result in inefficient analyst forecasting and 
company mispricing, which negatively affects the reporting company itself because in these 
cases stakeholders commonly demand higher cost of capital. García Lara et al. (2014) find that 
increases in conservatism that lead to decreases in information asymmetries are associated with 
more accurate and less dispersed analyst forecasts and more analyst following. Li (2008) shows 
that unconditional conservatism decreases analyst forecast errors in the case of good or mild 
bad news cases whereas it increases forecast errors in settings of extreme bad news. Mensah et 
al. (2004) find evidence that unconditional conservatism increases the absolute value of analyst 
forecast error and dispersion. Results are weaker when applying alternative conservatism 
measures (e.g., level of prior period accruals) which more likely capture conditional 
conservatism. Other studies find that analysts make optimistically biased and hence inefficient 
forecasts based on conditionally conservative information (e.g., Pae and Thornton, 2010; Louis 
et al., 2014). As shown by Louis et al. (2014), especially unsophisticated analysts are subject 
to this optimistic bias due to a lack of understanding of accounting conservatism and its impact 
on earnings. Literature reasons that a positive relation between (conditional) conservatism and 
analyst forecast error presumably stems from the fact that conservatism can increase 
information asymmetry and generate divergent opinions between capital market participants 
(Biddle et al., 2016).  
Conservatism also influences firms’ investment efficiency. Ahmed and Duellmann (2011) 
reason that if conservatism reduces managerial incentives to invest in negative NPV projects, 
companies applying conservative accounting should show higher future profitability. They find 
confirming evidence. Accordingly, García Lara et al. (2016) provide evidence that 
conservatism induces prudent and discourages risky investments, which decreases the 
investment related risk of insolvency. In this context, conservatism addresses creditors’ 
requirements facilitating a company’s access to debt and simultaneously enhances firms’ 
investment efficiency.  
In summary, conservatism not only provides benefits and costs for financial statement users but 
also for the reporting company itself. Although conservatism is still deeply rooted in 
international financial accounting standards and has been shown to provide benefits to different 
parties, nowadays, the concept is put under question. Conservative earnings behavior in one 
year can lead to non-conservative earnings behavior in following years (Beaver, 1998), biasing 
accounting information. Relatedly, researchers as Lev et al. (2005), Guay and Verrecchia 





by financial statement users. Standard setters want financial reports to provide decision useful 
information to all stakeholders, especially ‘potential investors, lenders and other creditors’ 
(IASB, 2010, CF OB2). The IASB shares the view that conservatism leads to downwardly 
biased reporting and conceals true performance conflicting with their aim to provide neutral 
decision useful information through the IFRS (IASB, 2008, CF ED BC2.21). ‘Today, the 
emphasis on objective and fair presentation and the primacy of the investor as user has lessened 
the reliance on conservatism’ (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004, p. 227). Standard setters have given 
preference to neutral accounting rules. Accounting neutrality aims at providing an unbiased, 
symmetric view of a company’s current net assets. This concept is presented in more detail in 
the next chapter.  
2.2 Neutrality of Accounting Information 
Financial reporting under IFRS aims at offering decision useful information to financial 
reporting users to enable them to make adequate decisions about ‘providing resources to the 
entity’ (IASB, 2010, CF OB2). International standard setters specify certain qualitative criteria 
that are necessary to ensure decision usefulness of the information reported in the Conceptual 
Framework to the IFRS (IASB, 2010, CF Chapter 3). Neutrality of the information provided 
represents one of these requirements (IASB, 2010, CF QC12; IASB, 2015, CF ED 2.15).  
The concept of neutrality demands accounting information to be objective and free from 
subjective biases. Under neutrality, the information is in no way, neither regarding selection of 
the information nor regarding its presentation, manipulated or biased to influence users’ 
information perceptions or their behavior (IASB, 2010, CF QC14). ‘Neutrality, in this context, 
refers to the absence of bias in the presentation of accounting information or reports’ (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004, p. 231). However, neutrality does not mean that the information does not have 
any influence on addresses’ judgment and decision making behavior because only in the case 
neutral information changes addressees’ decisions the information is relevant: ‘relevant 
financial information is, by definition, capable of making a difference in users’ decisions’ 
(IASB, 2010, CF QC14). The crucial point is that this change in behavior is not deliberately 
influenced by the reporting entity.  
Neutrality combined with the enhancing qualitative characteristic ‘timeliness’ of accounting 
information (IASB, 2010, CF QC29; IASB, 2015, CF ED 2.32) implies symmetric timely 
recognition of gains and losses. Symmetric accounting aims at correctly estimating current 
performance. Assets and liabilities hence neither should be overvalued nor undervalued (IASB, 





for financial instruments (cf. IAS 39) is an example of neutral accounting. The fair value is ‘the 
price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date’ (IASB, 2011, IFRS 13, Appendix A). 
Book values are written down if assets lose value and written up if asset value increases. Thus, 
theoretically, neutral (i.e., fair value) accounting reflects the true current economic value of the 
respective financial asset or liability. 
From a conceptual point of view, neutral accounting should lead to a correct estimation of 
current performance by recognizing gains and losses symmetrically. As stated by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), a timely recognition of both economic gains and losses implies a higher 
association between book and market values. Neutral accounting aims at shrinking the gap 
between book and market values to enhance relevance and decision usefulness of accounting 
information, being the main argument supporting the application of fair value accounting 
compared to historical cost accounting (Hitz, 2007; Barth, 2014). As explained earlier, 
conservatism, in contrast to neutrality, treats gains and losses asymmetrically by considering 
potential losses up-front potentially leading to downwardly biased accounting information. 
Following this logic, the opposite of conservative accounting would be ‘progressive’ 
accounting. In this case, potential gains would be realized up-front whereas losses would only 
be considered when they occur.  
Accounting information can be relevant to the capital market in different ways: researchers 
commonly distinguish between valuation relevance and forecasting relevance of accounting 
information (e.g., Lindemann, 2006). Prior research documents that fair value estimates of 
financial instruments are value relevant to investors for valuing companies’ and especially 
banks’ equity (e.g., Barth, 1994; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Graham et. al., 2003; Ahmed 
et al., 2006; Song et al., 2010). Fair values are hence associated with stock prices. Financial 
instruments have been one of the first asset categories accounted for at fair value under national 
standards and the IFRS due to the availability of market prices for this asset type. Therefore, 
fair value research has put a focus on financial instruments and the banking sector. The 
application of fair value accounting for non-financial assets is still more restricted in financial 
standards but continues to expand. Prior research related to non-financial assets also provides 
evidence for value relevance of asset measurement at fair value (e.g., Barth and Clinch, 1998; 
Aboody et al., 1999; Paik, 2009). Besides value relevance, several studies also document 
forecasting relevance (i.e., predictive ability) of fair value information in the banking sector 





shows that fair value accounting can cause volatility in performance indicators due to, e.g., 
managerial discretion and market volatility (e.g., Hodder et al., 2006; Song, 2015) reducing 
accounting information’s usefulness for company valuation and forecasting purposes.  
Hence, neutral accounting also entails weaknesses. Symmetric accounting can lead to the 
recognition of unrealized gains and losses. It can only produce neutral and objective accounting 
information under the condition that the particular asset or liability is valued objectively. 
However, existing scope for discretion in fair value as an example of neutral accounting can 
provoke biased information and hence distort its reliability. This could be the case when market 
values are missing (i.e., level 1 or level 2 fair values) and cost or capital-value oriented methods 
build the basis for the valuation of an asset or liability at fair value (i.e., level 3 fair values).10 
These valuation methods can include subjective biases when an estimation of, e.g., tax rates or 
future cash flows by managers is necessary. If fair values are not based on market values they 
are hardly verifiable (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Barth, 2007). Fair value accounting 
thus offers opportunities for opportunistic behavior (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Nissim, 
2003; Ramanna, 2008; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). Song et al. (2010) as well as Goh et al. 
(2015) provide evidence that mark-to-market fair values (level 1 and level 2 fair values) have a 
higher value relevance than mark-to-model fair values (level 3 fair values). This suggests that 
the perceived reliability of level 1 and level 2 fair values is higher compared to level 3 fair 
values. However, the value relevance of level 3 fair values increases with increasing corporate 
governance mechanisms such as, e.g., board independence (Song et al., 2010). 
In summary, prior literature shows that although neutral accounting can enhance relevance of 
accounting information, it simultaneously can decrease its reliability due to measurement 
uncertainties. Despite the described weaknesses and the trade-off between relevance and 
reliability in fair value accounting, the current trend in standard setting focuses on neutral 
accounting. This trend has already become apparent during the last 30 years with the balance 
sheet orientation of international standard setters (Dichev, 2008). Dichev (2008) explains that 
the central element of the balance sheet based approach in financial reporting (as opposed to 
the income statement approach) is a proper valuation of assets and liabilities. Earnings are hence 
determined by changes in asset value over a certain period. Fair value is considered as an 
extreme form of the balance sheet based approach followed by international standard setters 
(Dichev, 2008). The current standard setting focus on neutral accounting also manifests itself 
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in the specification of the qualitative characteristics of accounting information that changed 
during the revision process of the conceptual framework to the IFRS. In an older version of the 
framework (IASB, 1989) prudence (often used interchangeably with conservatism) and 
neutrality have both been argued to be qualitative characteristics of decision useful information. 
To address the trade-off between prudence and neutrality, the IASB removed prudence from 
the framework in 2010. This decision gave rise to intense criticism. In response to these 
critiques, the IASB reintegrated prudence in the exposure draft to the newest revision of the 
conceptual framework from 2015 (IASB, 2015, CF ED 2.18). The next chapter describes these 
developments and presents the current debate on prudent (conservative) versus neutral 
accounting from an IFRS framework perspective in more detail.  
2.3 Current Debate on Conservative vs. Neutral Accounting from an IFRS 
Framework Perspective  
The IFRS conceptual framework serves as a conceptual basis for international accounting 
standards. In the 2015 exposure draft of the revised conceptual framework, the IASB describes 
the framework as a ‘practical tool that assists the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) to develop Standards that are based on consistent concepts’ (IASB, 2015, CF ED, p. 6). 
Thus, the framework should help the IASB to target and consistently follow specified concepts 
when developing new and revising existing accounting standards. The framework also 
constitutes an interpretation and guiding aid for preparers of financial reports when applying 
the IFRS (IASB, 2010, CF). Overall, the framework is considered an important cornerstone for 
high quality financial reporting and standard setting (Financial Reporting Council, 2014).  
The underlying qualitative characteristics of decision useful accounting information form one 
part of the framework. Within the revision process of the framework, the qualitative 
characteristics have changed over time. In the ancient conceptual framework from 1989 that 
got under the responsibility of the IASB in 2001, two primary fundamental qualitative 
characteristics of reporting information were specified: ‘relevance’ and ‘reliability’ (IASB, 
2001, CF 26, 31). In this version of the framework, ‘prudence’ and ‘neutrality’ were explicitly 
mentioned as reliability enhancing characteristics (IASB, 2001, CF 36, 37). In 2010, IASB and 
FASB presented a revised joint Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting and introduced 
‘relevance’ and ‘faithful representation’ as the two fundamental principles of decision useful 
accounting information (IASB, 2010, CF QC4). Relevant information is defined as information 
able to change addressees’ decisions (IASB, 2010, CF QC6). To achieve a faithful 





(IASB, 2010, CF QC12). ‘Comparability’, ‘verifiability’, ‘timeliness’ and ‘understandability’ 
are classified as enhancing characteristics that are required to ensure decision usefulness of 
financial reporting information (IASB, 2010, CF QC19).  
In 2010, reliability was replaced by the qualitative characteristic faithful representation. 
According to the IASB, faithful representation includes the intent and meaning of reliability. 
That is why this fundamental principle, although not named explicitly, is argued to be 
nevertheless still considered (IASB, 2006, CF DP BC2.28). A further far-reaching change 
applied in 2010 was the removal of prudence from the framework. In the ancient framework 
from 1989, prudence was defined as ‘the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the 
judgments needed in making the estimates required under conditions of uncertainty, such that 
assets or income are not overstated and liabilities or expenses are not understated’ (IASB, 2001, 
CF 37). As a result, reported information should be prudent in situations of uncertainty as well 
as neutral in the sense that assets and liabilities are neither over- nor undervalued. Furthermore, 
prudence should lead to an appropriate consideration of uncertainty to enhance the reliability 
of accounting information. Following this logic, prudence does not lead to or favor a deliberate 
up-front undervaluation of net assets (as it could be the case when applying conservatism, cf. 
chapter 2.1.1). As stated by EFRAG (2013) a common understanding of prudence is consistent 
to conservative accounting: gains should only be recognized when realized whereas potential 
losses should be considered immediately when they become apparent. The terms conservatism 
and prudence have commonly been used interchangeably (Barker, 2015). Hence, conservatism 
is one way to cope with uncertainty and does not necessarily imply a deliberate undervaluation 
of assets or overvaluation of liabilities. Nevertheless, departing from the definition of prudence 
in the framework from 1989, ‘conservatism is not a qualitative characteristic of accounting 
information’ (Barth, 2008, p. 1167).  
Although prudence does not mean to deliberately undervalue assets or overvalue liabilities, 
international standard setters think that it is probable that prudence will lead to biased 
information in situations of uncertainty if an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses is 
applied. The IASB states that a ‘biased understatement of assets (or overstatement of liabilities) 
in one period frequently leads to overstating financial performance in later periods – a result 
that cannot be described as prudent. This is inconsistent with neutrality, which encompasses 
freedom from bias’ (IASB, 2008, CF ED BC2.21). Hans Hoogervorst (2012), the chairman of 
the IASB, argues that prudence (in the sense of conservatism) could even induce earnings 





purposes, e.g., in times of an economic downturn. Standard setters seem to focus on the 
informational (valuation) perspective of accounting information to support efficient resource 
allocation whereas the stewardship perspective is neglected (Göx and Wagenhofer, 2010). 
Against this background, neutral accounting is said to provide information that is more useful 
to stakeholders and that better increases accounting transparency compared to prudent 
accounting. To address the tradeoff between neutrality and prudence as qualitative 
characteristics of reporting information, IASB and FASB eliminated prudence from their joint 
conceptual framework in 2010.  
The removal of prudence from the framework gave rise to intense criticism from research and 
practice (Crump, 2013). This critique builds on the reasoning that prudence is related to 
conservative accounting in situations of uncertainty (considering potential losses up-front is 
considered a prudent behavior). Researchers theorize that if conservatism would only be 
beneficial for (debt) contracting purposes, there would be no need to integrate conservatism in 
financial statements because financial statement users could adjust neutral accounting 
statements for debt contracting purposes via, e.g., debt covenants (e.g., Kothari et al., 2010). 
However, it has been shown that conservatism is also beneficial from an informational 
perspective via, e.g., increased investment efficiency (e.g., García Lara et al., 2016; cf. chapter 
2.1.3.2). This evidence speaks against eliminating prudence in the sense of conservatism from 
accounting frameworks due to potential undesired economic consequences (García Lara et al., 
2014; 2016).  
Further literature provides hints that instead of distorting information, conservatism (prudence) 
can also enhance neutrality of accounting information. This is the case when an unknown bias 
introduced by managers (i.e., managers’ opportunism) applying neutral accounting is offset by 
a known bias introduced by conservative accounting (Chen et al., 2007; Gao, 2013). 
‘Surprisingly, adding one type of bias can reduce the other so much that the total equilibrium 
amount of noise in the accounting system is diminished’ (Chen et al., 2007, p. 560). As Gao 
(2013) argues even if neutrality is the optimal characteristic of financial reports from a decision 
usefulness perspective, the optimal accounting rule to enhance neutral financial reporting is 
conservative against the background of managerial opportunism. Researchers criticize the 
IASB for not having sufficiently considered economic reasons for the existence of prudence 
(conservatism) (especially from bondholders’ point of view) when having removed it from the 
framework (e.g., Beinsen and Wagenhofer, 2013; Financial Reporting Council, 2014; Gebhardt 





European Union if the board does not reintegrate prudence into the framework (Wagenhofer, 
2014). Conversely, Barth (2008) argues that the conservative bias in financial reports mainly 
stems from the fact that accounting standards have not yet been released from their traditional 
bias and are still inconsistent with the framework: ‘Conservative bias is not the result of 
attempts to achieve an objective of conservatism in the framework’ (Barth, 2008, p. 1167).  
The IASB initially did not depart from their decision to eliminate prudence from the framework 
and claimed that prudence remains vital and visible in the different standards (Hoogervorst, 
2012). Opponents argue that exactly for this reason it is important to reintegrate prudence in 
the framework which serves as a conceptual basis for consistent standards and should contain 
all applied concepts (e.g., Beinsen and Wagenhofer, 2013; Gebhardt et al., 2014). In response 
to an increasing number of critiques, the IASB changed its view and reintegrated prudence in 
the exposure draft of the revised conceptual framework from May 2015 – but the definition of 
prudence changed (Wagenhofer, 2014). This time, standard setters conceptually link prudence 
to neutrality instead of highlighting the trade-off between these concepts: ‘Neutrality is 
supported by the exercise of prudence. Prudence is the exercise of caution when making 
judgments under conditions of uncertainty’ (IASB, 2015, CF ED 2.18). In situations of 
judgment under uncertainty, users should thus apply cautious prudence, which is considered to 
support neutrality of accounting information. Nevertheless, standard setters still judge the 
concept of asymmetric prudence as not being compatible with neutral accounting. Asymmetric 
prudence is still excluded from the framework because it leads to current under- or 
overvaluation of assets and liabilities to the benefit of future performance (IASB, 2015, CF ED 
2.18).  
Comment letters addressing the 2015 exposure draft relate to arguments that have already been 
put forward in answer to the removal of prudence from the framework in 2010. Some parties 
support the argumentation by the IASB that only cautious prudence should be reintegrated in 
the framework to support neutrality while asymmetric prudence needs to be excluded for 
biasing information downward. Other parties argue that also asymmetric prudence should be 
part of the framework due to its embeddedness in the standards as well as its positive economic 
effects (from both a stewardship and an informational perspective, e.g., diminishing managerial 
optimism and limiting earnings management).11 The IASB currently works on their final 
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version of the revised conceptual framework. It remains to be seen if this final version can 
satisfy all parties.  
In summary, the discussion on conservatism versus neutrality in accounting is still ongoing. It 
remains unclear if the different parties will ever conclude about one concept clearly 
outperforming the other. As stated by Whittington (2008), it is probably necessary to select the 
appropriate concept situationally. Applying one universal measurement method appears 
‘fruitless’ (Whittington, 2008, p. 139). When looking at the most widely discussed arguments 
pro and contra conservatism or neutrality in accounting, it is striking that the discussed 
arguments mainly or even only relate to ‘external’ factors as, e.g., contracting purposes and 
valuation issues. This could be explained by the fact that the currently ruling constellation of 
institutional settings or the arrangement of contracts demand a certain way of reporting (neutral 
versus conservative) to be efficient and to enhance social welfare. However, accounting rules 
and regulations do not only stem from institutional settings. ‘Businesses chose conservative 
accounting in a time before a centralized authority set formal standards for accounting practices, 
which suggests that conservatism was derived from repeated transactions and functioned as a 
norm of behavior among business firms’ (Dickhaut, 2009, p. 1705).  
Being evolutionary stable strategies, many concepts governing today date back to long ago and 
developed through human evolution. As argued in prior research, also conservatism seems to 
be an evolutionary stable strategy based on brain functions and individuals’ endogenous 
preferences (Dickhaut, 2009; Nagar et al., 2016). Up to now, researchers have hardly considered 
such ‘intrinsic’ factors in the debate on conservatism vs. neutrality in accounting even though 
individuals might have endogenous preferences for neutral or conservative accounting (which 
can be unconscious). This thesis aims to enrich the current debate by analyzing individuals’ 
endogenous preferences for conservative vs. neutral accounting in an experimental study. The 
corresponding stream of literature providing a theoretical basis for this study is presented in the 
next chapter.  
2.4 Individuals’ Endogenous Preferences for Conservatism in Accounting  
Literature linking the development of accounting standards to human behavioral biases, 
especially loss aversion, provides hints for individuals having an intrinsic preference for 
conservatism. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) theorize that people dislike being disappointed and 
thus find conservatism appealing because it reduces the probability of future negative surprises. 
This chapter deals with individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism in accounting 





As explained in chapter 2.1.2, the capital market literature on conservatism differentiates 
between unconditional and conditional conservatism with unconditional conservatism being the 
stronger type of conservative accounting. In contrast, literature on individuals’ endogenous 
preferences for conservatism in accounting does not explicitly differentiate between the two 
existing types. These studies rather consider conservatism as an accounting concept that is a 
prudent reaction to uncertainty characterized by an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses 
(e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009; Nagar et al., 2016). The asymmetric treatment of gains and 
losses is the corner stone addressing individuals’ loss aversion and generating individuals’ 
endogenous preferences for conservative accounting (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). Both forms 
of accounting conservatism treat gains and losses asymmetrically and lead to an understatement 
of current net assets to the benefit of future performance in times of uncertainty (Watts, 2003a). 
Therefore, literature on human endogenous preferences for conservatism considers the concept 
in its entirety. The same approach is followed in the up-coming chapters by focusing on 
conservatism as a whole being a prudent reaction to uncertainty (Sunder, 1997; Watts, 2003a; 
Raith, 2009) without further distinguishing between the two existing types.  
2.4.1 Conservatism explained by the Psychological Attraction Approach 
Thinking about accounting concepts, the question arises if accounting rules are always created 
based on rational deliberations. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) doubt perfect rationality behind 
the development of accounting rules and introduce the ‘psychological attraction approach’ to 
accounting and disclosure rules: ‘The psychological attraction approach holds that heuristics 
and biases in judgments and decisions have shaped and continue to shape accounting rules and 
policy’ (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009, p. 1067). The approach to consider psychological 
phenomena when analyzing the development of existing as well as new accounting rules adds 
to and does not necessarily replace positive accounting research as the authors themselves 
underline in their paper. 
Analyzing accounting conservatism from a psychological attraction approach perspective, 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) explain its attractiveness with the fact that people do not like being 
disappointed or negatively surprised. Accounting measurement and recognition requires 
making forecasts of the future. The fact that assets are defined as future benefits already shows 
that each asset is an estimation of the future. Under conservatism, accounting numbers are 
biased in a way not to disappoint as the following brief example illustrates. In accounting, 
forecasts often play a role in situations of uncertainty. This could for example be the case when 





expenditures leave space for discretion and demand forecasts of the future. A positive 
development of a R&D project can hardly be guaranteed, but it can be predicted. Nevertheless, 
the risk of failure, which would materialize in form of asset impairment, remains present. 
Conservative reporting in the form of expensing instead of capitalizing R&D expenditures 
reduces the risk of future disappointment because potential future losses are considered upfront 
and impairments are avoided.12 People who do not like being disappointed thus ‘should find the 
principle of conservative reporting attractive’ (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009, p. 1074). Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2009) state that individuals do not necessarily know why they find conservatism 
appealing. Preference for conservatism can hence be an unconscious phenomenon. 
Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan (2012) develop a theoretical model showing that it is 
individuals’ intrinsic characteristic ‘prudence’ that demands conservatism – independent of 
individuals’ risk aversion. They define accounting systems as conditionally conservative ‘if 
they produce finer information at lower earnings levels’. Conditionally liberal accounting 
systems, in contrast, ‘produce finer information at higher earnings levels’ (Kirschenheiter and 
Ramakrishnan, 2012, p. 3). The authors measure prudence as the decision maker’s sensitivity 
to risk expressed by his saving decisions. Their main results are that prudent decision makers 
prefer conservative accounting systems while less prudent decision makers prefer liberal 
accounting systems (Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan, 2012). Furthermore, the authors find 
that risk aversion alone cannot explain the demand for conservatism. The important driver 
seems to be prudence.  
This evidence contributes to the psychological attraction approach. Individuals’ endogenous 
characteristics as loss aversion and prudence seem to drive their demand for conservative 
accounting. This reasoning is supported by literature that deals with the development of 
accounting concepts from a human evolution perspective. This stream of literature is presented 
in the following chapter.  
2.4.2 Conservatism as a Result of Human Evolution 
Accounting rules and regulations do not appear from nowhere but are manufactured. The 
development of accounting and its concepts comes along with the evolution of human beings 
and their social structures (Basu and Waymire, 2006). Human evolution is characterized by the 
development of evolutionary stable behavioral strategies that are superior over mutant strategies 
and prevailed until today (Smith and Price, 1973; Nagar et al., 2016). The functioning of the 
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human brain influences these stable strategies. As described by Kahneman (2012), the human 
brain applies two different ways of thinking: ‘fast and slow’. Kahneman (2012) refers to these 
two ways of thinking as System 1 and System 2 of the brain. In System 1, the human brain 
reacts to situations or problems with subconscious emotions as for example fear as a primary 
automatic and quick response. This System works with very little to no further mental effort or 
voluntary control. These more basic emotions elicited in System 1 transform into feelings that 
pass over to System 2. In System 2, these feelings as well as other situational aspects are 
processed in a slower, more conscious and rational way to solve the problem faced or to react 
to situational circumstances. Evolution has apparently selected this brain structure and its 
functioning that is still present today (Nagar et al., 2016). Hence, these brain systems influenced 
individuals’ preferences for resources and their corresponding behavior in the past and 
nowadays affect human behavior in modern (financial) markets (Kahneman, 2012).  
Conservatism is one accounting concept that resulted from and co-developed with human 
evolution and prevailed until today. In the following two subchapters, first, insights on 
individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative accounting gained from prior literature 
on record keeping and human brain behavior are described before, in a second step, presenting 
game theory based reflections on an evolutionary risk basis for individuals’ preferences for 
conservative accounting.  
2.4.2.1 Record Keeping and Human Brain Behavior 
Basu and Waymire (2006) link the development of record keeping and accounting to human 
evolution. They theorize ‘recordkeeping is a culturally evolved institution that enables complex 
economic interaction and plays an integral and pervasive role in human evolution. More 
specifically, [the authors] hypothesize that systematic recordkeeping outside an individual brain 
is a necessary condition for the emergence of extended economic cooperation that ultimately 
leads to complex human societies, markets, and economic organizations’ (Basu and Waymire, 
2006, p. 202). As reasoned by the authors, the capacity limit of the human brain for memorizing 
and tracking transactions, as, e.g., the exchange of goods led to the development of external 
tools facilitating an institutionalized memory of past exchanges. The authors advance the view 
that accounting represents one of these external tools that has co-evolved and still continues to 
co-evolve with the development of the human brain as well as institutions like law systems.  
Basu and Waymire’s (2006) view of causality between current accounting regulations and 
companies’ structures differs from the traditional perspective that stakeholders demand certain 





Zimmerman, 1986; Christensen and Demski, 2003). Basu and Waymire (2006) rather assume 
a two-way causality in the sense that not only users demand specific accounting rules for, e.g., 
stewardship purposes (e.g., Watts, 2003a) but also modern-life accounting only exists in its 
current form due to record keeping techniques developed through human evolution. When 
humans started living in groups and later on built agricultural settlements, trade and economic 
exchange increased. To enable coordination of trade and exchange of goods within these 
groups, economic institutions like record keeping evolved and persisted until today serving as 
tools that enhance human welfare. Modern civilization still builds on these institutions 
developed in the past that are not stable but culturally evolving over time (Basu and Waymire, 
2006). 
Dickhaut et al. (2010) extend the reasoning by Basu and Waymire (2006) and relate the 
evolution of accounting principles especially to the evolution of the human brain. They theorize 
that the way the human brain evaluates (past) economic exchange influenced the development 
of certain accounting principles that have particularly been created in the aim to enhance such 
evaluation of (past) transactions. The authors analyze parallels between accounting principles 
and human brain behavior in situations of economic decision making. They define accounting 
principles as ‘guides to behavior that are substantially broader than norms. Principles can be 
either designed or inferred from evolved practices; [the authors’] primary focus concerns 
evolved accounting principles that result from human action but not necessarily human design’ 
(Dickhaut et al., 2010, p. 232). Waymire (2014) takes a similar view. He states that ‘ultimate 
causation’ for accounting principles stems from human evolution and hence fundamental 
human behavior (Waymire, 2014, p. 2015). This fundamental behavior manifests itself in social 
norms (e.g., fairness) that developed through human evolution and turned out to be evolutionary 
stable strategies for enhancing social welfare. Accounting is considered as having been created 
in accordance with humans’ moral conduct as a tool to support exchange transactions and hence 
increase social welfare (Dickhaut et al., 2010; Waymire, 2014).  
One example of the theorized link between accounting principles and human brain functions is 
the concept of conservatism (Dickhaut et al., 2010). Conservative reporting leads to a timelier 
recognition of losses compared to gains (Basu, 1997), that is, gains and losses are treated 
asymmetrically. The human brain seems to be more sensitive to potential losses than gains. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) analyze human decision making behavior under uncertainty and 
bring together their findings in a behavioral model called Prospect Theory.13 They provide 
                                                 





evidence that in situations of decision making under uncertainty losses loom larger than gains. 
Losing a certain amount of money creates much more harm than gaining the same amount of 
money creates pleasure. Neuroscience research provides the opportunity to examine brain 
functioning in situations of economic decision making and hence enables researchers to shed 
more light on the development and functioning of accounting (Waymire, 2014). Research in 
the field of neuroeconomics and especially neuroaccounting indicates that the human brain 
function and the concept of conservatism have similar patterns. Relatedly, several neurological 
studies show that the human brain responds differently to financial gains and losses. Breiter et 
al. (2001) investigate human neural responses related to anticipation and experience of 
monetary gains and losses via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The authors 
found a differential neural activity regarding gains and losses. In a gain context, the 
predominant neural responses to the stimuli were observed in the right brain hemisphere 
whereas in a loss context, predominant neural responses were located in the left brain 
hemisphere. Relatedly, Knutson et al. (2003) provide evidence that monetary gains and losses 
are processed differently by the brain. Using fMRI, the authors find that monetarily rewarding 
outcomes trigger activation of the mesial prefrontal cortex while conditions involving potential 
monetary losses do not. Tom et al. (2007) also apply fMRI technique and find that brain areas, 
which show increasing activity as potential monetary gains increase show decreasing activity 
in loss situations. The authors additionally examine if individuals’ degree of loss aversion is 
correlated with individuals’ neural responses to gains and losses and find that greater behavioral 
loss aversion is associated with greater neural sensitivity to both gains and losses. Further 
analyses revealed that the decrease in brain activity for increasing losses is steeper than the 
increase in brain activity for increasing gains. Relatedly, the authors provide insights on 
individual differences in behavioral loss aversion being driven primarily by individual 
differences in neural sensitivity to potential losses.  
The finding that the human brain processes gains and losses differently in the sense that brain 
sensitivity for losses is higher than for gains supports the assumption that the concept of 
conservatism considering gains and losses asymmetrically has an evolutionary basis (Dickhaut, 
2009; Nagar et al., 2016). Linking the theory on the co-development of accounting principles 
and human evolution to insights from human decision making under uncertainty based on 
Prospect Theory and findings from neuroscience research, Nagar et al. (2016) provide a 
theoretical model generating an evolutionary risk basis for explaining individuals’ endogenous 





2.4.2.2 An Evolutionary Risk Basis for an Endogenous Demand for Conservatism 
As stated by Cosmides and Tooby (1997), the way the human brain processes information today 
emerged from natural selection processes through human evolution. Apparently, the current 
brain functioning was an evolutionary stable strategy for solving information-processing 
problems people faced during past human history. Referring to recent neurological insights on 
human brain’s differential processing of gains and losses (cf. chapter 2.4.2.1), Nagar et al. 
(2016) argue that individuals have endogenous preferences for an asymmetrical treatment of 
gains and losses in accounting. According to the authors, these endogenous preferences for 
conservatism have been created and formed through evolutionary processes in the context of 
resource and risk allocation in economies. The authors state that human preferences in today’s 
resource allocation settings (e.g., financial resource allocation) emerged from evolutionary 
resource procurement gambles. Conservatism is perceived as an evolutionary stable strategy 
for supporting a more efficient resource allocation in the economy. This reasoning is in line 
with Basu and Waymire (2006) and Dickhaut (2010) who argue that a two-way causality 
between accounting concepts and its users exists (cf. chapter 2.4.2.1). 
Nagar et al. (2016) develop a theoretical model to substantiate their assumptions on individuals’ 
endogenous preferences for conservative accounting. They generate endogenous preferences 
for conservatism by modeling individuals’ risk attitudes around an individual reference point 
in a basic gain-loss game. Individuals’ demand for asymmetric verification requirements for 
gains and losses (thus their demand for conservatism) represents an equilibrium outcome. The 
authors’ model consists of a non-cooperative ‘evolutionary resource procurement and survival 
game’ (Nagar et al., 2016, p. 5) in which a ‘producer’ produces an output (he hunts a prey) that 
a ‘stealer’ might try to steal. The authors model different scenarios depending on each 
counterpart’s strength (tough vs. weak). Each party has to decide whether to fight for the output 
or not. The outcome of the fight depends on the parties’ strengths. The authors theorize that 
independent of the stealer the producer’s production function is concave when considering 
production effort. In other words, the marginal utility of additional production effort decreases. 
For this reason, the producer is risk-averse in gain contexts. He prefers smaller sure gains to 
greater but uncertain gains in all-or-nothing gain gambles. After having hunted a prey, the 
producer might face a stealer who aims at stealing the produced output. In case both 
counterparts do not have (reliable) information about each other (i.e., they are in a situation of 
uncertainty), the model predicts the initiation of an all-out fight. The authors explain that a 
producer who offers to share the good with the stealer would be perceived as weak and the 





fight to protect his good. He prefers taking the risk of greater losses over accepting a sure but 
smaller loss in all-or-nothing loss gambles. The producer hence treats potential gains and losses 
asymmetrically.14  
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) models decision making under uncertainty 
and builds on experimental evidence that people are risk averse in gain situations and risk 
seeking in loss situations. It posits that an individual’s value function is steeper in loss than in 
gain contexts. This means that losing a certain amount of money generates much more 
displeasure than gaining the same amount of money yields pleasure. Loss aversion hence 
decreases risk seeking in gain contexts and increases risk seeking in loss contexts (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). As argued by Nagar et al. (2016), these behavioral patterns stem from 
evolutionary behavioral selection processes. 
In their procurement game model, Nagar et al. (2016) consider the distribution of information. 
Both producer and stealer must decide whether to fight for the good without knowing the type 
of their counterpart (tough vs. weak), thus being in an uncertain situation. If both parties do not 
have information on the respective counterpart, they will initiate an all-out fight. The authors 
argue that a fight always produces socially wasteful costs for both parties. A possibility to 
prevent such fights and thus avoid wasteful fight costs would be to reduce information 
asymmetry between the two counterparts. If each party receives concrete and reliable signals 
about the counterpart’s type, a fight could be avoided because, for example, a weak stealer 
would not attack a tough producer and a weak producer would leave the good to a tough stealer 
up-front. Hence, if information asymmetries between counterparties are reduced the preference 
for wasteful all-or-nothing fights in loss contexts is mitigated.  
The authors apply the above described deliberations to accounting. They define accounting as 
‘one natural institution that ameliorates information asymmetry in resource games by enabling 
credible information transfers’ (Nagar et al., 2016, p. 15). The concept of conservatism is 
depicted as a form of information aggregation in reporting that facilitates decision making. By 
treating gains and losses asymmetrically via considering potential losses upfront, the reliability 
of accounting information could increase (cf. chapter 2.1.3) and the probability of future 
disappointment is reduced (cf. chapter 2.4.1). According to Nagar et al. (2016), all individuals 
who use reporting information (e.g., for valuation purposes) influence the structure of the 
reported information via their endogenous risk preferences. The organization of information 
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thus depends on the endogenously demanded asymmetrical treatment for gains and losses. 
Being endogenous, the preferences’ occurrence for an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses 
depends on the context. It can be influenced by exogenous factors as informational settings, 
e.g., the level of information asymmetry and the degree of reliability of other information 
provided. According to Nagar et al. (2016), the demand for conservatism will be higher in 
situations of high information asymmetry and low information reliability than in conditions of 
low information asymmetry and high information reliability. The authors underline that 
‘information asymmetry patterns are a crucial driver of endogenous preference’ (Nagar et al., 
2016, p. 4). The information-based explanation for the demand of conservatism shows that the 
more uncertain a situation is (e.g., due to unreliable or missing information) the higher is the 
endogenously derived demand for conservatism. 
The above described insights from prior literature speak to the assumption that individuals do 
have endogenous preferences for conservatism in accounting and that this endogenous demand 
generated higher reporting verifiability requirements for gains than losses in accounting. 
Nevertheless, this has not been tested empirically yet. In the next chapter, specific research gaps 
are identified to afterwards derive corresponding research questions. This section closes by 
highlighting the contribution of this work. 
2.5 Research Questions and Contribution 
The aim of this research project is to contribute to prior literature on the usefulness of 
conservatism in accounting as well as to the corresponding discussion in standard setting. In 
this chapter, the literature on conservatism in accounting presented above is briefly summarized 
to identify research gaps that build the basis for this study’s research questions.  
Conservatism in accounting is defined as an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. Potential 
future losses are anticipated while gains are not. In contrast, neutrality treats gains and losses 
symmetrically, as it is, for example, the case under fair value accounting. Prior literature has 
offered various explanations for the existence of conservatism in accounting (cf. chapter 2.1.3). 
From a stewardship perspective, conservatism has been shown to enhance efficient contracting. 
From a valuation perspective, it can reduce information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders and provide value relevant accounting information. Due to its beneficial effects 






Despite its benefits, conservatism has also been subject to criticism (cf. chapter 2.1.3). 
Conservative accounting can lead to inefficient contracting as it might generate low signals in 
economic upturns and hence stimulate false default-risk alarm. Furthermore, it can reduce 
managerial investment in risky but positive NPV projects. Additionally, conservatism might 
lead to an increase in information asymmetries. In particular, it is criticized for concealing a 
company’s true performance leading stakeholders to draw false conclusions. Thus, 
conservatism can lead to inefficient decision making and inefficient resource allocation.  
Following this latter view, standard setters have given preference to neutrality in accounting in 
recent years. Due to a tradeoff between neutral and prudent accounting information, prudence 
has been removed from their framework in 2010. Although the IASB reintegrated the term 
prudence in the current exposure draft of the revised conceptual framework due to intense 
criticism after its removal, the notion of asymmetric prudence in the sense of conservatism is 
still excluded (IASB, 2015, CF ED). Now prudence is defined as supporting neutral accounting 
rather than distorting it.  
Nevertheless, the concept of conservatism is strongly embedded in standard setting and is still 
anchored in many current accounting standards. Although various rational explanations for 
conservatism in standard setting exist, they seem to be incomplete. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) 
therefore propose that there must be subjective preferences deeply rooted in individuals that 
give rise to a demand for conservatism in accounting. They argue that people dislike being 
disappointed and that conservatism reduces the likelihood of disappointment to occur by 
considering potential losses up-front. Neuroeconomics and neuroaccounting literature on 
human brain functioning supports the assumption that individuals do have endogenous 
preferences for conservatism in accounting. Parallels between human brain’s as well as 
conservatism’s differential treatment of gains and losses are considered one fundamental pillar 
of those endogenous preferences. Conservatism thus seems to be an evolutionary stable strategy 
to enhance social welfare.  
In summary, a broad body of research analyzing the usefulness of conservatism in accounting 
from a stewardship as well as a valuation perspective exists. Only very recent literature that 
builds on human evolution provides theoretical arguments for individuals having endogenous 
preferences for conservatism in accounting. From this point of view, the current trend in 
standard setting to focus on neutral accounting is questionable. Up to now, it remains unclear 
if individuals indeed do have preferences for conservative accounting relative to neutral 





is to analyze if individuals experience higher subjective value in a conservative compared to a 
neutral accounting setting. Furthermore, it is examined whether a higher subjective value could 
translate into economic consequences like, for example, a higher company valuation in 
situations of uncertainty. In particular, the present study’s analysis is built on the following 
research questions (RQ): 
RQ1:  Do conservative accounting rules have an influence on individuals’ subjective value in 
  the presence of uncertainty? 
RQ2:  Do individuals have (conscious or unconscious) preferences for conservatism relative 
to neutrality in accounting in the presence of uncertainty? 
RQ3:  Do individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative accounting translate into 
economically relevant consequences? 
This study answers to a request by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009, p. 1075) ‘to perform field or 
laboratory experimental testing to see whether and when people have an irrational preference 
for conservative reporting’. This thesis contributes to the current literature on conservatism in 
accounting by providing first experimental insights on individuals having endogenous 
preferences for conservative compared to neutral accounting in situations of uncertainty. This 
study furthermore enriches the current debate on the usefulness of conservatism in standard 
setting by investigating whether individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative vs. 
neutral accounting are related to higher company valuation in conservative compared to neutral 
settings. From an endogenous preferences perspective, conservatism could dominate neutral 
accounting by mitigating potential negative effects of losses on individuals’ subjective value 
and subsequent judgment and decision making behavior. 
The experimental setting created in this study relates to R&D accounting (cf. chapter 4.2), with 
capitalizing R&D expenditures being the neutral accounting method and expensing R&D 
expenditures representing the conservative accounting method. This thesis hence also provides 
insights on the effects of R&D accounting methods on individual behavior and adds to literature 






 Hypotheses Development  
The central questions this thesis wants to answer are whether people indeed have endogenous 
preferences for conservative versus neutral accounting and whether these preferences translate 
into economically relevant consequences. This thesis thus analyzes if people react differently 
to accounting information that is reported according to conservative vs. neutral accounting 
rules. 
As it has been argued by several researchers (e.g., Dickhaut et al., 2010; Nagar et al., 2016), 
individuals’ preferences for conservative accounting stem from human evolution. To be more 
precise, they co-developed with and are influenced by human psychological biases and 
behavioral anomalies (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009) that are deeply rooted in human beings  
(cf. chapter 2.4.2.1). As explained by Kahneman et al. (1991, p. 193), human behavior (as a 
research object) is characterized as a behavioral anomaly if ‘it is difficult to “rationalize,” or if 
implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm’. Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2009) reason that individuals should like conservatism because they dislike being disappointed 
and conservatism reduces the probability of future disappointment. A psychological bias that 
should hence strongly induce individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative accounting 
is loss aversion, that is, individuals’ reluctance to experience losses, being better addressed by 
conservative than by neutral accounting.  
Individuals’ reluctance to experience losses influences how humans behave when facing a 
potential future loss and how they behave after having experienced a prior loss. Individuals 
show loss aversion related behavioral biases in both situations. This chapter first provides an 
overview of insights from prior literature on individuals’ loss aversion related behavioral biases 
in situations of potential future and prior outcome experiences – especially losses. In a second 
step, it is described how the specific framing of a situation can affect individuals’ outcome 
perceptions potentially inducing loss aversion related behavior. Third, it is highlighted that loss 
aversion is a robust phenomenon endogenous to every human being, before, finally explaining 
how conservatism better addresses individuals’ loss aversion bias compared to neutral 
accounting. This last chapter ends with the derivation of the related hypotheses and a 





3.1 Loss Aversion as the Nucleus of Individuals’ Endogenous Preferences for 
Conservatism reflected in Human Behavior 
In classical economic research, researchers assume that individuals are rational decision makers 
aiming at maximizing their own welfare. Standard economic assumptions about market 
participants’ characteristics and their behavior are modelled in a construct called ‘homo 
oeconomicus’ (Kirchgässner, 2013). Economic models of human decision making under risk 
or uncertainty, as the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), 
as well as capital market models, as, e.g., the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), build on the assumed validity of the homo oeconomicus as a 
construct reflecting actual human behavior (Kirchgässner, 2013). With growing knowledge in 
and deeper insights on individuals’ decision making biases, which have initially been examined 
in psychology and sociology research, researchers in many fields as, e.g., economics, 
accounting and finance, started to consider these behavioral biases in their studies questioning 
the validity of the homo oeconomicus. In doing so, classical research expanded in an 
interdisciplinary way. Even specific behavior related research areas as behavioral economics, 
behavioral accounting or behavioral finance developed and are still further growing 
(Gillenkirch and Arnold, 2008; Trotman et al., 2011).  
The psychological bias most tightly related to individuals’ endogenous preferences for 
conservatism in accounting is loss aversion (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009; Nagar et al., 2016). 
People show a strong reluctance to the experience and mental processing of losses (cf. chapter 
3.1). The loss aversion bias influences peoples’ decision making behavior in situations in which 
they face potential future losses or in which they have experienced a prior loss. Individuals’ 
loss aversion is thus reflected in several other behavioral anomalies supporting the assumption 
that an endogenous demand for conservative accounting exists. These human behavioral biases 
and the specific decision making behavior they induce are presented in the following chapters 
building the underlying rationale for the hypotheses developed in this thesis.  
3.1.1 Negativity Bias 
On a more general level, individuals’ loss aversion bias is already reflected in the fact that 
people generally seem to pay special attention to negative compared to positive events, a 
behavior called negativity bias (Vaish et al., 2008). A positive or good outcome is commonly 
defined as being ‘desirable, beneficial, or pleasant’ while a negative or bad outcome is defined 
as being ‘undesirable, harmful, or unpleasant’ (Baumeister et al., 2001, pp. 324-325). The 





evidenced in a variety of situations and circumstances in human (daily) life.15 To illustrate the 
negativity bias and its broad appearance several key findings from prior literature are presented 
hereafter.  
The human focus on negative events has been documented in analyses of psychology texts and 
textbooks in which the number of terms identifying emotions dedicated to unpleasant emotions 
is twice as high as the number of terms related to positive emotions (Carlson, 1966). Czapinski 
(1985) confirmed this trend for Polish publications on psychology. He found a predominance 
of works addressing negative phenomena. On a term-level, he provides evidence that words 
describing unpleasant emotions are more frequent than terms referring to positive emotions. 
Pratto and John (1991, p. 380) aim at analyzing if ‘undesirable social stimuli are more likely to 
attract attention than are desirable social stimuli’ and find confirming evidence. They further 
show that individuals more easily remember bad events than good events. The authors explain 
this finding with an automatic shift of attention from good to bad outcomes, called automatic 
vigilance. The negativity bias is closely linked to emotions. Negative emotions are reported to 
be stronger than corresponding positive emotions (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Ben-Ze’ev (2000) points 
to the fact that positive and negative emotions have a different temporal character. ‘People 
ruminate about events inducing strong negative emotions five times as long as they do about 
events inducing strong positive ones’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, p. 99). Bad events can influence an 
individual’s well-being during subsequent days while the impact of positive events on human 
well-being is shown to be less long-lasting (Sheldon et al., 1996). The differential reaction to 
good and bad has also been confirmed by physiological studies by, e.g., confronting people 
with good and bad odors (Gilbert et al., 1987). People who watched subjects smelling the odors 
were asked to judge the type of odor subjects smelled. Facial reactions to negative odors have 
been more accurately classified than facial reactions to good ones. Neurological studies provide 
evidence on human brain’s different reactions to positive and negative outcomes (cf. chapter 
2.4.2.1).  
Vaish et al. (2008) underline the fact that most of the negativity bias research concentrates on 
adults. The authors thus focus on findings regarding the behavior of infants and conclude that 
besides adults also very young children behave according to the negativity bias pattern. They 
reason that the negativity bias has an evolutionary function for pure survival by inducing 
individuals to avoid harmful situations and plays an important role in children’s social-
emotional development by helping children to learn about their ‘environment and conspecifics’ 
                                                 





(Vaish et al., 2008, p. 21) thereby enhancing the probability of survival. Together with insights 
from neuroscience research on human brain functioning (cf. chapter 2.4.2.1), the reasoning by 
Vaish et al. (2008) speaks to the assumption that the human tendency to pay special attention 
to negative events is deeply rooted in human beings and has an evolutionary background.  
The negativity bias has also been documented in individuals' judgment and decision making 
behavior. In judgment contexts, individuals are shown to weight negative aspects of a stimulus 
more strongly than its positive aspects (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).16 The negativity 
bias thus shows that people mentally treat positive and negative events differently also 
influencing how individuals make decisions between several available options.  
The above-cited literature shows individuals special attention to negative events. The negativity 
bias is thus also reflected in literature that provides evidence on individuals’ reluctance to 
experience losses (i.e., negative events). Building on behavioral insights from psychology 
research, Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; 1992) examine 
individuals’ decision making behavior in situations of uncertainty involving gains and losses. 
They provide first seminal evidence that individuals perceive gains and losses asymmetrically. 
The authors find that losses generate negative feelings that are twice as strong as positive 
feelings induced by equivalent sized gains. Their findings intuitively suggest that people try to 
avoid losses to eschew the strong negative feeling of disappointment. Loss aversion and its 
behavioral consequences have been examined and evidenced in a variety of different settings 
as, e.g., investment contexts, insurance, labor supply and politics (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Camerer, 2000; McDermott, 2004; Barberis, 2013). Loss aversion is therefore considered 
a robust cognitive phenomenon playing an important role in individuals’ judgment and decision 
making behavior in situations of uncertainty of outcomes. Based on this type of behavioral 
phenomena, classical economic models of human decision making behavior that rely on the 
homo oeconomicus, as the EUT (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), were put under 
question. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) aimed at integrating behavioral biases in a theoretical 
model of human decision making behavior and developed the so-called Prospect Theory as an 
alternative to the EUT that better reflects reality. Prospect Theory and its insights on human 
behavior based on the loss aversion bias are presented in the next chapter. 
                                                 





3.1.2 Prospect Theory 
The EUT (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) is a central descriptive normative model of 
decision making under risk in economic research. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
depart from the assumption of a rational decision maker and theorize that people who face a 
choice task under risk apply several axioms for choosing one prospect out of the pool of 
available options. The following description of EUT axioms is based on Tversky and Kahneman 
(1986), who, amongst other researchers, provide a summary of main EUT axioms that have 
been contradicted by their own research findings. One EUT axiom characterizing preference 
relations is completeness. Individuals need to be able to compare the available options and 
indicate preference relations between them. Another axiom is transitivity of preference, 
meaning that individuals always choose the option with the highest subjective value. If option 
A is preferred to option B and option B is preferred to option C, then option A should also be 
preferred to option C. Choices are thus assumed consistent. This is possible if people can assign 
a specific value to each option independent of the other options (independence axiom). 
According to the EUT, people apply cancellation operations, meaning that they cancel equal 
attributes of options when comparing them. Decision makers base their choices on attributes 
that differ between the available options. Options are hence valued separately. Furthermore, the 
EUT states that people always choose the dominant option. If a first option clearly outperforms 
a second option regarding one attribute and is identical to the second option in all other 
attributes, people will choose the first option being dominant over the second one. The EUT 
further assumes the principle of invariance arguing that peoples’ decisions are independent 
from the presentation format of the respective choice problem. If these axioms hold, a utility 
function can be determined, that allows deriving expected utilities, which predict human 
preferences. 
Based on the EUT axioms described above, people choose between risky or uncertain prospects 
by comparing the expected utility of potential outcomes of each prospect. They derive the 
prospects’ expected utility values by weighting each possible outcome by its probability of 
occurrence. The following simple example taken from Koonce and Mercer (2005) illustrates 
this process. An alternative A includes two possible outcomes: 𝑥 and 𝑦. People derive 
individual utilities from potential outcomes. In the example, the utility of an outcome is 
expressed by 𝑢. 𝑃 is the outcome’s probability of occurrence. The potential outcomes’ utilities 
are weighted by their probability of occurrence. Thus, following EUT, an alternative A has the 





choose between two alternatives A and B, EUT states that the decision maker will rationally 
choose the alternative providing higher overall expected utility.  
Examining and working with the EUT, researchers first developed this normative model 
further. Savage (1954), for instance, developed an analytical framework for decision making 
under uncertainty considering personal (also called subjective) probabilities. He argues that in 
situations of uncertainty decision makers apply personal estimates to the prospect outcomes’ 
probabilities of occurrence. When applying subjective estimates of p, denoted as 𝑠 𝑝 , the 
subjective expected utility (SEU) of an outcome is defined as: 𝑆𝐸𝑈  𝑢 𝑥 ∗ 𝑠 𝑝 𝑥
𝑢 𝑦 ∗ 𝑠 𝑝 𝑦 . As pointed out by Koonce and Mercer (2005), Savage’s variant of expected 
utility is still consistent with basic axioms of EUT. However, since the middle of the 20th 
century, researchers found evidence that individuals do not always make decisions under risk 
and uncertainty that are in accordance with the EUT axioms transitivity, invariance, 
cancellation, and/or dominance. Their findings challenge the appropriateness of the EUT as a 
descriptive normative model of decision making under uncertainty (e.g., Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 
1961; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In consequence, 
researchers aimed at developing new models of human decision making in situations of 
uncertainty that better reflect actual human behavior. The most renowned model of decision 
making under uncertainty considering behavioral biases is Prospect Theory developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect Theory is a model of individuals’ risk attitudes that 
captures experimental evidence on risk taking and considers the experimentally derived 
violations of EUT (Barberis, 2013). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted several 
experiments confronting subjects with choice problems under uncertainty (lottery gambles). 
Results show inconsistencies with basic axioms of EUT, as described hereafter. 
First, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) document the so called ‘certainty effect’. According to 
EUT, people weight different possible outcomes by their probabilities. In contrast, the authors’ 
experiments reveal that people overweight outcomes that are certain, relative to outcomes that 
are probable. If neither of two options available is certain, people tend to overweight small and 
underweight medium and large probabilities. The certainty effect holds in situations when 
purely positive prospects (i.e., gains) are compared or when purely negative prospects  
(i.e., losses) are concerned.  
Second, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide experimental evidence that an individual’s 
preference order in the context of positive prospects is reflected around point 0 (an individuals’ 





This phenomenon is labeled ‘reflection effect’. The reflection effect combined with the 
certainty effect induces risk averse behavior in the context of positive prospects and risk seeking 
behavior in contexts of losses. In other words, people prefer a sure gain over a large merely 
probable gain in the context of positive prospects whereas they prefer a merely probable loss 
over a smaller certain loss in the context of negative prospects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Third, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide evidence for a phenomenon which they denote 
‘isolation effect’. In situations of choice between different alternatives, individuals tend to 
eliminate elements that the alternatives have in common and focus on those parts of the 
alternatives that are different to facilitate decision making. In contrast to what EUT predicts, 
this procedure can lead to inconsistent preferences because alternatives can be decomposed in 
common and differing parts in several ways. According to EUT, choice problems should be 
identical when looking at final states (principle of invariance). Nevertheless, as shown by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), preferences can be altered by different ways of representing 
alternatives (i.e., framing; cf. chapter 3.2 for more details). This important finding implies that 
‘the carriers of value or utility are changes of wealth, rather than final asset positions’ 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 273).  
Based on these findings, which differ from what EUT would predict, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) developed an alternative model of choice under risk that they call Prospect Theory. 
According to Prospect Theory, the process of choice between alternatives is divided into two 
subsequent phases: the editing and the evaluation phase (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
During the editing phase, individuals inspect all prospects and try to simplify the subsequent 
evaluation and choice process via one or more operations. As shown by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), individuals value outcomes based on a perception of gain or loss rather than considering 
the final state of welfare generated through the external stimuli. The classification of external 
stimuli in gains or losses occurs when individuals value these stimuli against a reference point. 
This procedure is called ‘coding’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As described by adaptation 
level theory (Helson, 1948), a reference point is what an individual would consider the neutral 
or expected level of an outcome. The reference point is individual to each person. The position 
of the reference point and thus the coding of the external stimuli as a gain or loss are not stable 
and can be influenced or manipulated by, e.g., the presentation or formulation of the prospects 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; see chapter 3.2 on framing effects). Another operation that is 
frequently applied in the editing phase is called combination. In order to simplify prospects, 





combined. Conversely, via segregation people segregate riskless components of options from 
risky ones. Via cancellation, components that are identical for all offered options are 
abandoned. People also simplify the comparison of prospects by, e.g., rounding decimal 
numbers of probabilities or outcomes. Detection of dominance is an operation leading to 
abandoning the dominant alternatives in further evaluation processes. Depending on operations 
applied during the editing phase as well as the order of operations chosen, prospects could be 
edited in different ways leading to individuals making different decisions. Applying operations 
as the ones described above can lead to individuals’ preference anomalies that contradict the 
EUT axioms (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) reason that once all prospects are edited individuals will value 
them and finally decide for the option with the highest subjective value. According to (S)EUT, 
an individual would value an alternative consisting of two possible outcomes by multiplying 
the subjective value of each outcome with its (subjective) probability of occurrence. Whereas 
(S)EUT assumes a rational decision maker assessing (subjective) probabilities in an unbiased 
way, Prospect Theory departs from human behavioral biases in weighting outcome 
probabilities. Prospect Theory supposes that each probability p or s(p) is associated with a so-
called decision weight ‘which reflects the impact of p on the over-all value of the prospect’ 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 275). The application of decision weights is derived from 
insights on the certainty effect showing that individuals tend to overweight small probabilities 
and underweight medium and large probabilities. The tendency to overweight small 
probabilities contributes for example to individuals’ willingness to buy lottery tickets 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect Theory furthermore differs from EUT in not defining 
utility as final asset positions but rather defining a prospect’s subjective value in terms of gains 
and losses depending on the individuals’ reference points. In Prospect Theory the subjective 
value of each possible outcome is thus defined as the value of the outcome’s deviation from the 
individual’s reference point. Thus, according to Prospect Theory, an individual’s context 
specific value function v  combined with the individual’s probability weighting function 𝜋  
influence the perceived final value of a prospect and determines individuals’ risk taking 
behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Referring to the simple example used to illustrate 
EUT, individuals’ overall value 𝑉 of an Alternative A would be calculated as follows:  
𝑉 v 𝑥 ∗ 𝜋 𝑝 𝑥 v 𝑦 ∗ 𝜋 𝑝 𝑦  (Koonce and Mercer, 2005, p. 181). 
As explained by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the subjective decision weight 𝜋 𝑝  generally 





effect, the decision weight of small probabilities is generally greater than the objective 
probability: 𝜋 𝑝 𝑝. Furthermore, subjective decision weights do not necessarily add to 1: 
for all 0 𝑝 1, 𝜋 𝑝 𝜋 1 𝑝  1 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 281). Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) call this characteristic subcertainty. They assume that decision weights are 
equal for probabilities of the same amount, independent of the respective involved prospect 
outcomes.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) insights on individuals’ valuation processes of external stimuli 
lead to a specific curvature of individuals’ value function. The authors find in their experiments 
on choice problems under uncertainty that the value difference of a monetary gain of 100 and 
a monetary gain of 200 seems to be greater than the difference in value between gains of 1,100 
and 2,200. In a loss situation, the value difference of a loss of 100 and a loss of 200 is perceived 
as greater than the difference between a loss of 1,100 and a loss of 2,200. The higher the gain 
and the higher the loss the smaller is its marginal value respectively. The decreasing marginal 
value in the area of higher gains or higher losses implies that in standard situations people are 
risk averse in the context of gains and risk seeking in a context of losses (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2012).  
The value function’s characteristic most important for this thesis is the fact that it is steeper for 
losses than for gains departing from the individual’s reference point. This asymmetric curvature 
in gain and loss contexts addresses the finding that individuals are more hurt by losses than they 
are thrilled by gains. Losing a certain amount of money hurts twice as much as gaining the same 
amount of money provides pleasure (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991; 1992). The cognitive effect of loss aversion is related to but distinct from risk aversion. 
As shown by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), people being loss averse exhibit both risk aversion 
and risk seeking behavior. In gain situations people are risk averse and prefer secure over risky 
gambles whereas in loss contexts people are risk seeking and prefer gambles providing the 
possibility of not losing money over sure losses even if the probabilities of avoiding losses are 
extremely small. Hence, the phenomenon of loss aversion represents individuals’ intrinsic 
outright contempt for losses and does not only refer to individuals’ search for risk reduction. 
The basic s-shaped curvature of the value function is generally identical for each individual. It 
turns from concavity in gain situations to convexity in loss situations at the reference point. 
Knowing that the position of the reference point’s level is individual to each person, peoples’ 
value functions can differ in this aspect. Insights from Prospect Theory presented above are 





(1979) themselves describe situations in which the value function’s curvature can deviate from 
its basic form. People who experienced a loss, which has not been mentally processed yet, will 
behave differently than people who have already mentally digested the experienced loss. 
Prospect Theory is not able to capture all psychological intuitions in once. Barberis (2013) 
brings up the example that convexity of the value function in loss domains captures individuals 
risk taking behavior in loss context. Nevertheless, it ignores the intuition that an individual who 
faces a loss which ‘represents a large fraction of wealth will be very sensitive, not insensitive, 
to any additional losses’ (Barberis, 2013, p. 175). Thus, when applying Prospect Theory to a 
specific context, it is important to rethink Prospect Theory’s underlying basics and to consider 
potential deviations from its basic elements brought up by the specific setting.   
To answer critiques made to the original version of Prospect Theory, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) advanced the original theory and developed the Cumulative Prospect Theory. They 
proved its validity in several experiments. In contrast to the original version of Prospect Theory, 
the Cumulative Prospect Theory is applicable to continuous distributions, it can be applied in 
contexts of probabilistic as well as uncertain prospects and it allows for decision weights that 
differ for gains and losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Decision weights, hence, can vary 
for probabilities of the same amount depending on the respective involved prospect outcome. 
The development of Prospect Theory dated back to 1979. Until today, it is widely viewed as 
‘the best available description of how people evaluate risk in experimental settings’ (Barberis, 
2013, p. 173). Prospect Theory has gained a significant standing in finance and economics 
research17 (e.g., Han and Hsu, 2004; Barberis and Huang, 2008; DellaVigna, 2009). Several 
researchers analyze Cumulative Prospect Theory’s value function as well as its weighting 
function in more detail and find supporting evidence for its central elements loss aversion and 
probability weighting (e.g., Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 
2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2013). Wu and Gonzalez (1996) examine 
individuals’ probability weighting functions further and find that Cumulative Prospect Theory 
offers substantial improvements compared to EUT. Currim and Sarin (1989) compare prospect 
and expected utility models regarding their predictive power and find that prospect models 
outperform expected utility models in defining individual decision making parameters – at least 
for dependent gambles. Nevertheless, the authors argue that both models perform equally well 
in situations of independent gambles which more often come into play. Besides Prospect 
                                                 






Theory’s significant standing in research as a descriptive theory of decision making under 
uncertainty, its application in economics is still in an early stage due to difficulties in its 
application (Barberis, 2013). Kahneman (2012, p. 286) underlines different ‘blind spots of 
Prospect Theory’. He argues that this theory is not able to integrate disappointment in individual 
valuation: The theory does not consider that the individual value of an outcome might change 
when it is highly unlikely or when an alternative output is very valuable. Furthermore, 
Kahneman (2012) points to the fact that Prospect Theory does not integrate regret but assumes 
that options are evaluated separately and independently. However, it is shown in literature that 
outcomes are evaluated dependently in the sense that people evaluate an option based on 
alternatives he could have chosen but did forgo (i.e., opportunity costs; cf. chapter 3.1.5). 
‘Prospect Theory was accepted by many scholars not because it is “true” but because the 
concepts that it added to utility theory, notably reference point and loss aversion, were worth 
the trouble; they yielded new predictions that turned out to be true’ (Kahneman, 2012, p. 288). 
Being difficult if not impossible to perfectly model real decision making behavior in situations 
of uncertainty, models as the EUT, whose basic axioms have in fact been contradicted, are also 
still applied as a simpler approximate forecast of human behavior.  
Prospect Theory models how people react to positive and negative outcomes in situations of 
uncertainty. One key insight is that people show risk averse behavior in gain settings and risk 
seeking behavior in loss settings under uncertainty. The fact how people classify an external 
stimulus (i.e., as a gain or a loss) relative to their individual reference point thus influences their 
decision making behavior. Peoples’ reluctance to losses on the one hand affects how they 
behave when confronted with potential future losses and on the other when having experienced 
a prior loss. The next two chapters present individual behavioral biases that appear in situations 
when potential futures losses are involved.  
3.1.3 Endowment Effect 
A psychological bias reflecting how individuals behave when confronted with potential future 
losses tightly related to loss aversion is the so-called endowment effect. The endowment effect 
is the phenomenon that ‘goods that are included in the individual’s endowment will be more 
highly valued than those not held in the endowment’ (Thaler, 1980, p. 44). In other words, the 
perceived value of a good or object increases with individuals’ ownership of it. The endowment 
effect covers the fact that individuals ‘often demand much more to give up an object than they 
would be willing to pay to acquire it’ (Kahneman et al., 1991, p. 194). Giving up a good creates 





gains and people try to avoid losses. Thus, people often behave irrationally and stick to goods 
owned although ceding them (e.g., accepting a buy-offer) would be beneficial. The authors add 
that ‘the main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good one owns, only the 
pain of giving it up’ (Kahneman et al., 1991, p. 197). Thaler (1980) argues that people often 
perceive ‘out-of-pocket costs’, that is, costs that have already been incurred by the individual, 
as losses and opportunity costs, e.g., a refused bid for a good owned, as forgone gains. The 
author states that as losses provide much more displeasure than gains provide pleasure, these 
different gain and loss perceptions contribute to the endowment effect inducing individuals to 
underweight opportunity costs.  
The following study conducted by Kahneman et al. (1991) illustrates the endowment effect. 
The authors create a market setting where subjects buy and sell mugs. Subjects learn in test 
rounds that transaction costs are insignificant in the implemented markets and that income 
effects are trivial. The laboratory market includes random price tests. For this reason, 
individuals know that ‘their bids to buy and offers to sell can have no conceivable effect on the 
eventual ruling price – as this is known to be determined randomly – and therefore know that 
there is no strategic reason to nominate any price other than one representing the true value’ 
(Kahneman et al., 2008, p. 940). In the main experiment, half of the subjects received a mug 
and could later sell it. The other half of subjects did not receive a mug. These subjects could 
buy one from the sellers. The distribution of mugs was done at random. After explanations and 
test rounds, mug owners were asked at which minimum price they would sell the mug. The 
buyers were asked at which maximum price they would buy a mug. The mean and median 
minimum prices demanded by sellers are $ 5.78 and $ 5.75. The mean and median prices, which 
buyers would pay for a mug at maximum, are $ 2.21 and $ 2.25 (Kahneman et al., 1991). Results 
show that the minimum selling price indicated by mug owners is about 2.5 times greater than 
the maximum buying price stated by mug buyers. 
Literature shows that the endowment effect is stronger if a good has a higher emotional loading 
as it is the case if people have put much effort in receiving a good, e.g., by creating it by oneself 
(‘IKEA effect’) or winning it in a competition (‘trophy winner effect’) (Norton et al., 2012; 
Bühren and Pleßner, 2014). The more people attach emotional value to a respective good, the 
higher will be the price they demand for selling it, hence the stronger will be the endowment 
effect. 
The endowment effect has been examined by numerous studies (cf. Horowitz and McConnell, 





humans but even for capuchin monkeys (Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008). Nevertheless, several 
researchers question the endowment effect arguing that the willingness to accept 
(WTA)/willingness to pay (WTP) gap shown in prior studies stems from individuals’ 
misconceptions induced by the specific experimental settings (i.e., conditions and controls 
applied) (e.g., Plott and Zeiler, 2005). In these cases, differences in valuation hence result from 
uncontrolled incentives as, e.g., inexperience with goods that subjects should evaluate. 
Controlling for this type of misconceptions, Plott and Zeiler (2005) do not find a gap between 
WTA and WTP, questioning the interpretation that the endowment effect found in prior studies 
is a result of loss aversion. Additional studies by the same authors confirm their finding (Plott 
and Zeiler, 2007). In contrast, Knetsch and Wong (2009) find that the decrease in the gap 
between WTA and WTP found by Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) is following their 
manipulations applied to control for the incentives of classical preference theory. They argue 
that these manipulations reduce subjects’ awareness for reference states that people generally 
apply to evaluate changes in value of goods. Therefore, in these cases giving up a good does 
not induce loss perceptions. The authors summarize that instead of the applied controls for 
general incentives it is the manipulations’ impact on reference states that mitigates the 
WTA/WTP gap.  
Although findings are mixed, prior literature provides evidence that the endowment effect is a 
behavioral bias strongly linked to loss aversion. The endowment effect reflects how people 
behave when facing potential future losses. Giving up a good represents a potential loss for the 
good’s owner. He hence wants to receive an adequate reward resulting in high WTA/WTP 
ratios.  
Further literature examining individuals’ judgment and decision making behavior in settings 
involving future losses provides insights on the sign and dread effect, presented in the next 
chapter.  
3.1.4 Sign and Dread Effect 
A variety of prior studies investigate how humans evaluate choice options providing an 
immediate vs. a delayed utility (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1993; Tunney and Shanks, 2002; Worthy et al., 2012). As underlined by Pang et al. (2015), 
most of these studies analyze individuals’ decision making behavior in gain situations and find 
that individuals follow a myopic approach: they prefer alternatives with better immediate 
rewards over alternatives with better long-term rewards. This behavior is referred to as 





comparing individuals’ decision making behavior in gain maximizing vs. loss minimizing 
contexts. As shown by a huge body of prior literature, people value gains and losses differently 
(see chapter 3.1.2) which leads the authors to the assumption that gain vs. loss contexts will 
exhibit different decision making behavior when considering the immediate vs. delayed utility 
of options. Pang et al. (2015) find that decision makers value delayed consequences of their 
decisions more in loss-minimizing situations relative to gain maximizing situations. Put in other 
words, ‘people were more eager to try to reduce losses incurred on future trials than to increase 
gains received on future trials even if it meant temporarily receiving larger immediate losses’ 
(Pang et al., 2015, p. 181). Pang et al. (2015) show that this behavioral tendency is more 
pronounced for people with low self-control. Self-control thus moderates the effect of the 
reward context (gain vs. loss environment). The authors infer that losses trigger individuals’ 
‘emotional aversiveness’ (Pang et al., 2015, p. 177) and make people favor reducing delayed 
losses although this means to temporarily have to incur larger immediate losses. The authors 
further provide evidence that the eagerness to reduce delayed losses is robust for low self-
control individuals even when the increasing option (reducing delayed losses and incurring 
immediate larger losses) is suboptimal. These findings illustrate individuals’ fear of losses 
making them behave in a way to reduce future loss experiences. 
Pang et al. (2015, p. 177) infer from their findings that ‘people assign greater weights to delayed 
losses than comparable delayed gains (if they assign smaller weights to delayed losses, they 
would prefer to defer losses)’. Relatedly, several researchers have analyzed intertemporal 
choice behavior and show that discounting rates people apply to future outcomes differ for gains 
and losses. Several researchers find that people discount the value of a future loss at a lower 
rate than the value of a future gain, a phenomenon called ‘sign effect’ (Thaler, 1981; Benzion 
et al., 1989; Murphy et al., 2001). According to Thaler (1981), peoples’ different perceptions 
of out-of-pocket and opportunity costs (cf. chapter 3.1.3) induce the sign effect. People who 
prefer receiving a gain immediately instead of receiving a gain plus a ‘waiting reward’ after a 
certain time span in the future have to bear opportunity costs. People who prefer postponing a 
loss into the future instead of experiencing a smaller loss immediately would have to incur 
additional out-of-pocket costs. As Thaler (1980; 1981) argues, individuals generally 
underestimate opportunity costs compared to out-of-pocket costs resulting in implicit discount 
rates that are higher for gains than for losses (i.e., the sign effect). Shelley (1994) finds opposite 
results. She examines a potential gain loss asymmetry in managerial choices in risky 
intertemporal choice settings and argues that managers judge future losses to be less credible 





Conformingly, Shelley (1994) provides evidence that managers discount losses more heavily 
than gains. She reasons that managers increased risk tolerance for future losses is probably 
linked to managers’ overconfidence based on past success and underlines that results could 
differ for subjects being less overconfident. Overall, this stream of literature highlights the 
importance of timing effects in individuals’ judgment and evaluation of immediate vs. deferred 
gains and losses.  
Related literature referring to the so-called ‘dread effect’ builds on the assumption that people 
exhibit dread for pain (Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). The anticipation of 
having to experience pain (i.e., e.g., the experience of an electric shock or a dentist appointment) 
in the future makes people feel highly uncomfortable. Dread describes the negative utility 
resulting from contemplating a future negative event (Loewenstein, 1987). ‘Anticipating pain 
is unpleasant or disadvantageous, rather like pain itself’ (Story et al., 2013, p. 2). People prefer 
getting over with undesirable outcomes preferably sooner than later. They are even willing to 
accept more pain in order to expedite its occurrence (Story et al., 2013; Pang et al., 2015).  
Loss aversion and the dread effect are considered potential sources of the sign effect (Story et 
al., 2013).  
In a comparable stream of literature, researchers think about how people handle payments. 
Contrary to the economically efficient approach to consume now and spend later, Prelec and 
Loewenstein (1998) assume that people show preferences for prepayments because of strong 
debt aversion. A prepayment makes people focus more on the enjoyment of an experience 
whereas a payment that has to be done after the event provokes gains in saliency of and attention 
to the payment and thereby reduces the individuals’ enjoyment of the event (Prelec and 
Loewenstein, 1998). Individuals seem to prefer mentally processing payments upfront to 
increase the enjoyment of the respective event.  
Literature presented in this chapter provides evidence that loss aversion induces people to 
minimize future potential losses sometimes even leading to suboptimal decisions  
(e.g., accepting higher losses in the aim to expedite the negative event).  
The following three chapters present insights on individual behavioral biases that play a role in 






3.1.5 Mental Accounting, Disposition Effect, Regret Effect, and Status Quo Bias 
A psychological phenomenon affecting how individuals behave to prior gains and losses is 
mental accounting. Mental accounting describes the human tendency to assign monetary 
payoffs to different mental categories. The concept was introduced by Thaler (1980; 1985; 
1999, p. 183) who defines mental accounting as ‘the set of cognitive operations used by 
individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities’. People 
mentally categorize their financial transactions to monitor their investments and adjust their 
investment behavior. Mental accounting builds on Prospect Theory (Thaler, 1985). A decision 
maker confronted with gambles would separate each type of gamble (e.g., mixed vs. pure gain 
or loss gambles) into different mental accounts. He would apply editing and evaluation 
operations consistent with Prospect Theory (cf. chapter 3.1.2) to each account separately. 
Individuals hence classify payoffs in gains or losses relative to a reference point and assign 
these payoffs to gain or loss accounts (Thaler, 1999).  
Individuals’ mental accounting systems influence their decision making. Prior research 
provides evidence that people dislike closing mental accounts at a loss (Thaler and Johnson, 
1990). Closing mental accounts at a loss provides displeasure while closing mental accounts at 
a gain provides pleasure. Due to loss aversion, the resulting displeasure from closing a loss 
account weights twice as hard as the resulting pleasure from closing a gain account (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991; 1992). People try to avoid negative hedonic outcomes (also see chapter 
3.1.6). Under mental accounting, this can lead to another behavioral bias called disposition 
effect: people are prone to sell stocks that increased in value too early whereas they hold value-
decreasing stocks too long (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). People thus tend to quickly realize 
positive hedonic outcomes and try to delay negative hedonic outcomes. A variety of studies 
provides insights on the disposition effect which is considered to be a robust empirical fact and 
a strong human behavioral bias (e.g., Odean, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Barberis and 
Xiong, 2009; Frydman et al., 2014).18 Nofsinger (2001) finds that the emergence of the 
disposition effect is dependent on the type of news released. Investor behavior corresponds to 
the disposition effect for company news but not for economic news. Nofsinger (2014) argues 
that in the case of bad company news the investor’s feeling of regret is much stronger than in 
the case of bad economic news. This is the case because the investor decided himself to invest 
in the stock, which now declines in value due to bad company news. His investment decision 
is thus tied to the stock loss. The author explains that bad economic or market news are out of 
                                                 





the investor’s control. The feeling of regret when taking a stock loss is thus weaker leading to 
‘actions that are not consistent with the predictions of the disposition effect’ (Nofsinger, 2014, 
p. 30) in the sense that investor are, e.g., less likely to sell in times of good news.  
By postponing closing a mental account at a loss, as it is the case under the disposition effect, 
people preserve the possibility to turn the loss into a gain in the future. In two stage gambles 
providing the possibility to compensate a first stage loss by a second stage gain, people even 
engage in irrational risk taking behavior and aim at breaking even in the second gamble to avoid 
having to close the mental account from the first stage of the gamble at a loss. Loss aversion 
hence also induces the break-even effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; cf. chapter 3.1.7). 
The way people behave under mental accounting also serves to address individuals’ regret 
aversion (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Individuals do not like the feeling of regret and therefore 
aim at avoiding actions that cause them regret. Nofsinger (2014, p. 24) defines regret as ‘the 
emotional pain that comes with realizing that a previous decision turned out to be a bad one’. 
The opposite feeling to regret is pride which is defined by ‘the emotional joy of realizing that a 
decision turned out well’ (Nofsinger, 2014, p. 24). By letting a mental loss account open, people 
avoid having to admit to have made a false decision. As explained by Shefrin and Statman 
(1985), aiming at being pride about one’s own former decisions and avoid regret fosters the 
disposition effect behavior under mental accounting. Shefrin and Statman (1985) attribute the 
disposition effect to insufficient self-control. People do not exhibit enough self-control ‘to close 
accounts at a loss, thereby limiting losses’ (Shefrin and Statman, 1985, p. 782).  
Regret-aversion also relates to the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) argue that in most decision situations people have the 
possibility to do nothing and hence stick to the current status quo. They show in several 
experiments that people stay with the status quo disproportionately often. The status quo 
becomes more attractive if it has been explicitly figured out as the status quo and if its 
advantages come to the fore with a growing number of competing alternatives. To protect their 
status quo and hence avoid experiencing a deterioration of their current situation, investors 
might exhibit no trading behavior and hence realize neither gains nor losses (Kahneman et al., 
1991). Loss aversion thus also contributes to the status quo bias.  
The behavioral biases presented in this chapter show that mental accounting does not follow 
severe rules as traditional accounting does (Thaler, 1999). Individuals introduce some 
flexibility in their own mental accounting rules to minimize negative and maximize positive 





on hedonic optimization operations applied by individuals to mentally process prior outcomes, 
especially losses. 
3.1.6 Hedonic Optimization  
As has been described in the previous chapter, people often make decisions that influence their 
own mind in a way that makes them feel happier. The disposition effect exemplifies this 
behavioral bias known as hedonic optimization. People do not like to close mental accounts at 
a loss and hence tend to hold value-decreasing stocks too long to avoid regret (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985). They are hence prone to maximize their hedonic outcome. Prospect Theory has 
already considered the human tendency to apply hedonic optimization rules. It assumes that 
people simplify the valuation and comparison of prospects via editing them (cf. chapter 3.1.2). 
They look for example for prospect dominance or, given that two options are strictly positive 
or strictly negative, they ignore identical prospect attributes and concentrate on the value 
difference between the two options (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The editing phase is not 
rigid. Prospect Theory allows flexibility in prospect editing (the order of applied editing 
operations can affect the decision made and hence the hedonic outcome) and thus already 
considers that past outcomes influence individuals’ future decision making (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).  
Based on these Prospect Theory insights, Thaler and Johnson (1990) further examine 
individuals’ valuation of prospects derived from Prospect Theory’s editing phase. They call 
these alternative representations of prospects ‘editing rules’. One important editing rule is 
hedonic editing. According to Thaler and Johnson (1990), people do not edit outcomes truly 
mechanically but in a way that makes them happiest. The authors argue that signs and 
magnitudes of outcomes determine whether hedonic editing makes people integrate or 
segregate prospect characteristics. The application of hedonic editing stems from four 
principles developed by Thaler (1985; 1999, p. 187): 
 Segregate gains (because the gain function is concave) 
 Integrate losses (because the loss function is convex) 
 Integrate smaller losses with larger gains (to offset loss aversion) 
 Segregate small gains (silver linings) from larger losses (because the gain function is 
steepest at the origin, the utility of a small gain can exceed the utility of slightly reducing 





These operations serve to make people feel happier about outcomes. By, e.g., integrating 
smaller losses with larger gains, the gain compensates the loss making the loss weighting less 
strong. Several studies find confirming evidence for hedonic editing. Lim (2006), for example, 
shows that investors are more prone to sell multiple stocks in loss than in gain contexts. This 
behavior shows the hedonic editing pattern of integrating losses and segregating gains. He also 
documents that investors thoroughly plan which winning and losing stocks they sell together to 
generate a hedonically optimized outcome by integrating losses and gains compared to treating 
them separately.  
In several experiments, Thaler and Johnson (1990) find that the hedonic editing principles 
described by Thaler (1985) do not always hold true. They find that people do not necessarily 
integrate losses. Individuals rather express that an initial loss increases the loss aversion related 
to subsequent losses. The effect of a prior loss on the disutility of a subsequent loss is not linear. 
A small or medium sized loss rather increases peoples’ awareness for comparable further losses 
whereas a large loss rather decreases individuals’ awareness for additional small losses. To 
summarize, ‘while subjects do seem to actively segregate gains, and cancel losses against larger 
gains, they do not appear to integrate losses’ (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 650). This is why 
the authors update the basic hedonic editing hypothesis developed by Thaler (1985) and 
introduce the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis.  
Hedonic optimization shows that people apply flexible editing operations when mentally 
processing stimuli and comparing different options to facilitate decision making. They thereby 
maximize the hedonic output for themselves. Most of the literature on hedonic editing examines 
the application of hedonic editing rules when individuals make prospective evaluations of 
options. Cowley (2008) investigates if people also apply hedonic editing rules when making 
retrospective evaluations of past experiences and finds confirming evidence.  
Hedonic optimization relates to individuals’ loss aversion bias highlighting the strong impact 
of humans’ loss averseness on human decision making behavior in contexts of prior outcomes. 
Building on hedonic optimization, the next chapter presents in more detail how people react to 






3.1.7 House Money, Risk Aversion and Break-Even Effect 
The quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis (cf. chapter 3.1.6) suggests that people do not easily 
integrate losses. In a two-period gamble, when experiencing a loss in the first period, 
individuals will not integrate potential subsequent losses with the first loss, whereas after prior 
gains, subjects will integrate subsequent losses with the initial gain. Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
show that in two-stage gambles prior gains induce individuals to take on higher risks in the 
second stage as long as potential future losses are compensated by the prior gains while 
previously experienced losses increase individuals’ sensitivity to future losses, resulting in 
higher risk aversion in loss-settings. These effects are known as the house money effect and 
risk aversion (or snakebite) effect (Nofsinger, 2014).  
When gaining money, people do not integrate the gain necessarily directly with their own 
equity. This is especially the case for gamblers who feel like they were gambling with the 
‘casino’s money’ (Nofsinger, 2014, p. 37). That is why they are willing to take more financial 
risk after a prior gain. Nofsinger (2014) supports this assumption with results of a little 
experiment: 77% of a group of economics students who won $ 15.00 are willing to bet $ 4.50 
on a coin toss. Hence, after a prior gain, most students placed the bet. However, without a prior 
gain, only 41% of the students were willing to participate in the gamble. Nofsinger (2014,  
p. 37) concludes that students were more risk taking after a prior unexpected gain ‘even when 
not ordinarily inclined to take such a risk’. 
The risk aversion effect describes risk averse behavior after prior losses. As Thaler and Johnson 
(1990) point out, risk seeking behavior should occur if prior losses were easily integrated with 
future outcomes. As stated above, the quasi-hedonic editing hypothesis doubts the facile 
integration. ‘Because integration is not automatic, an initial loss might cause an increase in risk 
aversion, particularly when the second choice does not offer the opportunity to break even’ 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 656). The authors provide experimental evidence for increasing 
risk aversion after prior losses. After losing money, people are often less prone to take financial 
risks. They ‘might have felt “snakebit”. Snakes don’t often bite people, but when they do, 
people become more cautious’ (Nofsinger, 2014, p. 37). Thus, after having experienced a 
financial loss, people often think that their streak of bad luck will continue, called the ‘hot hand’ 
effect (Gilovich et al., 1985). Thus, they become more risk averse. As Gilovich et al. (1985,  
p. 295) explain, people think that they can detect patterns in random sequences being ‘a general 
misconception of chance according to which even short random sequences are thought to be 





However, Prospect Theory predicts that individuals are risk seeking in the domain of losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Related to prospect theory’s underlying assumptions, Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) examine risk taking behavior after prior gains and losses in more detail and 
show that having experienced prior losses, subjects prefer outcomes that offer a possibility to 
break even. In this case, they are even willing to take on higher risks. Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
stress the fact that the influence of prior losses on risky decisions depends on the nature of 
future gambles. If an option provided in a two-stage gamble offers the opportunity to 
compensate prior losses by accepting additional risk, the break-even effect combined with 
individuals’ aversion to closing a mental account at a loss (cf. chapter 3.1.5) induces risk 
seeking (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The experiments designed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) refer to the latter case offering the chance to break even. That is why the authors find 
risk seeking behavior in loss contexts. The possibility of breaking even apparently facilitates 
integration of prior losses with potential future outcomes. 
Relatedly, prior literature provides evidence that people are more willing to invest in stumbling 
or stagnating projects or in projects with a negative NPV if they have already invested money 
in it before (also see chapter 2.1.3.1). This is called ‘sunk cost effect’ or ‘escalation of 
commitment’ (e.g., Thaler, 1980; Staw, 1981; Arkes and Blumer, 1985). As findings by Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) suggest, the sunk cost effect can be mitigated or strengthened depending 
on the setting. People hesitate to close mental accounts at a loss (cf. chapter 3.1.5). If the future 
provides at least a little hope that the prior loss can be compensated by a future gain, the sunk 
cost effect will be quite strong. In the case of two-stage gambles, when the possibility to break 
even exists, the ‘tendencies toward risk-seeking in the domain of losses might be enhanced’ 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990, p. 659).  
In summary, prior literature shows that people try to hedonically deal with prior losses by 
adapting their decision making behavior accordingly. Depending on the setting, they either 
become risk averse if no possibility to break even is available or they become risk seeking if 
future gambles provide the option to compensate prior losses.  
As has been argued in the previous chapters, broad evidence exists for a direct effect of prior 
outcomes on individuals’ subsequent judgment and decision making behavior. How people 
react to stimuli (previous or future outcomes) depends on their classification of the stimuli as 
gains or losses. Prior literature found that the way a stimulus is presented influences how the 





individuals’ decision making behavior. The next chapter explains outcome framing and 
presents its consequences (framing effects) that are related to individuals’ loss aversion. 
3.2 Outcome Framing inducing Loss Aversion related Behavior 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) show in several experimental studies that presenting identical 
information in different ways (i.e., framing the same decision problem differently), can have a 
significant influence on individuals’ decision making behavior. Frames influence mental 
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) that individuals apply in choice situations to facilitate decision 
making. The respective frame is characterized by all information available to the decision maker 
to define the decision context (Soman, 2004). Framing effects occur if the decision maker 
comes to differing choices depending on the applied frame. A well-known example of the 
influence of framing on human decision making is the ‘Asian Disease Problem’ (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) created the following setting: subjects 
receive the information that 600 people are about to die due to an unusual Asian disease. They 
are told that the US government develops two programs to fight against this disease. Subjects 
must indicate which program they would choose. Subjects are distributed to two treatment 
groups and receive information on the two programs that is framed differently. 
Treatment group 1 receives the positive frame: 
Program A:  200 people will be saved.  
Program B:  With a probability of 1/3, 600 people will be saved; with a probability of 2/3, 
   no one will be saved.  
Treatment group 2 receives the negative frame: 
Program C:  400 people will die. 
Program D:  With a probability of 1/3, no one will die; with a probability of 2/3,  
    600 people will die.  
72% of subjects in treatment group 1 preferred the sure option A to the more risky option B. 
The choices in treatment group B were the opposite: 78% chose the riskier option D over the 
sure option C. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) hence provide evidence for preference reversal 
due to framing. According to rational choice theory (e.g., EUT, von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944), people have preferences between different available options, which are transitive and 
stable. As argued for instance by Arrow (1982) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986), if rational 
choice theory would hold, different frames of the same choice problem should thus not 





evidence that the framing of options can influence individuals’ choices and even induce a 
change in preference order (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 1986). Results of the Asian 
Disease Experiment also confirm Prospect Theory’s proposition that people are risk averse in 
gain contexts and risk seeking in loss contexts (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect Theory 
considers framing in the editing phase: how and in which order people apply editing rules to 
prospects determines the prospects’ framing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; cf. chapter 3.1.2). 
Soman (2004) illustrates that the mental representation of a decision problem leads to a specific 
judgment that results in a specific decision. In summary, an individual’s final decision thus 
depends on the mental representation of the respective decision problem.  
Different types of framing exist. Levin et al. (1998) differentiate between attribute framing  
(i.e., a certain attribute of an object is the goal of the framing manipulation), goal framing  
(i.e., the goal of an action or behavior is the focus of the framing manipulation) and risky choice 
framing. Outcome framing as risky choice framing (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; for a 
meta-analysis on risky-choice framing see Kühberger, 1998) is the type of framing the most 
relevant to this study. ‘In this type of framing, the outcomes of a potential choice involving 
options differing in level of risk are described in different ways’ (Levin et al., 1998, p. 150). 
Individuals judge external stimuli relative to individual reference points (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Shifting the reference point can hence change the perception of a stimulus as a 
gain or a loss in situations of uncertainty. The Asian Disease Problem described above 
exemplifies outcome framing: A reference point shift (how many people will be saved vs. will 
be killed) leads to an inverse perception of gains and losses and a subsequent preference 
reversal. This is consistent with mental accounting. Under mental accounting, people classify 
external stimuli in mental gain or loss accounts depending on their individual reference points. 
Framing can influence the category to which an external stimulus is assigned. Framing can thus 
shift individuals’ perceptions regarding gains and losses thereby inducing different risk taking 
behavior: risk aversion in gain contexts vs. risk seeking in loss contexts. ‘Perhaps the most 
important conclusion to be reached from this research is that making generalizations about risk-
taking preferences is difficult. General tendencies can be reversed by a simple reframing of 
options. This result points out how difficult it is to predict behavior’ (Thaler and Johnson, 1990, 
p. 660). 
Effects of framing on preferences and subsequent choices have been examined and proven valid 
in a variety of contexts (e.g., cf. Kühberger, 1998, for a meta-analysis on risky choice framing). 





from it, they normally do not consider possible framing effects in their own decision making 
process. ‘Indeed, one of the important implications of framing effects is that people are usually 
unaware of the possibility that their views of a problem might change with a different 
formulation-for example, that risk aversion could be replaced by risk-seeking when the same 
problems were framed in terms of losses rather than gains’ (Kahneman, 1992, p. 305). Literature 
provides strong evidence that individuals in specifically framed decision making situations will 
use the presented information as such without trying to reframe it (e.g., Bettman and Kakkar, 
1977; Bettman and Zins, 1979; Jarvenpaa, 1989; Kleinmuntz and Schkade, 1993). Hence, the 
‘information presentation format affects the way consumers acquire and process that 
information’ (Bettman and Zins, 1979, p. 142).  
Prior literature demonstrates that the way a stimulus is perceived influences individuals’ 
behavior. Based on loss aversion, individuals aim at completely avoiding or at least minimizing 
future loss experiences and try to hedonically optimize prior loss experiences by adapting their 
future behavior accordingly. As illustrated by the previous chapters, loss aversion is a 
psychological phenomenon being the nucleus of several behavioral biases. The research interest 
in loss aversion, its roots and behavioral consequences, still endures. The next chapter presents 
recent empirical insights showing that loss aversion is a robust phenomenon endogenous to 
every human being.  
3.3 Loss Aversion as a Robust Phenomenon Endogenous to Every Human Being  
As has been shown in previous chapters, individuals’ loss aversion bias is reflected in 
individuals judgment and decision making behavior in situations when (potential or prior) 
losses are involved. Recent research examines if these behavioral patterns stemming from loss 
aversion bias are stable phenomena endogenous to every human being. Researchers 
furthermore investigate which other factors potentially influence the appearance of these loss 
aversion related behavioral biases. 
When describing the human brain’s System 1 way of thinking (cf. chapter 2.4.2) Kahneman 
(2012, pp. 21-22) states that this system’s capabilities ‘include innate skills that we share with 
other animals. We are born prepared to perceive the world around us, recognize objects, orient 
attention, avoid losses, and fear spiders’. With this statement, he takes up the assumption that 
loss aversion is something innate. This assumption has been examined in prior research. 
Research on primates found that primates being genetically strongly related to human beings 
exhibit loss aversion (Chen et al., 2006; Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008). Capuchin monkeys 





the specific trades are either framed as gains or losses. The monkeys show a strong preference 
for bonus frames compared to in fact logically identical loss frames (Chen et al., 2006). 
Lakshminaryanan et al. (2008) document that capuchin monkeys also exhibit the endowment 
effect in food-trading tasks. Related to these findings, researchers argue that loss aversion 
extends beyond humans and thus probably has ‘a specific, evolutionarily conserved 
neurobiological basis’ (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009, p. 5035). Recent neurological as well as 
neuroeconomic research shows that losses elicit different and often stronger human 
neurological reactions than gains. Losses activate other brain regions than comparable gains 
(Knutson et al., 2003), induce stronger skin conductance response (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), 
and they generate an increase in heart rate and pupil dilation relative to equivalent-sized gains 
(Hochman and Yechiam, 2011).19 These studies provide evidence that individuals 
neurologically process losses differently than gains induced by loss aversion. Departing from 
these prior neurological and neuroeconomic insights, loss aversion seems to be a universal 
feature endogenous to every human being.  
Several studies confirm the evidence provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1991; 1992) that the 
aggregated loss aversion coefficient λ, reflecting the difference in slope of the loss and the gain 
region of Prospect Theory’s value function, is around 2 (e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2013). 
Kahneman (2012) states that loss aversion ratios estimated in prior experiments usually take on 
a value between 1.5 and 2.5. Losses thus on average produce twice as much harm as equivalent 
sized gains provide pleasure. In the aim of specifying the nature of loss aversion, Johnson et al. 
(2006) develop four assumptions about the loss aversion parameter. According to the authors, 
loss aversion could be constant across individuals and attributes, it could be stable across 
attributes but varying between people, it could be rather stable across people but clearly 
differing across attributes, and it could differ across both people and attributes. Recent literature 
provides confirming evidence for the fourth assumption, as explained hereafter.  
Several researchers find that the degree of loss aversion varies between people and depends on 
situational factors (e.g., Gächter et al., 2010; Pighin et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2016). Gächter et 
al. (2010) conduct an experiment on the endowment effect using a within-subject design. Their 
study design elicited WTA and WTP for a good per subject. They find that the individuals’ 
degree of loss aversion, hence the WTA/WTP ratio, differed substantially: the average loss 
aversion coefficient was 2.62 with a standard deviation of 2.28. Thus, nearly each subject 
showed loss averse behavior – but to a different degree. The authors furthermore show that 
                                                 





socio-demographic variables affect individuals’ degree of loss aversion. People become more 
loss averse with increasing age. Higher education mitigates loss aversion but does not fully 
eliminate it and an individuals’ level of income and wealth is positively associated with loss 
aversion. Wang et al. (2016) add that also culture can influence the degree of loss aversion. 
They find that the cultural dimensions individualism, power distance and masculinity defined 
by Hofstede (2001) lead to higher loss aversion. These insights document that personal 
situational factors affect individuals’ degree of loss aversion. Further recent research even 
shows that completely exogenous factors can influence loss aversion. Pighin et al. (2014) 
document that mild hypoxia (a reduced supply with oxygen) decreases the degree of loss 
aversion. Participants in the normoxic (i.e., normal supply of oxygen) condition accepted 
gambles if the gain was 2.4 times higher than the loss whereas subjects in the mild hypoxia 
(i.e., reduced supply with oxygen) condition accepted gambles if the gain was 1.7 times higher 
than the loss. This finding shows that exogenous factors as oxygen supply can influence loss 
aversion.  
Related literature provides hints that loss aversion not only varies between people and is 
influenced by personal as well as exogenous factors but also varies across attributes. This 
variation strongly relates to individuals’ emotional attachment to goods. People seem to exhibit 
loss aversion to avoid the experience of negative emotions that might generate from processing 
losses. Brain regions activated when processing losses, e.g., the amygdala (Coricelli et al., 
2005), are also involved in processing stimuli that induce emotions as fear (LeDoux, 2000; 
Thomas et al., 2001) or regret (Coricelli et al., 2005). Hence, researchers suppose that loss 
aversion is an emotional reaction of fear (Camerer, 2005) also being linked to the emotion of 
regret (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; cf. chapter 3.1.5). Findings by research on the endowment 
effect (cf. chapter 3.1.3) strengthen the assumed emotional component of loss aversion. Goods 
with a higher emotional loading induce higher WTA and hence stronger loss aversion compared 
to goods with lower emotional attachment (e.g., Bühren and Pleßner, 2014).  
Furthermore, it has been shown that loss aversion does not only relate to truly experienced gains 
and losses but also relates to predicted future outcomes. Kermer et al. (2006) provide 
experimental evidence that individuals show loss aversion in affective forecasts. In their study, 
subjects predict that losing would have a greater emotional impact than winning a certain 
amount of money. Nevertheless, these predictions do not correctly reflect reality. The authors 
argue that people fail to consider that they will apply mental techniques to handle the losses. 





predicted. Nevertheless, this way of forecasting one’s own loss aversion influences peoples’ 
judgment and decision making and might lead ‘people to make decisions that maximize neither 
their wealth nor their happiness’ (Kermer et al., 2006, p. 652).  
Research has also put attention to the question if loss aversion decreases with an increase in 
experience. Harbaugh et al. (2001) investigate if the endowment effect decreases with age and 
do not find confirming evidence. Children at the age of five as well as adults at the age of 20 
show a consumption behavior, which is consistent with the endowment effect. The authors 
derive that the endowment effect seems to be a ‘’real’ part of preferences, rather than a mistake 
that diminishes with experience and learning’ (Harbaugh et al., 2001, p. 181). Gächter et al. 
(2010) provide confirming evidence and show that age even increases loss aversion. The 
authors further find that, in contrast, higher education in fact decreases loss aversion but without 
fully eliminating it. Experimental studies on the endowment effect examine if the discipline of 
market experience eliminates loss aversion and find mixed evidence. Market experience can 
significantly reduce individuals’ loss aversion bias but does not eliminate it (Brookshire and 
Coursey, 1987; Coursey et al., 1987; Knetsch and Sinden, 1987). List (2003; 2004) provides 
evidence that for individuals with intense trading experience the impact of the endowment 
effect on trading decisions becomes negligible. In contrast, Kahneman et al. (1990) find that 
experience does not mitigate the endowment effect. Pope and Schweitzer (2011) provide further 
evidence that loss aversion even persists in settings with intense competition and very 
experienced agents. Haigh and List (2005) even document that experienced option traders 
exhibit more myopic loss aversion than student subjects do.  
In summary, prior literature provides hints that loss aversion reflected in its relating behavioral 
biases is an emotional reaction resulting from individuals’ fear of experiencing losses. Although 
higher education and more experience can reduce loss aversion related behavioral anomalies, 
they do not fully eliminate them. These findings lead to the assumption that loss aversion is a 
robust phenomenon endogenous to every human being, although the degree of loss aversion 
reflected in the strength of behavioral biases varies across people and attributes.  
The next chapter explains how conservative accounting better speaks to individuals’ loss 
aversion bias compared to neutral accounting, derives the related hypotheses and illustrates the 






3.4 Conservatism addressing Loss Aversion  
Numerous studies examining framing effects provide evidence that the alternative presentation 
of equal information affects individuals’ perceptions of external stimuli and can influence 
individuals’ preferences and subsequent choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; cf. chapter 3.2). Framing concepts in different ways can lead to differences 
in mental representation, which are quite stable. Literature provides strong evidence that, due 
to limited cognitive capacity, individuals process information in the form in which it is 
presented and do not try to reframe it (cf. chapter 3.2). Following Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009, 
p. 1074), individuals ‘dislike being disappointed, and they find conservatism appealing because 
it reduces the likelihood that future disappointment will occur’. The following example on 
accounting for research and development expenditures20 illustrates that conservatism better 
addresses individuals’ loss aversion bias than neutral accounting by inducing different framing 
effects.  
Methodologically, it is possible to either expense or capitalize R&D expenditures.21 The 
immediate expensing of R&D as incurred is a typical example for conservative accounting 
(Beaver and Ryan, 2005). When expensing R&D, R&D expenditures are treated as costs. 
Hence, a future asset re-measurement is not possible because the potential asset is measured at 
zero (i.e., costs are immediately expensed independent of news). In contrast, capitalizing R&D 
expenditures represents neutral accounting. This is the case when a symmetric timely 
recognition of gains and losses is applied. Under this condition, capitalizing R&D leads to the 
creation of an asset on the balance sheet that is amortized over its useful life and tested for 
impairment. Changes in asset value are hence considered dependent on news. 
The application of conservative vs. neutral accounting in the context of a multi-period R&D 
project affects a company’s accounting income (i.e., earnings) differently when considering 
each project period separately. When looking at the project in its entirety, both accounting 
methods lead to the same overall income result. The following concrete example of a two-
period R&D project illustrates both methods’ impact on a company’s accounting income.22  
A company makes an investment of 8 million23 in a R&D project in time period t=1. If the 
project is successful, the incremental cash flow in t=2 from the project will be 20 million,  
                                                 
20 Accounting for R&D also serves as the setting in the experiment (cf. chapter 4.2.2). 
21 See chapter 4.2.2.1 for more details on accounting methods for R&D expenditures under IFRS. 
22 A concrete currency is left out in the example.  
23 The example serves to illustrate the general impact of both R&D accounting methods on a company’s 





0 otherwise. The likelihood of project success is p=0.5. Table 1 documents the accounting 
income resulting from the project in t=1 and t=2 depending on the accounting method applied 
as well as on project success. 
Accounting Method and  
Project Outcome Condition 




Expense Condition: Project = Success - 8M + 20M 
Expense Condition: Project = Failure - 8M 0 
Capitalizing Condition: Project = Success 0 + 12M 
Capitalizing Condition: Project = Failure 0 - 8M 
Table 1: Accounting Methods’ Impact on Company’s Accounting Income 
Table 1 shows that in the conservative condition potential future losses (i.e., the loss of the 
invested amount in the case of project failure) are considered upfront in time period t=1 whereas 
in the neutral condition the company’s accounting income remains unaffected in t=1 due to 
asset creation on the balance sheet. In t=2, under conservatism, the company and its investors 
can only experience a positive incremental cash inflow of +20M from the successful project or 
experience no change in accounting income in case of project failure. In contrast, neutral 
accounting either generates a decrease in equity of –8M in t=2 due to asset depreciation in case 
of project failure or a positive cash inflow of +12M in case of project success due to 
depreciation being offset with project return. Under neutrality, potential losses are hence only 
considered when they effectively occur. The above-described example illustrates that the 
impact of conservative vs. neutral accounting on accounting income only differs in the short 
run, when time periods are considered separately, but is the same in the long run, when 
considering the project in its entirety. Overall, under both accounting methods the project 
results in either a loss of –8M or in a gain of +12M.  
Due to segregation of initial investment and subsequent returns conservatism makes people 
experience and mentally process potential reductions in equity immediately in t=1. It is assumed 
that investors rather perceive this equity reduction as an investment than a loss because project 
outcome has not yet turned out. In t=2, under conservatism, investors can only experience an 





Project failure is thus not directly linked to a reduction in equity. In contrast, in the neutral 
condition, due to integration of initial payment and project return, subjects do not experience a 
change in equity in t=1. However, individuals face a gain vs. loss situation in t=2 in the neutral 
condition, because depending on project outcome equity will increase or decrease in t=2. It is 
assumed that investors rather perceive an equity reduction in t=2 as a loss than as an investment 
because it is directly induced by project failure and is accounted for as an impairment loss. 
Neutrality hence bears the risk that individuals mentally have to process a loss in future periods. 
As explained in chapter 3.1.4, people prefer minimizing future losses even if this means to incur 
a greater loss at present (e.g., Pang et al., 2015). From a manager’s perspective, it would be 
economically more efficient to defer losses to the future instead of considering them up-front 
due to discounting effects. This is in favor of neutral accounting. However, from an investor’s 
point of view, being the focus in this study, considering losses up-front better addresses 
individuals’ loss aversion. The stream of literature presented in chapter 3.1.4 highlights the 
importance of timing effects in individuals’ judgment and evaluation of the utility of immediate 
vs. deferred gains and losses. People prefer getting over with undesirable outcomes preferably 
sooner than later. Mentally processing the consequences of an unsuccessful project should thus 
be more comfortable in a conservative than in a neutral setting.  
Furthermore, individuals probably perceive a negative project outcome in t=2 differently 
depending on the accounting method applied. As argued above, in the conservative condition, 
people should process the project related potential loss as an investment in t=1 and experience 
project failure in t=2 as no change in equity whereas people in the neutral condition should 
process the project failure in t=2 as a loss reducing equity. Peoples’ subjective value and future 
behavior should hence be more strongly influenced by a prior loss experience in the neutral 
than in the conservative condition. In case future investment options offer the chance to break 
even, the desire to compensate prior losses should be higher in the neutral than in the 
conservative setting. In case future investment options do not offer the possibility to compensate 
prior losses with future gains, risk aversion should be higher in the neutral compared to the 
conservative setting (cf. chapter 3.1.7).  
The investment’s equity impact in t=2 depends on the accounting method applied (conservative 
vs. neutral) and project success (gain vs. loss). The expected individuals’ perception and value 
of the respective change in equity differs in the resulting four conditions: In case of project 
success, an increase in equity should be perceived equally positive in the conservative and the 





able to cope with project failure in the conservative than in the neutral setting because under 
conservatism the potential loss has been considered up-front and should have been mentally 
processed rather as a project investment than a loss. The disutility generated through project 
failure should hence be higher in the neutral setting because people perceive the reduction in 
equity as a loss.  
The example demonstrates that conservatism better addresses individuals’ loss aversion than 
neutral accounting by considering potential losses upfront and thereby mitigating future 
disappointment as well as the impact of prior loss experiences on subjective value. Based on 
the above argumentation, subjects should hence have preferences for conservative compared to 
neutral accounting because conservatism provides higher mental comfort especially in 
situations of failure.  
It is important to consider that individuals do not necessarily consciously prefer conservative 
to neutral accounting. When people are in a judgment context and only experience the impact 
of one of the two accounting methods, they probably would not reframe the situation but instead 
value it independent of other possible frames. They are generally not aware that their judgment 
and decision making behavior might change with the change of presentation format 
(Kahneman, 1992). ‘It is likely that most users are guided by “gut” or “instinctive” notions that 
unconsciously guide what seems plausible and appealing’ (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009,  
p. 1075). Hence, in the first place, preferences for conservatism are probably unconscious. This 
argumentation leads to the first hypothesis:  
H1a: Subjects unconsciously value conservatism more highly than neutral accounting after 
prior losses. 
As explained in chapter 3.3, existing research provides hints that the psychological behavioral 
bias loss aversion is rather innate to humans than learned (e.g., Chen et al., 2006). Tom et al. 
(2007) conduct neural imaging studies providing evidence that individuals’ asymmetric 
reaction towards gains and losses have a neural basis. Although loss aversion is endogenous to 
every human being, individuals show different degrees of loss aversion (e.g., Gächter et al., 
2010). A higher degree of individual loss aversion could hence strengthen unconscious 
preferences for conservatism in accounting. In consequence, individuals showing higher 
degrees of loss aversion should also value conservative accounting more highly than people 
with lower degrees of loss aversion should. The corresponding hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1b: Subjects’ individual degree of loss aversion is positively associated with subjects’ 





As pointed out by Maines et al. (2006), when aiming at providing insights from research that 
have consequences24, it is suggested to not only focus on individuals’ judgments but also on 
individuals’ decisions. According to the authors, experimental researchers should on the one 
hand examine which judgments are influenced by the independent variables and on the other 
investigate how final decisions are affected by these judgments (Maines et al., 2006). In light 
of this reasoning, it is thus also important to analyze individuals’ conscious preferences for 
conservatism relative to neutrality in accounting influencing their decision making behavior. 
Because loss aversion is an innate psychological bias (Chen et al., 2006) individuals are not 
necessarily aware of having endogenous preferences for conservatism in accounting 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). These unconscious or unintentional preferences are expressed in 
judgment contexts through individuals’ reactions to stimuli. Nevertheless, individuals might 
become aware of their endogenous preferences when encountering both conservative and 
neutral accounting. The question arises if encountering and hence experiencing both accounting 
mechanisms strengthens or rather mitigates endogenous preferences for conservative 
accounting. On the one hand, this experience could prompt individuals to develop explicit 
intentional preferences for conservative accounting based on intrinsic loss aversion. On the 
other hand, experience could induce individuals to overcome loss aversion and thus attenuate 
individuals’ preferences for conservatism because as the above-presented R&D example shows 
both accounting methods just frame logically equivalent situations differently and in the end 
lead to the same result.  
Literature provides mixed evidence regarding the effect of experience on the persistence of 
behavioral biases (cf. chapter 3.3). Prior literature shows that market experience can eliminate 
decision errors (List, 2003; 2004) and hence mitigate loss aversion related behavior but it does 
not fully extinguish it (Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Coursey et al., 1987). Recent research 
provides evidence that loss aversion even persists in settings with intense competition and very 
experienced agents (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). Hence, despite having a high level of 
experience, experienced agents’ behavior seem to be influenced by loss aversion. Haigh and 
List (2005) even show that professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion to a greater extent 
than less experienced student subjects. Gächter et al. (2010) provide evidence that age increases 
loss aversion whereas higher education decreases loss aversion. Thus, prior literature shows 
that experience can indeed reduce loss aversion related behavioral biases but does not fully 
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eliminate them. Hence, loss aversion seems to be that deeply rooted in human beings that 
individuals do not easily overcome this and related behavioral biases.  
As explained above, framing strongly influences individuals’ decision making behavior  
(cf. chapter 3.2). Referring to the concreteness principle (Slovic, 1972; Payne, 1982; Thaler and 
Johnson, 1990) individuals who are confronted with a framed concept presumably do not try to 
reframe it. ‘Concreteness represents the general notion that a judge or decision maker tends to 
use only the information that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object and will use it only 
in the form in which it is displayed’ (Slovic, 1972, p. 9). Hence, when encountering two 
identical concepts, which are framed differently, being the case for conservative vs. neutral 
accounting in this study, individuals rather do not reframe them to economize on cognitive 
effort. In a choice context, reframing these concepts would probably result in being indifferent 
between the options that are logically equivalent but if reframing does not take place, 
individuals would probably rather choose the frame they prefer. Due to loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; cf. chapter 3.1.2), the sign and the dread effect (e.g., Thaler, 
1981; Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993; cf. chapter 3.1.4), in a deliberate 
choice setting, people should prefer the conservative relative to the neutral option, which allows 
to get potential losses (i.e., pain) over with more quickly. As has been explained for the 
derivation of Hypothesis H1b, this preference should be stronger for people having higher 
degrees of loss aversion.  
Based on these prior deliberations and findings, the related hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H2a: Subjects have an explicit preference for conservative accounting. 
H2b:  Subjects’ individual degree of loss aversion is positively associated to subjects’ explicit 
preference for conservative accounting. 
As argued above, conservatism better addresses individuals’ loss aversion bias compared to 
neutral accounting due to framing effects. Although leading to the same result in the long term, 
conservative and neutral accounting frame changes in earnings differently in the short run. Prior 
losses should be perceived more negatively in the neutral than in the conservative accounting 
condition, whereas gains should be perceived equally positive, independent of the underlying 
accounting method. The impact of the accounting method applied on subjective value is thus 
based on its influence on individuals’ perceptions of prior outcomes. As explained in chapters 
3.1.5 to 3.1.7, a large body of literature examines how prior outcomes affect individuals’ future 
judgment and decision making behavior. By framing accounting income differently, the 





subjective value. Conservative relative to neutral accounting should positively moderate the 
direct effect of prior outcome on subjective value due to better addressing individuals’ loss 
aversion.  
Based on the above reasoning (see chapter 3.3), people with a higher degree of loss aversion 
should have stronger preferences for conservative compared to neutral accounting. The degree 
of loss aversion should thus itself positively moderate the moderating effect of the accounting 
method applied on the direct relation between prior outcome and subjective valuation. These 
deliberations thus lead to the creation of a moderated moderation model (see Hayes, 2013, for 
theoretical explanations of different types of research models and their related statistical 
models)25 with the accounting method applied as the primary moderator and loss aversion as 
the secondary moderator.  
The data needed to test the above-developed hypotheses are collected via an experimental study. 
The following chapter presents the experiment’s design and its implementation. 
                                                 





 Experimental Study  
When conducting a research study, it is important to choose a research method that fits to theory 
and literature (Smith, 2015) and generates appropriate data for testing the hypotheses developed 
and for answering the research questions raised (Maines et al., 2006). The research questions 
introduced in this study (cf. chapter 2.5) aim at revealing if individuals have preferences for 
conservative vs. neutral accounting and if these preferences translate into economically relevant 
consequences. This thesis follows an experimental approach because this data collection 
method has specific strengths and is suitable for providing insights on human judgment and 
decision making behavior (Libby et al., 2002).  
This chapter first briefly describes general methodological strengths as well as particular 
characteristics of experimental research to consider and think about when developing an 
experimental study. Second, the specific experiment created to test for the hypotheses derived 
in this thesis is presented, and third, the experiment’s final implementation is described.  
4.1 Experiments as a Method of Data Collection in Behavioral Accounting Research  
Experimental research provides comparative advantages relative to other research approaches, 
as, e.g., archival studies, in terms of determining how, when and why financial accounting 
features influence human behavior (Libby et al., 2002). In an experiment, the experimenter 
manipulates one or more independent variables of the research study, holds constant or 
randomizes potentially confounding factors (extraneous independent variables) and 
investigates the influence of the manipulated independent variables on one or more dependent 
variables (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000; Maines et al., 2006).  
In the following chapters, first the role of experiments in accounting research is briefly outlined. 
Afterwards, an experimental research’s key strength, namely the possibility to examine causal 
relations between variables, is addressed being one reason why this data collection method has 
been applied in this thesis. Furthermore, potential confounding factors are described that can 
jeopardize an experiment’s validity. After having explained main validity criteria, common 
experimental designs are presented. 
4.1.1 Behavioral Research in Accounting 
Since the 1970s, experimental studies have gained in importance for accounting research. 
Experimental accounting research differs from other types of accounting research not only in 
its method of data collection (experiments in contrast to, e.g., archival, case or field studies) but 





from research disciplines like psychology and sociology in contrast to mainly applying 
economic theory, as it is the case in empirical archival research (Maines et al., 2006). These 
theories generally reflect behavioral biases in human decision making behavior (cf. chapter 
3.1). The introduction of behavioral (experimental) research in accounting led to the 
development of an own field of research called Behavioral Accounting being strongly 
interdisciplinary (Gillenkirch and Arnold, 2008).  
As highlighted by Maines et al. (2006), research questions developed in the field of accounting 
often address capital market participants’ (e.g., investors or accountants) judgment and decision 
making behavior. This stream of research examines how accounting information influences 
individuals’ judgment and decision making behavior by investigating how accounting 
information is used and processed. Especially behavioral accounting deals with the impact of 
the design of internal and external accounting systems on human decision making behavior and 
aims, on the one hand, at explaining and forecasting human behavior and, on the other hand, at 
providing recommendations for the organization and design of these accounting systems 
(Gillenkirch and Arnold, 2008).  
Behavioral accounting is a growing research area due to an increase of interest in behavioral 
research in general and due to an expansion in methods used to study related issues. Thus, 
boundaries of behavioral accounting research are nowadays blurred (Birnberg, 2011). 
Gillenkirch and Arnold (2008) provide an overview of different research areas and related 
research topics that are commonly subsumed under behavioral accounting research.26 They 
argue that depending on the respective research area, the judgment and decision making 
behavior of a certain group of stakeholders (e.g., investors, taxpayers, or managers) is the focus 
of interest. These insights contribute to the above-cited overall aim of behavioral accounting 
research, that is, enhancing social welfare by optimizing the design and implementation of 
accounting systems depending on how addressees perceive and use them (Gillenkirch and 
Arnold, 2008).  
Gillenkirch and Arnold (2008) state that one part of behavioral accounting research addresses 
methodological issues. Such issues related to experimental research are further described in 
chapters 4.1.2 to 4.1.4. Although experiments receive special attention in behavioral 
accounting, other research methods as for example archival, survey or case studies also play an 
important role (Gillenkirch and Arnold, 2008; Birnberg, 2011). There is for example a growing 
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body of archival financial accounting research, which aims at integrating economic and 
psychological theory to provide new behavioral insights about financial accounting issues 
(Koonce and Mercer, 2005). Each method has its own specific strengths and weaknesses. 
Researchers as Libby et al. (2002) and Trotman et al. (2011) hence argue that research methods 
should rather be perceived as complementing than as replacing each other. Applying various 
research methods with specific strengths and weaknesses to provide insights on a certain 
research question ‘increases the diagnostic value of the findings’ (Libby, 1981, p. 15).  
The next chapter explains how experiments enable researchers to test for causal relations and 
underlines the necessity to address potential confounding factors. 
4.1.2 Examination of Causal Relations and the Role of Confounding Factors 
Experiments enable researchers to generate primary data especially collected for testing the 
hypotheses developed upfront. This is also true for other research methods as, e.g., survey or 
interview data (i.e., data based on questionnaires) as well as field data (observations directly 
taken from reality, e.g., within a company). In contrast, archival studies are based on data that 
is already available. This type of data, called secondary data, is generally collected and 
published for a non-research purpose, as, e.g., company data provided through annual reports 
(Maines et al., 2006).  
A major strength of experimental research is that experiments not only allow for testing 
associations between variables but also allow for investigating causal relations (Libby et al., 
2002; Smith, 2015). As stated by Shadish et al. (2002, pp. 3-4), ‘the definitions of terms such 
as cause and effect depend partly on each other and on the causal relationship in which both are 
embedded’27. A cause is at the inception of an effect. Often times, more than one factor is 
required to induce an effect. Shadish et al. (2002) underline that for this reason causal 
relationships are not deterministic and depend on the specific factors or the specific 
environment under which they occur. Based on Mill (1843), the authors explain that a causal 
relation between two variables is dependent on three conditions that are reflected in the 
conduction of an experimental study. First, the cause needs to precede the effect. This sequence 
is found in an experiment in the sense that the potential cause is first manipulated before 
afterwards generating observations on the dependent variable under investigation. Second, it is 
necessary that cause and effect are related. In an experiment, independent variables are 
manipulated at different levels to examine if variations in the cause are associated to variation 
                                                 





in the dependent variable, i.e., the effect. Third, the cause needs to be the only plausible 
explanation for the effect. Potential confounding factors that can have a systematic impact on 
the dependent variable under investigation are accounted for in an experiment to isolate the 
effect of the manipulated variable(s) on the dependent variable(s).  
Prior literature identified various confounding factors that could potentially jeopardize a study’s 
internal or external validity and hence its results (Campbell and Stanley, 1967; Kerlinger and 
Lee, 2000; Shadish et al., 2002). Campbell and Stanley (1967) provide an overview of the most 
common confounding factors. Other researchers build on and relate to this overview when 
discussing methodological issues in experimental research (e.g., Schwering, 2016). The 
confounding factors presented by Cambpell and Stanley (1967) have been considered for the 
design of the present experiment and are briefly introduced hereafter.28 The first nine factors 
are threats to the internal validity of a study while the last four factors potentially distort a 
study’s external validity (for further details on validity criteria see chapter 4.1.3).  
 History: Events happening between two times of measurement could potentially 
confound the results.   
 Maturation: Subjects mature in the passage of time independent of specific events. They 
could become, e.g., more tired during the study. These changes in personal well-being 
could introduce noise in subjects’ judgment and decision making behavior. 
 Testing: Results of or experiences gained in a first test can affect subjects’ behavior in 
a subsequent second test.  
 Instrumentation: A study’s results could differ in case experimental instrumentation is 
changed between treatment groups. Experimental material (e.g., instructions) and also 
the experimenter himself are part of an experiment’s instrumentation.  
 Statistical Regression: It has been shown that pre- and post-test results differ in pre-
test’s results being higher than post-test results. This is especially the case if post-test 
subjects are selected based on high scores they yielded in a pre-test because in post-tests 
answers commonly regress to the mean.   
 Selection: If subjects are selected for treatment groups based on specific criteria or if 
individuals self-select into treatment groups based on certain characteristics, results 
could be affected by the selection criteria and could thus potentially be biased. 
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 Experimental Mortality: If subjects prematurely cancel the experimental task resulting 
in a loss of respondents.  
 Selection-maturation interaction: Two or more of potential confounding factors could 
interact (e.g., selection and maturation). These interactions could be confounded with 
the effect of the independent variables of the study. 
 A further threat to internal validity is the so-called Demand and researcher expectancy 
effect (Maines et al., 2006): The creation and implementation of an experiment demands 
a high degree of researcher involvement. The experimental material as well as the 
interactions between experimenter and participants during the implementation phase 
can create demand in the sense that subjects feel induced to guess the expected answer 
and hence might revise their responses accordingly. 
 Reactive or Interaction Effect of Testing: A pre-test might affect a subject’s sensitivity 
to the variable under investigation which in turn might influence the subject’s post-test 
answers. Results gained from a pretested group of subjects are not comparable to results 
of a group of subjects who did not participate in the pre-test.  
 Interaction of Selection and Experimental Variable: In case the choice of subjects who 
participate in the study interacts with the dependent variable, results are only valid for 
the specific subject group. This confounding factor threatens the generalizability of 
results. 
 Reactive Effects of Experimental Arrangements: In case the experimental situation 
strongly differs from the real world, subjects might behave unnaturally, i.e., different 
from how they would behave in reality.  
 Multiple-treatment Interference: In case subjects are exposed to multiple treatments, 
previous treatment effects potentially bias subjects’ behavior in subsequent treatments.   
By controlling variables in an experiment, the researcher can isolate the effect of the 
independent variables on the dependent variables of interest, which goes beyond testing for 
associations and can reveal causal relations (Libby et al., 2002; Sprinkle, 2003; Trotman et al., 
2011). Common methods to control for confounding factors are discussed by Libby et al. (2002) 
and presented hereafter. The best way to deal with confounding factors would be to eliminate 
them. Although this is possible for certain factors (e.g., making subjects work in cubes to 
preempt them from communicating with each other during the study), it is not as easy for others 
(e.g., influence of the experimenter). In case elimination is not feasible, confounding factors 





group and does not bias the results asymmetrically between groups. A further method to cope 
with potential confounding factors is to measure them and integrate the resulting variables as 
control variables in the data analyses. This method is commonly applied to control for subjects’ 
attitudes. Another way to deal with confounding factors is randomization. Randomly 
distributing subjects to treatment groups mitigates or even eliminates selection biases as well 
as systematic differences between groups. Randomization contributes to an equal influence of 
potential confounding factors in each treatment group hence allowing isolating pure treatment 
effects. As Libby et al. (2002) explain, randomization helps keeping the omitted variable bias 
at a minimum level. The authors finally state that for efficiency reasons it can even be necessary 
to simply ignore certain extraneous variables if controlling them would be extremely complex 
(i.e., e.g., costly and/or time consuming). 
The examination of causal relations is thus possible due to the fact that the investigator has 
control over the independent variables by manipulating treatment conditions as well as over 
potential extraneous variables by holding them constant or via randomization (Kerlinger and 
Lee, 2000; Libby et al., 2002; Sprinkle, 2003; Trotman et al., 2011). This is not the case for 
non-experimental research as, e.g., archival or field research due to a lack of control over 
variables (Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). Data used in non-experimental research often relate to 
variables, which are inherently not manipulable (Maines et al., 2006).  
It is important to add that although being appropriate for investigating causal relations, 
experiments only have limited ability in identifying effect size. As Maines et al. (2006) explain 
this is partly caused by the fact that independent variables are normally not manipulated at all 
possible levels. Therefore, experiments are especially suitable for studying effects of discrete 
in contrast to continuous variables (Maines et al., 2006).  
One key characteristic of experimental research is the fact that the researcher himself can design 
the setting for the specific experimental study (Trotman et al., 2011). Therefore, experiments 
are an appropriate method not only for disentangling components which are interrelated in the 
natural environment and investigate causal inferences between these elements but also for 
examining effects of conditions which do not yet exist in the real world (Libby and Luft, 1993). 
Hence, an experiment allows researchers to examine, e.g., effects of exposure drafts of revised 
or even new accounting standards by designing a corresponding experimental setting (Maines 
et al., 2006). Additionally, experiments are also appropriate for testing and extending analytical 
research (Sprinkle, 2003). Due to the ability to test causal relations, experiments are able to not 





individuals’ behavior might deviate from the models’ predictions (Moser, 1998; Kerlinger and 
Lee, 2000). 
The next two chapters point to validity criteria as well as common experimental designs both 
representing important aspects that need to be considered and decided on for successfully 
implementing an experimental study.  
4.1.3 Validity Criteria 
When evaluating experimental research theory and designs regarding their validity, three 
validity criteria commonly come into play: construct validity, internal validity and external 
validity (Smith, 2015). 29 These three criteria are presented hereafter. 
As described by the predictive validity model (Libby, 1981), which is a framework for theory 
validation, a theory that a researcher develops in most cases addresses the relationship between 
two or more concepts. Because these concepts normally are not directly observable or 
measurable, the researcher needs to operationalize them. Hence, the theory must be tested via 
the operationalization of the variables involved (Libby, 1981; Libby et al., 2002). Construct 
validity addresses the extent to which these abstract concepts are appropriately operationalized 
through measurable variables. The less successful the operationalization is the less reliable 
experimental results will be (Smith, 2015). The operationalization of the constructs that are 
involved in the present study (cf. description of the research model presented in chapter 3.4) is 
presented and explained in chapters 4.2.3 to 4.2.5.   
Related to construct validity that is expressed by the quality of the concepts’ operationalization, 
internal validity concerns refer to the degree to which one can be sure that variations in 
dependent variables are truly triggered by variations in independent variables (Libby et al., 
2002). Different approaches exist that serve for increasing an experiment’s internal validity  
(cf. techniques to deal with confounding factors presented in chapter 4.1.2).  
Because experimental designs frequently abstract from real world settings, they often suffer 
from external validity concerns (Maines et al., 2006). External validity is the degree to which 
experimental results are representative and can be generalized beyond the specific experimental 
setting, measurement methods, and subject pool (Libby, 1981; Libby et al., 2002). According 
to Libby et al. (2002), external validity is not only a question of the validity of experimental 
stimuli but also of the theory and hypotheses developed. The authors argue that if the theory 
                                                 
29 Detailed explanations on experimental research validity criteria are provided, e.g., by Campbell and Stanley 





and hypotheses address elements of the related target environment, the study’s results should 
be generalizable to this environment under the condition that the study does not suffer from 
internal validity concerns. There are several ways to increase external validity of an 
experimental study. One approach to strengthen external validity is for example to develop 
hypotheses which rather focus on causal relations and specifically on directional effects than 
on specific numerical predictions which are less likely to be generalizable (Libby et al., 2002; 
cf., e.g., Cook and Campbell, 1979, for a presentation of different models increasing an 
experiment’s external validity). 
Although experiments are commonly criticized for a lack of external validity, they have a 
fundamental and crucial strength, which is the high level of internal validity (Kerlinger and Lee, 
2000). As Campbell and Stanley (1967) state, an ideal research design is characterized by 
achieving a high level of both internal and external validity at the same time. However, creating 
a research design, which is strong in internal as well as external validity, is difficult because 
both criteria are often contradictory. Due to the fact that trade-offs between validity types are 
inevitable, the prior between validity criteria needs to be defined depending on the research 
conducted (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
As described above, it is important to consider all three validity criteria when designing an 
experiment to assure the validity and usefulness of the collected data and hence the validity of 
the study’s results. When working on an experiment’s specific design, the researcher has several 
possibilities to model the study. The next chapter briefly presents fundamental experimental 
designs that are commonly applied in behavioral experimental research.      
4.1.4 Experimental Designs 
The design of experiments is commonly distinguished regarding the number of treatments 
subjects go through.30 In a between subjects design, participants normally experience only one 
out of all available treatment groups and hence provide one observation per construct. The 
researcher can thus analyze differences between treatment groups. To collect enough data, this 
design often demands a higher number of subjects relative to within-subjects designs, 
potentially leading to higher costs of conduction (e.g., in time and money) (Libby et al., 2002). 
Libby et al. (2002) state that the application of a between-subjects design can reduce the noise 
introduced by potential carry-over and salience effects that risk to appear in within- subject 
designs as explained hereafter. 
                                                 





In a within-subjects design participants experience more than one treatment. In this case, the 
experimenter receives more than one observation per subject (Libby et al., 2002). Within-
subjects designs allow controlling for between subject effects but at the same time increase the 
probability that subjects comprehend the underlying treatment effects (salience effect), which 
could introduce biases in subjects’ responses such as socially desired answers. In case subjects 
experience more than one treatment it is important to control for order effects to assure truly 
isolating treatment effects (Shadish et al., 2002). Randomizing the order in which treatments 
appear can also reduce the practice and carry over effect: subjects’ answers provided in 
subsequent measures can be biased by experiences made in prior measures (Shadish et al., 
2002). One type of a within-subjects design is the pretest-posttest design, which enables 
researchers to use pretest results as covariates in the analysis of the posttest results (Libby et 
al., 2002). 
Sometimes a combination of both between- and within-subjects design can be useful. This is 
especially the case in judgment and decision making research when investigators aim at 
separating effects of unintentional biases (heuristics) from effects of intentional judgments 
(rules) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Libby et al., 2002). Due to the fact that in a between-
subjects design participants only experience one treatment they receive less information than 
subjects in a within-subjects design experiencing more than one treatment. A between-subjects 
design provides evidence on the question if subjects rely on heuristic reasoning meaning 
researchers receive information on subjects’ natural reasoning process. In contrast, in a within-
subjects design subjects experience at least two treatments. This repetition increases the 
salience of the manipulated variables enabling subjects to rethink about and even change or 
correct their responses. It thus provides evidence on how individuals address a potential conflict 
between rules and heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Libby et al., 2002).  
In case a between-subjects design provides significant differences in results while a within-
subject design does not, subjects’ behavior is suggested to be unintentional. On the contrary, 
finding significant differences in results implementing a within-subjects design but non-
significant results in a between-subjects setting indicates that subjects understand and consider 
the manipulations of stimuli but they do not integrate this knowledge in their natural reasoning 
process (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996; Libby et al., 2002). If within-subjects results are 
consistent with between-subjects results, subjects seem to be able to integrate this information 
in their natural reasoning process because their judgments in the between-subjects design seem 





Depending on the hypotheses under investigation, it is thus important to apply the most suitable 
experimental design. Based on the prior methodological explanations, the next chapter presents 
the experiment conducted in this thesis.  
4.2 Experimental Design and Construct Operationalization  
As explained in chapter 4.1, when developing an experimental study it is desirable, even though 
difficult, to try to maximize all validity criteria at once and chose an appropriate experimental 
design to generate suitable data to test for the hypotheses under investigation. This chapter 
presents the experimental design as well as the applied operationalization of the constructs 
involved (cf. chapter 3.4) and highlights how potential methodological biases are addressed.   
4.2.1 Overview of the Experiment’s Design and Construct Operationalization   
The number of the factor levels of the involved independent variables influences the specific 
experimental design. According to the research model, two main independent variables, namely 
prior outcome (direct effect) and accounting method applied (primary moderator), influence the 
dependent variables subjective value and subjective preference. Both independent variables are 
considered on a two factor level basis. Prior outcome is either positive or negative (gain vs. loss 
experience) and the accounting method applied is either conservative or neutral. The impact of 
these independent variables on the dependent variables is investigated between subjects. This 
leads to a 2 x 2 between-subjects design (see Table 6, chapter 4.2.3). 
Subjects are randomly distributed to one of the four treatment groups. In the specific 
experimental setting (cf. chapter 4.2.2.2), subjects are invested in a company.31 They experience 
changes in value of their equity stake depending on the company’s investments and the 
accounting method applied. Throughout the experimental task, subjects have the possibility to 
sell their equity stake. The dependent variable subjective value is operationalized by subjects’ 
indications of selling prices (the specific measurement of subjective value is explained in 
chapter 4.2.4.1).  
To operationalize participants’ subjective preference for one or the other accounting method, 
all subjects are confronted with the same choice situation between two investment options that 
only differ in the accounting method applied (details on the measurement of subjective 
preference are provided in chapter 4.2.4.2). The experimental design thus switches from a 
                                                 
31 The aim of this study is to provide insights on the impact of accounting conservatism vs. neutrality on financial 
information users’ judgment and decision making. Therefore, subjects are put in their investor role representing 





between-subjects design to a within-subjects design for analyzing individuals’ conscious 
preferences for one or the other accounting method. 
The secondary moderator variable loss aversion is included on a subject basis by calculating 
each subject’s individual degree of loss aversion in risk and time settings (cf. chapter 4.2.5 for 
more details).  
The experiment is divided into three parts that include different tasks to collect data on the 
dependent variables under examination as well as on independent and control variables 
considered in this study.  
Part 1 is the main part of the experiment and serves to elicit subjects’ preferences for 
conservative vs. neutral accounting. In part 1, subjects experience five alternative investment 
scenarios. In scenarios 1 to 4, individuals are in a judgment context (between-subjects design) 
and experience either conservative or neutral accounting. This allows examining if individuals 
value conservative accounting more highly than neutral accounting (H1a) and hence show 
unconscious preferences for it. In scenario 5, subjects are in a choice context (within-subjects 
design) to investigate individuals’ explicit preferences for conservatism vs. neutrality in 
accounting (H2a).  
Part 2 consists of two instruments based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) that elicit subjects’ risk and 
time preferences serving as control variables in this study. The data collected on risk and time 
preferences allow calculating subjects’ individual degrees of loss aversion. Subjects’ loss 
aversion is a moderator variable in this study (H1b; H2b). 
Part 3 is the final part of the study and consists of a post experimental questionnaire (PEQ) on 
subjects’ understanding of the tasks, their personal attitudes, and demographics that are 
integrated as control variables in the analysis.   
The next chapter illustrates the task subjects completed in part 1.  
4.2.2 Subjects’ Task  
This thesis investigates individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservative compared to 
neutral accounting. The setting in which the main task is embedded thus needs to be able to 
capture the difference between these two accounting concepts. Several accounting topics exist 
that could provide an appropriate context. One example is the accounting for provisions. 
Recognizing provisions (e.g., for unsettled transactions) represents conservative accounting 
while not recognizing provisions would refer to neutral accounting, or recognizing contingent 





examples of conservatism are loan loss reserves and impairments of assets, or write-offs of 
doubtful receivables. Write-offs alone would be conservative whereas symmetrically 
recognizing changes in value by both write-offs and write-ups would represent neutral 
accounting. A typical example of neutral accounting therefore is full fair value accounting. 
Although these topics could provide a suitable context for the experiment, they are not further 
developed in this study because there is a consensus on the usefulness of recognizing provisions 
and depreciating receivables reducing the tension inherent in these topics. In contrast, another 
appropriate accounting topic that is currently controversially debated in literature and practice 
hence being more suspenseful is the accounting for R&D expenditures. 
The following chapter first presents current R&D accounting methods under IFRS that provide 
the particular context in which the experimental task is modeled, before afterwards illustrating 
the specific task subjects fulfilled in part 1 of the study that serve to examine individuals’ 
unconscious preferences for conservative vs. neutral accounting.  
4.2.2.1 Accounting for R&D Expenditures under IFRS  
The degree of conservatism in accounting depends on the prevailing accounting regulations and 
the exercise of accounting choice. In this thesis, this is illustrated via the example of R&D 
accounting under IFRS (also see chapter 3.4). According to IAS 38, expenditures on internally 
generated intangible assets in their research phase have to be expensed immediately when 
incurred (IAS 38.54). Capitalizing expenditures on intangibles in their development phase is 
mandatory when certain criteria are met. Otherwise, immediate expensing is required. These 
capitalization criteria are specified in IAS 38.57 and comprise the following points: technical 
and commercial feasibility, that is an entity’s intention to complete and use or sell the asset, the 
generation of future economic benefits through the asset, availability and provision of adequate 
resources and an entity’s ability to measure reliably the expenditures attributable to the 
intangible asset during its development. In summary, the fulfillment of these conditions thus 
confirms the project’s or product’s economic and technological feasibility. If a company is not 
able to clearly distinguish the research from the development phase of a project that is set up to 
create an intangible asset, the company must treat the corresponding expenditures as costs and 
expense them immediately as incurred (IAS 38.53).  
Development expenditures that are capitalized and hence recognized as an asset on the balance 
sheet must be amortized. If these assets have a finite useful life, they are regularly amortized 
over their useful lives and are further subject to impairment testing. If these assets have an 





impairment at each reporting date whether or not there is any indication of an impairment-
triggering event (IAS 36). In case the impairment test shows that the asset’s carrying amount 
exceeds its recoverable amount the asset must be written-off to the recoverable amount.  
On a theoretical level, several possible alternatives of recognizing expenditures on intangible 
assets exist representing different degrees of conservative accounting. Mandatory expensing of 
R&D expenditures as incurred, as prescribed under US GAAP (ASC 730-10-25-1), is an 
example of unconditionally conservative accounting (Penman and Zhang, 2002; Beaver and 
Ryan, 2005). This accounting treatment is mechanical and news-independent. R&D 
investments are recognized as expenses, not as assets. Expensing, being the classic conservative 
accounting method, does not necessarily reflect bad news about a project’s success but it 
considers a high degree of uncertainty about the project’s outcome upfront. As opposed to 
conservative accounting, neutral accounting prescribes capitalizing R&D expenditures, thus 
recognizing R&D investments as assets. As explained above, IFRS requires expensing of 
expenditures related to the creation of an intangible asset if the expenditures are incurred in the 
research phase (IAS 38.54). In contrast, IFRS requires the capitalization of development 
expenditures if the intangible asset arising from the development phase fulfills certain criteria 
that test for the commercial and technical feasibility of the venture (IAS 38.57). Under IFRS, 
assets are defined as future economic benefits (IASB, 2010, CF4.4-4.8). Development 
expenditures are treated as assets conditional on certain criteria specified in IAS 38.57 
representing conditional conservative accounting because future economic benefits are likely 
to flow to the firm as a result of the investment. The regulations set out in IAS 38 thus reflect a 
compromise between conservative and neutral accounting.  
Table 2 summarizes conceptual differences between conservative and neutral accounting based 
on the example of recognition of R&D expenditures. 
 Conservatism Neutrality 









 Treating R&D 
expenditures as costs, 
not assets  
 Capitalizing of 
Development 
expenditures under the 
conditions of IAS 38.57 
 
 Treating Development 
expenditures as assets  





 Treating R&D 
expenditures as assets  





In summary, mandatory immediate expensing of R&D expenditures represents unconditional 
conservatism, capitalizing development expenditures conditional on specified criteria 
represents conditional conservatism, and capitalization of R&D expenditures represents neutral 
accounting. The experimental setting modeled in this thesis compares conservative with neutral 
accounting without further distinguishing between different types of conservatism. Subjects 
experience either pure expensing or pure capitalizing of development expenditures 
unconditional on news. 
The next chapter presents the specific task subjects completed in the first part of the experiment. 
4.2.2.2 Specific Task in Part 1 of the Experiment 
The experimental task created in this study is newly developed. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted using z-Tree software (z-Tree Version 3.6.6; Fischbacher, 2007).32 
Participants thus performed the experimental tasks computer-based. The experiment was 
conducted at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and at the University of St. Gallen, 
Switzerland (cf. chapter 4.3 for details on the implementation of the final experiment). 
Part 1 of the experiment consists of five different investment scenarios serving to elicit subjects’ 
preferences for conservative vs. neutral accounting. Subjects are asked to put themselves in the 
position of an individual investor. The experimental currency used in this study is called Dollar 
$ (for details on the currency used and monetary incentives cf. chapter 4.3.2). In each 
investment scenario, subjects are endowed with equity of $ 200,000 (fresh start for each 
scenario). In scenarios 1 to 4, subjects are invested in a company (company A in scenario 1 to 
company D in scenario 4) at the full amount of their initial equity endowment of $ 200,000. 
The respective company has equity capital of $ 20M. Subjects’ equity stake thus represents 1% 
of the company’s equity. Investment decisions influencing the company’s equity also affect 
subjects’ equity stake in the firm. In investment scenario 5, subjects face two companies 
(company X and company Z) and are asked to decide in which of both companies they want to 
invest their equity endowment of $ 200,000. Participants see the amount of the company’s 
equity as well as the value of their own equity stake permanently top left on the computer 
screen.  
In investment scenarios 1 to 4, the respective company conducts two R&D projects 
sequentially. In investment scenario 5, subjects choose between investing their equity in 
                                                 
32 Z-Tree is a software especially developed for conducting economic experiments. It is based on a client-server 
application. Z-Tree itself is used on the server (i.e., the experimenter’s computer), and the clients  





company X vs. company Z. After investing in one of the two companies the company chosen 
conducts one R&D project. Table 3 provides an overview of R&D projects conducted per 
scenario. 
Investment Scenario Company R&D Project 
1 A 1 & 2 
2 B 3 & 4 
3 C 5 & 6 
4 D 7 & 8 
5 X vs. Z 9 
Table 3: Overview of R&D Projects per Scenario 
The probability of project success or failure is 50% for each R&D project conducted. Table 4 
provides an overview of the amount the respective company invests in the corresponding R&D 
project as well as of the R&D projects’ returns in case of success and failure. 
R&D Project Investment Success  Failure  
1 & 4 & 5 & 8 $ 8M $ 20M  $ 0 
2 & 6 & 9 $ 10M $ 25M  $ 0 
3 & 7 $ 6M $ 15M  $ 0 
Table 4: R&D Projects’ Cash Flows in Investment Scenarios 1 to 5 
Subjects have the possibility to sell their equity stake at any time throughout the investment 
scenarios. To make sure that selling decisions (i.e., company valuation) are not driven by 
differences in R&D projects’ profitability, the projects’ internal rate of return is hold constant 
at 25%33 across all projects (calculated for a period of 1 year). To account for time value of 
money, subjects are informed that the respective company generates its return on equity only 
through conducting R&D projects. Hence, R&D projects’ success represents the company’s 
equity return. Subjects can sell their stake in the firm at any time and hold their capital in an 
                                                 
33 Prior literature states that on average only 14% of initial ideas on new products finally become commercial 
successes and only ‘54% of commercialized new products were successful from a profit perspective’  
(cf. Barczak et al., 2009). Because of the high rate of R&D project failure these projects generally need to show 
a high rate of return for being conducted. Based on these deliberations, 25% is considered a realistic one-year 





account instead that would earn a market rate of return of 0%. This ensures that all projects are 
highly valuable from an economic perspective.  
Investment scenarios 1 to 4 follow the same structure. Scenario 1, representative for scenarios 
1 to 4, is exemplarily described in more detail hereafter. Starting the first investment scenario, 
subjects are informed that the company is planning to invest $ 8M in a R&D project, which 
spans two fiscal years: t=1 and t=2. The investment in the R&D project will be made in period 
t=1.34 It is further explained that in t=2 a random generator will determine if the project is 
successful or not. The likelihood of project success is 50%. Depending on the treatment group, 
the company either capitalizes or expenses R&D expenditures.  
The corresponding impact on subjects’ equity stake per period depends on the accounting 
method applied and project success. In case the company capitalizes R&D expenditures (neutral 
condition), subjects’ equity remains unchanged in period t=1. In fiscal year t=2, profit or loss 
depends on the success of the project affecting subjects’ equity differently. If the project is 
successful, the company will receive a return of $ 20M. This leads to a profit (and an according 
increase in equity) of $12M after amortization of the development costs. Subjects’ equity thus 
increases by $ 120,000. If the project fails, there will be no return on the investment, leading to 
a loss of $ 8M in t=2. Subjects experience a decrease in their own equity by $ 80,000. Annex 
1.1 provides a screenshot of the corresponding explanations subjects see on the computer 
screen.35  
In case the company expenses all development expenditures as incurred (conservative 
condition), the investment will lead to a reduction in company’s equity of $ 8M and to a 
reduction in subjects’ equity of $ 80,000 in fiscal year t=1. In fiscal year t=2, if the project is 
successful, the company will earn a return of $ 20M. This leads to a profit (and an according 
increase in equity) of $ 20M. Subjects’ equity will hence increase by $ 200,000. If the project 
fails, there will be no return on the investment and no profit or loss. A screenshot of the 
corresponding screen subjects see at this stage of the experiment is provided in Annex 1.2.  
Before the project investment is made in t=1, subjects are asked to indicate a price at which 
they would be willing to sell their equity stake at this point in time (t=0). Annex 1.3 shows the 
corresponding computer screen. To elicit subjects’ true price quotations, i.e., their willingness 
to accept a random buy offer for selling their equity stake, an auction procedure adapted from 
                                                 
34 Being in their investor role, subjects do not have any influence on whether the company invests in the R&D 
project or not. The company’s management has decided on project conduction. 





Becker et al. (1964) is applied (cf. chapter 4.2.4.1 for more details on this auction mechanism). 
Subjects are informed that by selling their equity stake they would forgo the chance of 
benefiting from a positive project return in case of project success. However, in case they do 
not sell their equity stake, they would continue to bear the risk of project failure. 
At the end of time period t=1, after the investment has been made by the company, subjects 
who did not sell their equity stake in t=0 are confronted with changes in their amount of equity 
stemming from project investment. Changes in equity after project investment depend on the 
accounting method applied (capitalizing vs. expensing R&D) (cf. Annex 1.4 for the 
corresponding screen shown in the capitalizing condition). Afterwards, subjects again indicate 
a price at which they would be willing to sell their equity stake. Subjects who do not sell their 
stake at this point will afterwards experience the R&D project’s outcome in t=2. Annex 1.5 
exemplarily shows the computer screen subjects see in the capitalizing condition in case of 
project success. After the first R&D project has been completed in t=2 and project outcome has 
been revealed, subjects are again asked to indicate a price at which they would be willing to 
sell their equity stake. In this moment, subjects do not have any concrete information about the 
company’s future projects. 
After the indication of a selling price in t=2, subjects are informed that the company has the 
opportunity to invest in a second R&D project. Subjects who have not sold their equity stake 
yet now run through the second R&D project in an identical way as has been described above 
for R&D project 1. At this point, subjects’ state of equity is not set back to initial values.  
Table 5 illustrates the steps subjects run through in the first investment scenario depending on 
whether and when they sell their equity stake. In case subjects sell their equity stake in the 






Time Periods in  
Investment Scenario 1 
Stages Subjects run through in Investment Scenario 1 
(In scenario 1, subjects are invested in Company A) 
t=0  Subjects are informed about R&D Project 1  
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
t=1  Company invests in R&D Project 1  
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
t=2  Outcome of R&D Project 1 is revealed  
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
 Subjects are informed about R&D Project 2 
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
t=3  Company invests in R&D Project 2  
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
t=4  Outcome of R&D Project 2 is revealed  
 Possibility to sell the equity stake 
 End of Investment Scenario 1 
Table 5: Stages Subjects run through in Investment Scenario 1 
The stages subjects run through that are described above and illustrated in Table 5 are identical 
for all R&D projects involved in scenarios 1 to 4 (the cash flows related to each project are 
illustrated in Table 4). At the beginning of each scenario, equity is set back to initial values. 
Subjects thus experience a fresh start (i.e., they are invested in the respective company at the 
amount of $ 200,000).  
Investment scenario 5 differs from investment scenarios 1 to 4 in asking subjects in time period 
t=0 to choose in which of two companies X and Z they want to invest their equity of $ 200,000. 
Company X and company Z are identical except for the accounting method applied: company 
X capitalizes R&D expenditures while company Z expenses R&D expenditures as incurred (see 
Annex 1.6 and Annex 1.7 for the respective screens subjects see at this stage of the study). 
Depending on the choice subjects make (cf. Annex 1.8 for the computer screen asking subjects 
to choose between both options), they experience R&D project 9 in either a neutral or a 
conservative setting. The point of interest in scenario 5 is the choice subjects make between 
company X and company Z. This scenario is hence shortened by making subjects experience 





The next chapter explains the specific manipulation of the independent variables. These 
explanations also provide further details on the task subjects completed in part 1 of the study.   
4.2.3 Manipulation of Independent Variable and Primary Moderator 
As mentioned in chapter 4.2.1, the independent variables prior project outcome and accounting 
method applied are both manipulated at a two factor level leading to a 2x2 between-subjects 
design. The accounting method applied for R&D expenditures is either neutral or conservative 
(CONS36) and prior R&D project outcome is either a success or a failure (LOSS). 
These manipulations result in the creation of four treatment groups. Subjects are randomly 
distributed to one of the four groups. The first manipulation relates to the accounting method 
applied. Treatment groups 1 and 2 (3 and 4) experience investment scenarios 1 and 2 in a neutral 
(conservative) setting and investment scenarios 3 and 4 in a conservative (neural) setting. The 
second manipulation addresses R&D projects’ outcome. For comparability purposes, the 
sequence of R&D projects’ outcome is determined randomly for treatment group 1 (probability 
of project success p=0.5) and afterwards applied in an identical manner to treatment group 3. 
Treatment groups 2 and 4 experience the respective opposite project outcomes.37 Table 6 
provides an overview of the manipulations applied in investment scenarios 1 to 5 experienced 
by treatment groups. 
 Treatment Group 1 Treatment Group 2 Treatment Group 3 Treatment Group 4 
Scenario 1 Capitalizing Capitalizing Expensing Expensing 
Project 1 Loss Gain Loss Gain 
Project 2 Loss Gain Loss Gain 
Scenario 2 Capitalizing Capitalizing Expensing Expensing 
Project 3 Gain Loss Gain Loss 
















                                                 
36 Names of corresponding variables that are integrated in the data analysis (cf. chapter 5) are given in parentheses. 
Annex 4 provides an overview of all variables involved in this study. The overview includes variables’ 
definitions and measurement. 
37 Predetermining a random sequence of stimuli that is subsequently applied to all participants is a procedure used 
in experimental research to limit variation across subjects (cf., e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002). This approach leads to 





Scenario 3 Expensing Expensing Capitalizing Capitalizing 
Project 5 Gain Loss Gain Loss 
Project 6 Loss Gain Loss Gain 
Scenario 4 Expensing Expensing Capitalizing Capitalizing 
Project 7 Loss Gain Loss Gain 
Project 8 Gain Loss Gain Loss 








Project 9 Random Random Random Random 
Table 6: Overview of the Manipulations applied in Investment Scenario 1 to 5 per Treatment Group 
At the beginning of investment scenarios 1, 3, and 5, after having received information on the 
basic conditions of the corresponding R&D project as well as the accounting method applied 
by the company, subjects answer comprehension check questions to examine if they understood 
the respective scenario correctly.38 Annex 1.9 provides a screenshot of the corresponding 
computer screen subjects see in investment scenario 1. If subjects tick wrong answers, they are 
directed back to the comprehension check questions screen and have to re-answer the questions 
until all answers are correct.39 These questions asked during the task mainly serve to keep 
subjects concentrated on the task and point their attention to the difference in accounting 
method applied. Classical manipulation check questions that serve to check subjects’ 
understanding of the manipulations are part of the PEQ (cf. chapter 4.2.5.2). 
The next chapter explains the measurement of the dependent variables.  
4.2.4 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
As stated in the hypotheses (cf. chapter 3.4), this thesis examines if individuals value 
conservatism more highly than neutral accounting and if individuals have explicit preferences 
for conservatism relative to neutrality. The operationalization and the measurement of both 
dependent variables, i.e., subjective value and explicit preference, are explained in the 
following two chapters. 
                                                 
38 These manipulation check questions are not asked in investment scenarios 2 and 4 because these scenarios’ 
settings are equivalent to the settings in investment scenarios 1 and 3. 





4.2.4.1 Subjective Value 
The concept of subjective value is operationalized by individuals’ valuation of the equity stake 
they own in a company depending on prior project outcome and the respective accounting 
method applied (WTA). As described in chapter 4.2.2.2, in each scenario, subjects are invested 
in a company and experience equity in- or decrease generated through R&D projects under both 
accounting methods. Subjects have the possibility to sell their equity stake at each point in time: 
before the company invests in the R&D project, after the company has invested in the project 
but before the project’s outcome turns out, and after the R&D project outcome has been 
revealed. An incentive compatible variant of an auction procedure adapted from Becker, 
DeGroot, Marschak (1964) (BDM-procedure) is applied to elicit the actual minimum price at 
which subjects would be willing to sell their equity stake. 
The BDM-procedure is a value elicitation method that follows a certain pattern. In a first step, 
subjects indicate a selling price for a certain stimulus they face or own (e.g., a lottery, a company 
share, a product, etc.). In a second step, a random generator draws a random buy offer for the 
respective stimulus. In a third step, both price quotations are compared. If the random buy offer 
exceeds the subject’s selling price, the buying-selling transaction takes place and subjects sell 
the stimulus at the price of the random bid. The procedure thus elicits a specific cash amount 
that subjects judge to be equivalent to receiving a random reward from the lottery or from 
keeping the company share or product (Becker et al., 1964). 
From the subjects’ perspective, under the BDM-procedure it is optimal to set their minimum 
selling price equal to their actual valuation of the respective stimulus (i.e., to indicate the 
corresponding cash equivalent). If they understate their true valuation and the random generator 
draws a buy offer that is only slightly higher than the indicated selling price but lower than 
subject’s true valuation, the transaction takes place. In this case, subjects forfeit money because 
from their perspective the stimulus is undervalued. If they overstate their true valuation and the 
random buy offer is lower than the indicated selling price but higher than subjects’ true 
valuation, the transaction does not take place. In this case, subjects would forgo a monetary 
gain. In summary, under the BDM-procedure, a deliberate misevaluation can lead to sub-
optimal transactions. The BDM-procedure thus induces subjects to reveal their true valuation 
of the respective stimulus. The BDM price elicitation procedure has been applied in a variety 
of settings (e.g., estimation of consumers’ WTP (Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002) or valuation 





The application of the BDM-procedure in the present study is illustrated hereafter based on the 
example of investment scenario 2, R&D project 3, time period t=0. In t=0, subjects receive the 
information that company B is planning to invest $ 6M in a R&D project in t=1. The project 
would yield a return on investment of $ 15M ($ 0) in t=2 in case of project success (failure). 
The probability of success is p = 0.5. Company B owns equity of $ 20M before project 
investment. Subjects’ equity stake has a value of $ 200,000. Before the investment is made, 
subjects have the possibility to sell their equity stake and hence escape the risk of project failure. 
It is underlined that in case of selling their stake, they also forgo the chance to benefit from 
project success. Subjects are asked to indicate on a slider the minimum price that they would 
demand for selling their share. The slider spans a price range from $ 140,000 to $ 290,000.40 
Annex 1.10 shows the corresponding computer screen subjects see when indicating their selling 
price. Subjects are informed that after indication of their price quotation, a random generator 
will determine a buy offer by drawing a random number between $ 140,000 and $ 289,000. To 
offer subjects the possibility to definitely hold their equity stake, the buy offer is taken from a 
price range between $ 140,000 and $ 289,000 instead of determining $ 290,000 as the upper 
level. Indicating $ 290,000 as the selling price would hence prevent subjects from selling their 
equity stake. Indicating $ 140,000 would definitely lead to a selling transaction. 
The random generator operates with equally-distributed random numbers. The fact that every 
number from the defined buy offer price range can potentially be drawn induces subjects to 
indicate their true minimum selling price. If the selling price participants indicate is equal to or 
below the random buy offer drawn by the random generator, subjects have to sell their equity 
stake at the price determined by the buy offer.41 In case the selling price subjects indicate is 
above the randomly drawn buy offer, the transaction does not take place. If subjects sell their 
equity stake in one scenario they are immediately directed to the subsequent scenario. The 
respective comparable scenarios (i.e., capitalize and expense conditions in which subjects 
experience the same sequence of R&D project outcome; cf. Table 6) are economically identical 
at all times because ranges of possible selling prices are defined by project outcome. If they 
would have been defined by subjects’ current amount of equity the scenarios would differ 
economically in t=0 and t=1 depending on the accounting method applied.  
                                                 
40 Overall, the R&D project can lead either to a decrease in subjects’ equity of $ 60,000 in case of project failure 
or to an increase in subjects’ equity of $ 90,000 in case of project success. Departing from subjects’ initial equity 
of $ 200,000, these amounts determine the price span for the indication of the minimum selling price: $ 140,000 
to $ 290,000.  
41 Using the randomly determined buy offer instead of the selling price indicated by subjects as the final transaction 





Comparing the means of indicated selling prices between treatment groups allows investigating 
if there are differences in subjective value depending on prior project outcome and the 
accounting method applied. Subjective value is hence operationalized by subjects’ price 
quotations, which represent the minimum buy offer they would accept for selling their equity 
stake. To solve the problem of non-comparability of absolute price quotations due to differing 
valuation scales based on prior project outcome, deviations of indicated selling prices from the 
respective rational economic value of the corresponding share (EVS) are calculated 
(𝑊𝑇𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑉  𝑊𝑇𝐴 𝐸𝑉𝑆  and compared across treatment groups. Using price deviations 
from rational share values allows comparing all four groups because price spans from which 
the evaluations are taken are identical across treatments. A positive (negative) deviation of the 
price quotation from the rational share value indicates an overvaluation (undervaluation) of the 
equity stake. 
Based on the Hypothesis H1a, individuals should value conservative accounting more highly 
than neutral accounting. The mean of deviations of subjects’ price quotations from the rational 
share value should be higher in the conservative treatment. This would represent a lower 
willingness to sell their company share and thus show a higher valuation of the conservative 
condition. Due to the fact that at this stage of the experiment subjects do not deliberately 
compare conservative to neutral accounting but stay in one treatment group, the respective 
results would provide evidence that individuals have unconscious (i.e., unintentional) 
preferences for one or the other accounting method (H1a) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996;  
Libby et al., 2002).  
The next chapter explains how explicit preferences for an accounting method are 
operationalized and measured. 
4.2.4.2 Explicit Preference 
Investment scenarios 1 to 4 each contains two R&D projects to create several possibilities for 
subjects to implicitly encounter how the respective accounting method works in gain and loss 
situations. In investment scenarios 1 to 4, preferences for conservative vs. neutral accounting 
are investigated in a between-subjects design. To go one step further, it is additionally examined 
if these individual judgments are intentional or rather unintentional. Therefore, the between-
subjects design in scenarios 1 to 4 switches to a within-subjects design in investment  
scenario 5. Combining a between- with a within-subjects design allows to shed more light on 






To operationalize individuals’ explicit conscious preferences for one or the other accounting 
method (H2a), investment scenario 5 consists of a within-subjects choice setting. Being in their 
investor role, participants face two investment opportunities: company X and company Z. The 
two companies are completely identical besides the accounting methods applied for R&D 
projects: company X applies neutral accounting whereas company Z applies conservative 
accounting. Both companies envisage conducting a profitable R&D project (cf. Table 3 and 
Table 4). To avoid order effects, subjects receive the presentations of company X and company 
Z in a random sequence. Subjects are required to indicate in which company they want to invest 
their equity of $ 200,000 (INVDEC) (cf. Annex 1.8 for the computer screen subjects see at this 
stage of the experiment). Afterwards, subjects run through the corresponding investment 
setting.  
From a rational economic point of view, both investment options are completely identical. The 
accounting method applied does not have any influence on overall profits or losses. In case 
subjects consider this fact when choosing one option, the choice does not necessarily reflect a 
preference but rather indifference between the options. Therefore, to refine this 
operationalization, subjects indicate how much they prefer the chosen over the unchosen option. 
A 7-point Likert Scale is used to measure the strength of preference (PREF). Subjects also 
specify if their choice between option X and Z was random (RAND). They are further asked 
whether they consider the accounting method to be relevant for the economic evaluation of the 
investments’ profitability (ACCMETH1). Subjects also indicate if they made their investment 
decision based on the accounting method applied by the respective company (ACCMETH2).  
Rationally, subjects should be indifferent between both investment options. If this is true, both 
options should be chosen equally often. In this thesis, it is argued that individuals’ show 
preferences for conservative compared to neutral accounting based on loss aversion (cf. chapter 
3.4). Prior literature provides hints that experience does not fully eliminate loss aversion. Due 
to the fact that loss aversion seems to be an innate phenomenon deeply rooted in human beings, 
experience should not fully mitigate individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism in 
accounting. Subjects should not be able to fully overcome this bias (cf. chapter 3.4). If this is 
true, company Z should be chosen more often than company X and the choice should reflect 
real preferences for the respective option.  
The next chapter presents extraneous variables that could potentially influence the dependent 






4.2.5 Measurement of Control Variables and Calculation of Secondary Moderator 
The selling prices subjects indicate in investment scenarios 1 to 4 and the choice between the 
investment options subjects make in investment scenario 5 might not only be influenced by the 
specific independent variables that are part of the research model. To isolate the influence of 
the respective manipulation of the independent and moderator variables on the dependent 
variable, it is critical to hold the experimental setting constant across all treatment groups. 
Furthermore, extraneous factors that potentially influence the dependent variables and hence 
could bias the results should be controlled for (cf. chapter 4.1.2). The following two chapters 
present the measurement of control variables that are considered in this study and further 
describe how the secondary moderator is calculated. 
4.2.5.1 Risk and Time Preferences and Derived Loss Aversion 
The second part of the experiment is dedicated to the measurement of individuals’ utility under 
risk and utility over time based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013). The instrument by Abdellaoui et al. 
(2013) is currently one of the most recent and complex approaches for measuring individuals’ 
risk and time preferences compared to other instruments (cf., e.g., Charness et al., 2013, for an 
overview of different methods for measuring risk attitudes). 
Risk involved in the R&D projects conducted in study part 1 (the probability of project success 
is 0.5; cf. chapter 4.2.2.2) could potentially influence subjects’ decisions on selling prices and 
investment options. Supported by findings on the risk aversion effect presented in chapter 3.1.7, 
people who are more risk averse should be more reluctant to stay invested in the respective 
company because in this case they would take on the risk of project failure. They should be 
more willing to forgo potential gains by selling their equity stake than people who are less risk 
averse. In case future risky options (i.e., R&D projects) provide the possibility to compensate 
prior losses, risk attitudes might change. Even more risk averse people might stay invested and 
take the risk of project failure to keep the chance to break even (cf. chapter 3.1.7). Therefore, it 
is important to control for subjects’ risk attitudes and pay special attention to the specific setting 
in which the risk related behavior is observed.  
Individuals’ time preferences might also play a role when subjects decide on selling prices in 
investment scenarios 1 to 5. As explained in chapter 3.1.4, individuals frequently discount 
future losses at a different and mostly lower rate than future gains. They get loss experiences 
preferably over and done with rather sooner than later. Depending on the accounting method 
applied in investment scenarios 1 to 5, the timing of a potential loss experience differs. In the 





they are delayed to the subsequent period. People discounting losses at a low rate should hence 
be more reluctant to stay invested in the company under neutral accounting than people with 
higher loss discounting rates should. It is hence important to control for individual time 
preferences. 
Related to these prior deliberations, Abdellaoui et al. (2013) argue that individuals’ utility 
functions for uncertain (delayed) outcomes are defined by individuals’ risk (time) preferences. 
Individuals’ loss aversion leads to differences in the curvature of utility functions over positive 
vs. negative outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Abdellaoui et al., 2013). The collected 
data on risk and time preferences builds the basis for the calculation of individuals’ degrees of 
loss aversion for risk and time contexts (LARISK, LATIME). As explained in chapter 3.4, 
individuals’ degree of loss aversion is a moderator variable in this study. A higher degree of 
loss aversion could strengthen endogenous preferences for conservatism in accounting. If this 
is true, the degree of individuals’ loss aversion would moderate the hypothesized moderator 
impact of the accounting method applied on the direct effect of prior project outcome on 
individuals’ subjective valuation. In consequence, individuals showing higher levels of loss 
aversions should also value conservative accounting more highly and show stronger preferences 
for conservatism than neutrality in accounting than people with lower degrees of loss aversion 
should. 
4.2.5.1.1 Instrument for Eliciting Certainty and Present Equivalents based on 
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
The instruments developed by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) allow to separate individuals’ risk 
aversion from individuals’ loss aversion and enables researchers to consider risk and time 
attitudes as well as loss aversion as independent or control variables in their projects. The 
authors do not find a unifying concept of utility. Their experiments show that utility under risk 
and utility over time are uncorrelated. The same is true for loss aversion: the authors’ results 
lead to the assumption that loss aversion is stronger in risk than in time settings.  
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) conducted two experiments for testing their instrument on utility under 
risk and utility over time: one in Rotterdam and one in Paris. The present study focuses on the 
instrument applied in Paris, which is the ameliorated and advanced version. Individuals’ risk 
and time preferences are measured in pure gain, pure loss, and mixed outcome contexts. For 
risk, in a first step, subjects decide between a two-outcome lottery and a sure payment in a pure 
gain setting. Both options initially have the same expected value. Subsequently, the amount of 





certainty equivalent for the respective lottery. In a second step, the same procedure is applied 
to derive certainty equivalents for losses. In a third step, individuals face choices between two-
outcome lotteries with mixed payoffs and a sure payment. Annex 1.11 provides an example of 
a computer screen subjects see in the mixed outcome setting. The negative outcome of the 
lottery is changing iteratively depending on the choices subjects make. Results from the mixed 
setting are used for calculating loss aversion (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.2).  
In the context of time, present equivalents are identified via making subjects choose between 
an option consisting of a sure payment now and a second option consisting of a sure payment 
now and a sure payment delayed to the future. Both options initially include the same amount 
of money. In pure gain and loss settings, the single payment now is changing depending on 
individuals’ choices to derive present equivalents iteratively. In a mixed setting, subjects chose 
between an option containing a sure payment today and an option consisting of a two-
component payoff with a certain positive (negative) amount to be received now and a certain 
negative (positive) amount to be received later (cf. Annex 1.12 for an example of a computer 
screen subjects see in the mixed outcome setting). The amounts to be received later change 
iteratively depending on subjects’ choices. Again, the results generated from the mixed 
prospects are used to calculate individuals’ degree of loss aversion. 
When applying the instruments developed by Abdellaoui et al. (2013), certain adjustments were 
made to fit them to the present study. Via these adjustments, elements of the investment 
scenarios of study part 1 are reflected in the instruments applied in study part 2. This allows 
collecting data on risk and time preferences that most suitably correspond to individuals’ 
attitudes that come into play in the investment scenarios of study part 1. Adjustments made both 
for risk and time instruments are described hereafter. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) collected the data in personal interview sessions where the 
experimenter enters the answers subjects provide. In the present study, subjects work on the 
task computer-based and enter their answers themselves. Abdellaoui et al. (2013) started with 
the instrument on time followed by the instrument on risk. The order is reversed in the present 
study because the instrument on utility under risk is incentive compatible as are investment 
scenarios in study part 1. In contrast, the instrument on time is conducted on a hypothetic basis 
in the present study. Therefore, the inversed order seemed to be more consistent. Instead of 18 
training questions in total, the present study included only four training questions. The number 
of training questions was reduced to economize on time. Questions are considered easy to 





subjects’ performance in study part 2. The number of rounds of each iteration process applied 
by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) was not fixed up-front but only stopped if the indifference values 
changed by less than EUR 2. In the present study, the number of iterations was fixed to five for 
gain and loss prospects and to six for mixed prospects, which is considered to lead to valid 
results. The outcomes involved in the instruments on risk and time preferences are presented in 
the experimental currency ($) to keep the same monetary dimensions that have been used in 
part 1. 
In the present study, in the context of risk, seven certainty equivalents were derived for gains, 
seven certainty equivalents were derived for losses and two certainty equivalents were derived 
for mixed outcomes. The total number of stimuli applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) was higher 
due to robustness check purposes. Another adjustment made is that lotteries’ payoff 
probabilities are held constant at 50% instead of 25%. 50% better reflects the setting of study 
part 1: the probability of R&D projects’ success vs. failure is also held constant at 50%. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the risk stimuli applied in the present study’s part 2. In the 
gain setting, for instance, individuals first choose between a two-outcome lottery consisting of 
receiving $ 100,000 or 0 with a probability of 50% and a sure payment of $ 50,000. Both options 
thus have the same expected value. Depending on the subject’s choice, the sure payment 
changes iteratively. The same procedure holds for loss prospects. For mixed prospects, the 
negative outcome of the mixed prospect changes iteratively depending on subjects’ choices. 
Table 7 further provides descriptive information on subjects’ certainty equivalents determined 
for all gain and loss prospects as well as for the corresponding derived negative outcome of the 
mixed lotteries making the lottery equivalent to a sure payment of $ 0. Regarding, for instance, 
the first gain prospect applied in study part 2, subjects’ derived mean certainty equivalent is 
45.33. The corresponding median is 48.44. As indicated by the interquartile ranges (IQR), 50% 
of the certainty equivalents for the first gain prospect lie between 39.06 and 51.56. These 
derived subjective values are used to measure probability weights and risk utility parameters 






All amounts are 
stated in 





Median IQR Mean 
Gain prospects (100, 1/2; 0) 50 48.44 [39.06, 51.56] 45.33 
 (200, 1/2; 50) 125 117.97 [99.22, 127.34] 116.05 
 (200, 1/2; 100) 150 146.87 [132.81, 151.56] 142.39 
 (50, 1/2; 0) 25 24.22 [19.53, 25.78] 23.05 
 (150, 1/2; 100) 125 124.21 [117.97, 125.78] 122.70 
 (200, 1/2; 150) 175 174.22 [167.19, 175.78] 170.72 
 (200, 1/2; 0) 100 90.62 [71.87, 96.87] 82.37 
Loss prospects (-100, 1/2; 0) -50 -48.44 [-54.69, -42.19] -48.80 
 (-200, 1/2; -50) -125 -122.66 [-127.34, -103.90] -115.39 
 (-200, 1/2; -100) -150 -148.44 [-151.56, -135.94] -143.45 
 (-50, 1/2; 0) -25 -24.22 [-25.78, -21.09] -23.98 
 (-150, 1/2; -100) -125 -124.22 [-125.78, -119.53] -123.36 
 (-200, 1/2; -150) -175 -174.22 [-175.78, -167.19] -170.99 
 (-200, 1/2; 0) -100 -96.87 [-103.12, 84.37] -95.79 
Mixed prospects (200, 1/2; -200) 0 -150.00 [-203.12, -103.12] -151.98 
 (50, 1/2; -50) 0 -49.22 [-50.78, -29.09] -44.59 
Table 7: Stimuli applied for Elicitation of Utility under Risk and Corresponding Derived Certainty Equivalents and 
Negative Payments of Two-Outcome Prospects 
As it has been the case for the instrument on risk attitudes, certain adjustments were made to 
optimally relate the instrument on time preferences to the first part of the study. For time, seven 
present equivalents are derived for gains, seven present equivalents are derived for losses and 
four present equivalents are derived for mixed outcomes. Again, the total number of stimuli 
applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) was higher due to robustness check purposes. Another 
adjustment made is the fact that the delay period is held constant at one year instead of six 
months. This delay corresponds to what has been used in part 1: the execution of the R&D 
projects is described in steps of fiscal years. 
Table 8 provides an overview of the time stimuli used in the present study’s part 2. In the pure 
gain setting, for instance, individuals first have the choice between a two-payment prospect 





$ 100,000 today. Both options thus initially include the same amount of money. Depending on 
the subject’s choice, the one-payment option changes iteratively. The same procedure is applied 
for loss prospects. For mixed prospects, the negative payment of the two-payment option 
changes iteratively depending on the subject’s choice. Table 8 provides descriptive information 
on subjects’ present equivalents determined for all gain and loss two-payment prospects as well 
as for the corresponding derived negative payment of the four mixed two-payment prospects 
making them equivalent to a one-payment option of $ 0. Regarding, for instance, the first gain 
prospect used in the time setting of study part 2, subjects’ derived mean present equivalent is 
90.56. The corresponding median is 96.87. As indicated by the interquartile ranges (IQR), 50% 
of the present equivalents for the first gain prospect lie between 90.62 and 96.87. These derived 
subjective values are used to measure discount factors and time utility parameters per subject 
and calculate subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.2). 
All amounts are 






Median IQR Mean 
Gain prospects (100, 1 year; 0) 100 96.87 [90.62, 96.87] 90.56 
 (75, 1 year; 25) 100 97.66 [88.28, 97.66] 94.66 
 (150, 1 year; 0) 150 140.62 [135.94, 145.31] 135.36 
 (50, 1 year; 0) 50 45.31 [42.19, 48.44] 44.45 
 (100, 1 year; 50) 150 146.87 [134.37, 146.87] 140.71 
 (150, 1 year; 50) 200 185.94 [176.56, 195.31] 184.38 
 (200, 1 year; 0) 200 193.75 [181.25, 193.75] 183.67 
Loss prospects (-100, 1 year; 0) -100 -96.87 [-100.00, -90.62] -92.79 
 (-75, 1 year; -25) -100 -97.66 [-97.66, -88.28] -92.53 
 (-150, 1 year; 0) -150 -145.31 [-145.31, 135.94] -139.72 
 (-50, 1 year; 0) -50 -48.44 [-50.00, -42.19] -45.85 
 (-100, 1 year; -50) -150 -146.87 [-146.87, -140.62] -139.97 
 (-150, 1 year; -50) -200 -195.31 [-195.31, -185.94] -185.04 

















Mixed prospects (-200, 1 year; 200) 0 -196.87 [-196.87, -184.37] -186.32 
 (-50, 1 year; 50) 0 -47.66 [-49.22, -42.97] -44.54 
 (200, 1 year; -200) 0 -203.12 [-215.62, -196.87] -210.11 
 (50, 1 year; -50) 0 -50.78 [-56.25, -49.22] -54.10 
Table 8: Stimuli applied for Elicitation of Utility over Time and Corresponding Derived Present Equivalents and 
Negative Payments of Two-Payment Prospects 
The above described instruments on risk and time preferences applied in this study contain eight 
consistency check questions for risk and time stimuli respectively. For consistency check 
purposes, subjects again choose between two options in three randomly selected scenarios from 
the pure gain context, three scenarios from the pure loss context and two scenarios from the 
mixed outcome context to verify if their answers are consistent and not random. Consistency 
check questions appear at the end of the respective setting (gain, loss, mixed context) without 
drawing subjects’ special attention to them. Due to the high number of choices subjects make 
in study part 2, they probably do not realize that they answer several questions twice. Hence, 
the consistency check questions should truly reflect the actual degree of consistent answers. For 
risk, inconsistency rates were 23.47% in the pure gain setting, 20.07% for pure loss outcomes, 
and 16.58% for mixed prospect questions. For time, inconsistency rates were 8.50% in the gain 
context, 6.80% for pure loss prospects, and 6.38% for mixed outcome questions. The 
inconsistency rate observed in the risk setting is comparable to reversal rates found in prior 
studies that normally lie in the range of 10% to 30% (e.g., Stott, 2006, for a list of corresponding 
studies and observed reversal rates). Answers provided in the time setting were noticeably more 
consistent than answers given in the risk setting. This is comparable to findings by Abdellaoui 
et al. (2013, Rotterdam experiment). This noise pattern indicates that decisions under risk are 
of higher complexity for people than decisions over time. 
4.2.5.1.2 Measurement of Risk and Time Parameters and Calculation of Loss Aversion  
Based on the above-described determined certainty (present) equivalents, probability weights 
(discount factors) and risk (time) utility parameters are derived per subject. The corresponding 
measurement approach applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) and used in this thesis is presented 
in Annex 2.  
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) depart from Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to derive 
prospect evaluation under risk (cf. Annex 2.1) and relate to a sign-dependent discounted utility 





sign-dependent utility function for risk and time, which consists of a basic utility function 
𝑢  (j = r for risk and t for time) and a loss aversion parameter 𝜆  (j = r for risk and t for time) 
(cf. Annex 2.3). To derive 𝑢  and 𝜆  per subject, a three-step procedure is followed (cf. Annex 
2.4). The corresponding regression equations are estimated via nonlinear least squares, using 
exponential specifications for 𝑢  and 𝑢  (cf. Annex 2.5). In risk contexts, the utility parameters 
(µ, 𝜈) represent individuals’ risk attitudes. ‘The exponential utility function is concave (convex) 
for gains (losses) if µ > 0 (𝜈 > 0), linear if µ 𝜈 0, and convex (concave) if µ < 0 (𝜈 < 0)’ 
(Abdellaoui et al., 2013, p. 2156). In gain contexts, a larger compared to a lower µ represents 
higher risk aversion while in loss contexts a larger compared to a lower ν represents less risk 
aversion. Table 9 shows mean parametric estimations for Risk and Time (µ, 𝜈) based on 
individual data.  
 Utility Gains Utility Losses Loss-aversion 
Coefficient λ  
Risk (µ    
N=196 0.89 (0.39) -0.26 (0.12) 2.62 (0.97) 
N=193* 0.92 (0.39) -0.25 (0.12) 1.5 (0.08) 
Time (𝜈    
N=196 -0.12 (0.04) -0.37 (0.12) 1.22 (0.18) 
N=195** -0.11 (0.04) -0.37 (0.12) 1.04 (0.05) 
Means; Standard Errors in Parentheses 
*3 subjects are excluded whose λ for risk is above 8 
**1 subject is excluded whose λ for time is above 8 
Table 9: Parametric Estimation for Utility under Risk and Utility over Time 
Table 10 shows median probability weighting and discounting based on the individual data. 
N=196 Gain Loss 
Probability Weight 𝑤  (1/2) = 0.48
[0.37, 0.55]






Median; IQR in brackets 





The resulting utility parameters for risk (time) and probability weights (discount factors) 
together with certainty (present) equivalents derived from two-outcome lotteries’ results serve 
to calculate individuals’ level of loss aversion for risk and time settings (LARISK50, 
LARISK200, LARISK, LATIME1, LATIME2, LATIME3, LATIME4, LATIME, LATIMESOON, 
and LATIMETOTAL) (cf. Annex 2.4, Step 3). 
Besides calculating values of loss aversion per subject, Abdellaoui et al. (2013, p. 2161) also 
measure risk aversion per subject and for all prospects 𝑖 via computing (𝐸𝑉 𝐶𝐸 /𝜎 , where 
𝐸𝑉  is the expected value of prospect 𝑖, 𝐶𝐸  is its certainty equivalent, and 𝜎  is its standard 
deviation. Larger values of the resulting ratio represent higher risk aversion. The same approach 
for calculating a risk aversion ratio per subject for gain, loss and mixed prospects is applied in 
this thesis (RAGAIN, RALOSS, RAMIXED). Table 11 presents corresponding means of risk 







Risk Aversion Ratio 0.126 -0.082 0.138 
Table 11: Mean Risk Aversion Ratios per Type of Prospect 
Consistent with Prospect Theory and results found by Abdellaoui et al. (2013), subjects are risk 
averse in gain settings and risk seeking in loss settings (0.126 > -0.082). Based on loss aversion, 
individuals should show most pronounced risk aversion in mixed settings. Results confirm this 
prediction (0.138 > 0.126 > -0.082). 
4.2.5.1.3 Risk Measure based on Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
After participants completed the instrument on utility under risk that was based on Abdellaoui 
et al. (2013), an instrument for measuring risk preferences was added in part 2 of the experiment 
for robustness check purposes. This instrument is adapted from Gneezy and Potters (1997) who 
designed an incentive compatible measure for examining individuals’ risk preferences taken 
from the context of financial decision-making (RAGNEEZY). Subjects are endowed with a 
certain amount of equity ($ 200,000 in this study), which they can fully or partly invest in a 
two-outcome lottery. The lottery is characterized by a probability of 2/3 that the subjects lose 
the amount they invested and a probability of 1/3 that they win two and a half times the amount 
they bet. Subjects keep the remaining part of the endowment in either case. Annex 1.13 shows 
the corresponding z-Leaf Screen. The lottery is designed in a way that the expected value of 





person should invest the whole amount or at least a big part of the endowment whereas a risk-
averse person would probably bet less in the lottery (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Charness et al., 
2013). Risk attitude was measured by dividing the amount of money subjects invest in the 
lottery by the total amount of equity they are endowed with (= $ 200,000). Higher ratios imply 
less risk aversion. Although the method does not allow for a differentiation between risk-
seeking and risk-neutral decision makers, the amount invested provides a good measure of 
differing risk preferences since risk-seeking preferences are relatively rare (Charness et al., 
2013). Only very few participants of the present study (5 out of 196 = 2.5%) chose to invest 
100%. The application of this instrument in the present study was done in an incentive 
compatible way. Hence, subjects receive the information that this choice situation could be 
picked at the end of the study as the compensation relevant decision situation randomly selected 
from the mixed outcome context.  
The next chapter presents further control variables considered in this study and addressed in a 
post experimental questionnaire (PEQ). 
4.2.5.2 Variables measured in the Post Experimental Questionnaire 
Part 3 of the study contains a PEQ on individuals’ understanding of the experimental tasks as 
well as on their personal characteristics and demographics. Annex 3 presents the specific 
questions asked and the instruments used in the PEQ. 
4.2.5.2.1 Manipulation Check Questions 
The first part of the PEQ relates to subjects’ understanding of the manipulation. As explained 
by Libby et al. (2002), manipulation check questions are useful for investigating if subjects did 
notice and understand the manipulation of the independent variable(s) correctly. These 
questions serve as a test of an effective operationalization of the constructs involved. In case 
the manipulation did not work and subjects tick wrong answers disproportionately often, the 
study’s results are questionable because subjects’ misunderstanding of the experimental setting 
might have biased the results. To examine if subjects understood the manipulation on 
accounting methods applied in scenario 1 to 5 correctly they are asked to judge two statements 
on the equity impact of conservative versus neutral accounting regarding their correctness. As 
both statements were correct, subjects should have indicated ‘Yes’ in both cases. 181 subjects 
out of 196 (92%) provided a correct answer to statement 1 (MCQ1) and 154 subjects out of 196 
(78%) correctly judged statement 2 (MCQ2). Overall, 335 out of 392 answers (85%) were 





in the study’s results coming from a potential misunderstanding of the setting. However, to 
address the fact that some subjects provided false answers, the present study’s main results  
(cf. chapter 5.3.3.3) are examined for robustness by eliminating subjects who wrongly answered 
MCQ1 or MCQ2 from the sample (cf. chapter 5.3.3.4).  
4.2.5.2.2 Additional Measures of Individuals’ Risk Preferences 
The second part of the PEQ contains additional instruments to collect data on individual risk 
attitudes. Charness et al. (2013) provide an overview of different experimental methods to elicit 
individuals’ risk preferences. The authors underline that it is important to choose an instrument, 
which is suitable in the specific context of the study and fits to the respective research questions 
and the subject pool. As described in chapter 4.2.5.1.1, the main method used to elicit subjects’ 
risk attitudes applied in this study is based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013). Nevertheless, due to 
generalizability concerns (Abdellaoui et al. 2013; Charness et al., 2013) as well as for 
robustness check purposes, individuals’ risk attitudes are verified in the PEQ via three other 
instruments eliciting risk preferences. These additional instruments require participants to self-
report their willingness to take on risks on 7-point Likert Scales. This type of measure is less 
complex and not incentive compatible but also acknowledged in literature (Charness et al., 
2013).  
The first self-report question was developed by Dohmen et al. (2011). This question is not 
context-specific and aims at capturing a more general self-assessment of one’s own attitude 
towards risk (RAGEN). Although it was shown in a field experiment that this general risk 
question realistically reflects individual risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011), prior literature 
also finds that individuals’ risk preferences are differing depending on the context in which 
they are elicited (Weber et al., 2002). To consider this finding, two self-report instruments on 
risk attitudes in specific contexts are applied additional to the self-report question on risk 
attitude in general. Firstly, the general question developed by Dohmen et al. (2011) is modified 
by adding the specific context of this study, namely ‘risk taking in financial situations’ (RAFIN). 
Secondly, risk attitude is measured via the so-called domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) 
scale developed by Weber et al. (2002). The full DOSPERT scale comprises 40 items, which 
address risk taking in different domains (e.g., Financial, Health/Safety, Recreational, and Social 
Risk Taking). In this study, the four statement items concerning the domain of financial 
investments are applied because they strongly relate to the study’s context. Subjects are asked 
how likely they would invest part of their personal equity in rather risky (statement 1 and 2; 





shares and bonds (1=very unlikely; 7=very likely) (cf. Annex 3). To analyze correlations 
between the four items, items 3 and 4 are recoded to capture overall risk seeking behavior  
(cf. chapter 5.3.1). 
4.2.5.2.3 Additional Measures of Individuals’ Loss Aversion 
The instruments for risk and time preferences based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) applied in the 
second part of the study allow to mathematically derive individual levels of loss aversion per 
subject. For robustness check purposes, the PEQ contains two additional instruments measuring 
individuals’ degree of loss aversion. These measures are based on personal acceptance of 
lotteries involving gains and losses adapted from Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  
In the first instrument that is adapted from Wang et al. (2016) subjects face two lotteries. Each 
lottery offers a 50% chance of gaining and a 50% chance of losing money. The amount of the 
potential monetary loss is given: EUR 25 in lottery A; EUR 100 in lottery B.42 Subjects are 
asked to indicate for each lottery the minimum amount of gain to make them willing to 
participate in the respective lottery. The resulting gain-loss ratio represents the respective loss 
aversion index (LAWANG1; LAWANG2). 
The second instrument is adapted from Gächter et al. (2010) and consists of six different 
lotteries each including a potential gain and a potential loss. The amount of the potential gain 
is the same in each lottery (EUR 6)43 whereas potential losses differ and increase from one 
lottery to the other (from EUR 2 in lottery 1 to EUR 7 in lottery 6). The probability of gaining 
or losing money is 50% in each lottery. The gain-loss ratio of the lottery when people no longer 
accept playing the lottery but reject it represents subjects’ loss aversion index (LAGAECHTER). 
As explained by Gächter et al. (2010), this instrument explicitly uses small monetary amounts 
(EUR 2 to EUR 7) to make sure that the decision-making behavior truly reflects loss aversion 
and not risk aversion. The authors base their choice to use small monetary amounts on Rabin 
(2000) who theorizes that individuals who aim at maximizing expected utilities and whose 
utility functions are strictly increasing and concave over wealth should be approximately risk 
neutral towards small stake gambles. Based on Rabin (2000), choice behavior in small stake 
gambles cannot be explained by risk aversion because otherwise individuals would show 
unrealistic high degrees of risk aversion in high-stake gambles. As Gächter et al. (2010) explain, 
                                                 
42 In the experimental sessions conducted in St. Gallen, monetary amounts used in the instruments adapted from 
Wang et al. (2016) were indicated in Suisse Francs (CHF) instead of Euros (EUR). 
43 In the experimental sessions conducted in St. Gallen, monetary amounts used in the instruments adapted from 





people should accept all lotteries that have a positive expected value (lotteries 1 to 5).  
A rejection of low-stale gambles with a positive expected value can be interpreted as an 
indication of loss rather than risk aversion. 
Both of the two simpler measures of loss aversion that are characterized by pure gain/loss ratios 
are based on strong assumptions. Probability weights are assumed to be equal in gain and loss 
contexts and subjective values of small stake outcomes are assumed to be linear (cf. Gächter et 
al., 2010). In this case, the loss aversion coefficient only depends on the gain and loss outcomes 
involved in the lottery: 𝜆 Gain/Loss. 
The instruments on risk aversion and loss aversion applied in the PEQ are non incentive 
compatible, less complex and less sophisticated than the instruments developed by Abdellaoui 
et al. (2013) used in the second part of this study. Nevertheless, they could provide valuable 
results. These simpler instruments are explicitly applied for robustness check purposes and to 
cover a bigger part of the diverse pool of existing methods for eliciting risk and loss aversion. 
4.2.5.2.4 Measures of the Judgment of the Experimental Tasks and Demographics 
In the third part of the PEQ subjects were asked to indicate whether the scenarios were 
comprehensible (COMP), whether questions and tasks were clearly stated (CLEAR), and 
whether it was easy to answer the questions (EASY) to investigate subjects’ understanding of 
the instructions. Statement items were judged on a 7-point Likert Scale from 1 (totally disagree) 
to 7 (totally agree). 
The PEQ elicits via an open question what subjects think is investigated in this study to capture 
their understanding of the research questions. In case participants identified the study’s goal 
correctly, they might have felt induced to give answers they think the experimenter expects or 
wants to get (Maines et al., 2006). Table 12 provides an overview of most frequently mentioned 
topics. 
Assumed Underlying Research Topic Number of Subjects 
Individuals’ Risk Attitude in Investment Contexts  169 
Impact of Accounting Method applied on Investment Decisions 17 
Other 10 
Table 12: Assumed Research Topic 
Table 12 shows that most subjects considered individuals’ risk attitudes in investment settings 
as the underlying research interest of the present study. This group of subjects often referred to 





196 participants explicitly mentioned the impact of accounting methods applied on individual 
investment decisions as the central research interest of this study. No subject directly referred 
to individuals’ preferences for one or the accounting method. Due to the fact that the 
instruments on utility under risk and utility over time cover a large part of the study, subjects’ 
attention was apparently drawn to individuals’ risk attitudes. Overall, participants did not 
identify the study’s goal correctly. Subjects’ assumptions on the research question should not 
have biased the answers provided and should not limit the validity of the collected data. Even 
if subjects had identified the research question correctly, it would probably not have biased the 
results because no right or wrong preference for one or the other accounting regime exists. 
Finally, in the last part of the PEQ, subjects provide information on the following demographics 
that are frequently integrated in analyses of individuals’ investment behavior (cf., e.g., Koonce 
et al., 2005; Pinello, 2008): age (AGE), gender (GENDER), nationality (NATION), years of 
professional experience (PROFEXP), course of current studies (bachelor or master level) 
(MASTER), major field of studies (accounting/finance; strategy (including marketing and 
strategic management); others (mainly including economics and politics) (CLUSTER), share 
ownership in the past (SHARESP), presence (SHARESC) and future (SHARESF), and 
experience in analysis of annual reports (consideration of annual reports, EXPFA1), (analysis 
of annual reports, EXPFA2), (confidence in using/analyzing annual reports, ANALYSISAR). 
The next chapter illustrates the final implementation of the experiment. 
4.3 Running the Experiment 
Besides considering extraneous factors that could affect results, it is also important to deal with 
potential confounding factors that might arise from the experimental design itself or from the 
way the experiment is implemented (cf. chapter 4.1.2) to strengthen the study’s internal and 
external validity. This chapter first presents the type of participants invited to take part in the 
study and explains the monetary incentives provided before afterwards describing the 
conduction of a pretest and the implementation of the final experiment. It is pointed out how 
potential confounding factors are addressed.  
4.3.1 Participants  
The experiment was conducted at two different universities, the University of Augsburg, 
Germany, and the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, to enlarge the sample size. Participants 
are business students at bachelor and master level who serve as proxies for nonprofessional 





study. The Laboratory for Economic Experiments on Human Behavior of the University of 
Augsburg as well as the Behavioral Lab of the University of St. Gallen recruited subjects 
randomly from their respective experimental laboratory’s database. Students were informed 
about the possibility to take part in the experiment via the universities’ and the laboratories’ 
homepages as well as via announcements in lectures. Regarding bachelor students, the focus 
was set on students who are at least in their third bachelor semester. The laboratories’ databases 
allow filtering for business students. Only business students who are registered in the respective 
database received the e-mail invitation for participating in this study. In total, 196 students took 
part in the study (42 students participated in Augsburg and 154 students participated in  
St. Gallen). 
4.3.2 Monetary Incentives 
Researchers argue that for the implementation of an experiment it is important to decide 
whether to provide monetary incentives. They underline that participants may behave 
differently when facing monetary incentives compared to when answering hypothetical 
questions. Subjects’ decisions made in incentive compatible settings may reflect real world 
investment decisions more closely than hypothetical decisions. Otherwise, if people succeed in 
imagining how they would behave in actual situations of choice, their hypothetical decisions 
should be close to what they would do in reality. Researchers argue that subjects normally do 
not have any reason to hide their true preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) analyzed 74 experiments in which the level of financial performance-based 
incentives varied. They found that ‘in games, auctions and risky choices the most typical result 
is that incentives do not affect mean performance, but incentives often reduce variance in 
responses’ (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, p. 34). Although differences between hypothetical and 
actual answers seem to be rather small, other studies provide contradicting evidence (Holt and 
Laury, 2002). To address potential concerns related to hypothetical settings, the present study 
provides real monetary incentives in its main part.  
Examining the moderating impact of individuals’ loss aversion on the moderator effect of the 
accounting method applied on the influence of prior outcome on individuals’ decision making 
behavior involves an analysis of the impact of prior gains and losses on individuals’ subsequent 
valuations and choices. A suitable incentive compatible experiment would hence involve 
making subjects experience negative outcomes (i.e., losing real money). This scenario generates 
an ethical issue (Thaler and Johnson, 1990): subjects might actually complete the experiment 





The experiment took place at the University of Augsburg, Germany, and the University of  
St. Gallen, Switzerland. To incentivize participation, subjects receive a show up fee of € 5.00 
in Augsburg and CHF 10.00 in Switzerland respectively for participating in the study. When 
entering the laboratory, subjects directly receive the show up fee in cash and are told to put the 
money in their purse. The show-up fee is fixed and independent from the subjects’ performance 
during the study. The show-up fee is treated as being paid by the laboratory and hence being 
independent of the following study to keep the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; 
cf. chapter 3.1.7) at a minimum.  
Afterwards, subjects are informed that they have the possibility to earn a variable compensation 
throughout the experiment. When starting the study, subjects read on the computer screen that 
they receive EUR 10.00 (CHF 20.00) for their effort and time they have already spent to come 
to the laboratory and take part in the study. Putting the focus on subjects’ personal effort 
invested in taking part in the study should strengthen their commitment to the study’s tasks and 
incentivize subjects to take the tasks seriously and make truthful decisions. This procedure also 
serves to limit the house money effect (cf. chapter 3.1.7). By providing an initial equity 
endowment subjects can experience an increase as well as a decrease in equity without having 
to suffer a real personal monetary loss.  
The currency used in the experiment is called DOLLAR $. $ is a fictitious currency applied in 
this study to create monetarily realistic investment scenarios regarding the amount of money 
invested in R&D projects by different companies (e.g., $ 6M) that would have been impossible 
under the application of a real currency as Euros or Swiss Francs. The exchange rate is defined 
as $ 100,000 = EUR 5 or $ 100,000 = CHF 10 respectively. The endowment is converted in the 
experimental currency. Every subject hence owns $ 200,000. The specific exchange rates were 
chosen to ensure that subjects receive appropriate variable payoffs after having finished the 
study. The experimental laboratory of the University of Augsburg demands subjects’ final 
payment per hour to be on average at the amount of the net salary per hour of a student assistant. 
Final payments should hence be on average EUR 12.50/hour. The Behavioral Lab in St. Gallen 
suggests to provide an average payment of CHF 25.00/hour.  
As explained in chapters 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.5.1, the random generator chooses one out of five 
scenarios of study part 1 as well as one choice situation of each choice context (gain, loss, 
mixed) of the instrument on risk preferences from study part 2 per subject that become 
compensation relevant. Each subjects sees the corresponding $ amounts generated in the 





exemplary screenshots of the corresponding computer screens subjects see when their final 
payment is determined. In case the resulting variable compensation is negative, it is set to $ 0. 
The resulting $ amount is converted in EUR or CHF according to the determined underlying 
exchange rate: $ 100,000 = EUR 5.00 or $ 100,000 = CHF 10.00 (cf. chapter 4.2.2.2). All 
converted amounts greater than zero are added to the show up fee to calculate the final 
compensation. Subjects receive the show up fee in cash when entering the laboratory. At the 
end of the study, each participant receives his final variable compensation (that is greater or 
equal to 0) in cash and signs a receipt of reception of the total compensation (show up fee + 
variable compensation). One session took approximately 90 minutes. Payments (including 
show-up fee) averaged EUR 21.93 in Augsburg and CHF 35.49 in St. Gallen. As explained in 
chapter 4.2.2.2, the difference in compensation is related to differing laboratory demands for 
net compensation per hour as well as to differing living expenses in both countries that are 
higher in Switzerland than in Germany. Subjects’ monetary expectations for participating in a 
research study are hence higher in Switzerland. Therefore, the slightly different average 
compensation in both countries should not influence the study’s results. 
At the end of the experiment, a random generator selects one out of the five investment 
scenarios for compensation purposes. Subjects receive their individual respective remaining 
amount of equity additional to the show-up fee.44 
Subjects are informed that at the end of the study a random generator will pick one choice 
situation from each decision context (pure gain, pure loss, mixed outcomes) that will become 
relevant for their final compensation. The instrument on risk is hence incentive compatible to 
make sure that subjects take the task seriously and make choices according to their true risk 
attitudes. 
The instrument on time is not incentive compatible in this study. An incentive compatible 
approach would have included organizing the payment of the respective compensation one year 
after the actual experiment was conducted. This would have been incompatible with the current 
specifications by the Behavioral Lab of the University of St. Gallen that demands a direct (cash) 
compensation. Subjects are not explicitly informed about the fact that they make hypothetical 
choices in the time part of the experiment. Instead, they do not get information on the 
compensation relevance of these decision situations and hence indirectly receive the 
information that answers are hypothetical. As explained in chapter 4.2.2.2, prior literature raises 
                                                 
44 This random selection procedure serves to incentivize participants to take all scenarios and tasks seriously and 
to complete them truthfully. Subjects are induced to treat all tasks with an equal level of attention and 





concerns that hypothetical answers differ from answers provided in incentivized settings  
(e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). In this study, subjects first run through study part 1 as well as 
through the instrument on risk aversion both being incentive compatible, before completing the 
non-incentive compatible instrument on time. It is assumed that the mindset of providing true 
answers generated in part 1 and the instrument on risk preferences also prevails during the 
instrument on time preferences inducing subjects to make honest choices. Furthermore, subjects 
do not have any reason to disguise their true preferences. 
The next chapter presents the implementation of the final experiment. 
4.3.3 Final Implementation and Consideration of Potential Confounding Factors 
When conducting a laboratory experiment45 it is usually necessary to organize several 
experimental sessions. Due to laboratory size restrictions it is rarely possible to just run one 
session that covers all participants at once. This chapter addresses the final implementation of 
the experiment. It first presents the organization and schedule of the experiment’s sessions 
before afterwards describing the conduction of one exemplary experimental session in more 
detail. Other studies highlight the importance of considering potential confounding factors in 
an experiment (e.g., Schwering, 2016). During the course of the following two subchapters, it 
is thus explained how potential confounding factors stemming from the organization and set up 
of the experiment itself are addressed. 
4.3.3.1 Organization of Experimental Sessions 
Before finally conducting the experiment, it is highly recommended to pre- or pilot test the 
experimental material developed (Webster and Sell, 2014). Webster and Sell (2014) explain 
that in a pretest certain elements of the experiment are examined while in a pilot test a whole 
experimental session is conducted to test if everything works as expected. Both ways of testing 
the experiment before its final conduction serve to make sure that the tasks are designed in a 
way that subjects understand them correctly. Furthermore, these tests might for example reveal 
potential confounding factors that additionally need to be controlled for or potential technical 
or procedural issues that should be solved up-front. A pretest of the present experiment with 
the focus on the experiment’s part 1 and 2 was run in December 2016 in the experimental 
laboratory of the University of Augsburg with 27 doctoral students to identify potential issues 
of the experimental design and its procedure. The doctoral students were randomly distributed 
                                                 
45 A laboratory experiment is characterized by the fact that it takes place in a specific laboratory and hence in a 
controlled artificial setting instead of being conducted in a natural situation as it would be the case for field 





to one of the four treatment groups. They ran through the experiment and wrote down comments 
in case they found parts of the setting or tasks irritating or confusing. After participants 
completed the pretest, the experimenter (i.e., the author of this thesis) started an open discussion 
to ask for their comments on the study. Changes in phrasing and organization were made based 
on their input. 
The final experiment was conducted from January to March 2017 at the University of 
Augsburg, Germany and the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. The experiment was 
conducted in January 2017 at the University of Augsburg. This period of data collection directly 
preceded the university’s exam period that generally covers February. This fact negatively 
influenced the availability of student participants. Therefore, the data collection was continued 
at the University of St. Gallen in March 2017 whose exam period differs from the one in 
Augsburg and did not negatively influence students’ availability for participating in the 
experiment.  
Business student subjects were invited via e-mail to take part in the experimental study. Because 
pretest participants differed from subjects used in the final study, reactive effects of testing  
(cf. chapter 4.1.2) that would decrease a study’s external validity are ruled out in the present 
study. Furthermore, biases stemming from statistical regression effects (cf. chapter 4.1.2) do 
not play a role because subjects of the main study do not participate in the pretest and hence are 
not selected based on pretest results. 
Via the invitation, students knew up-front that the study they are invited to participate in is a 
laboratory experiment. This awareness was clearly strengthened when subjects entered the 
respective university’s laboratory for participating in the study. As argued in chapter 4.1.2, the 
experimental arrangements (i.e., e.g., the laboratory setting) could generate reactive effects. If 
this is the case, subjects do not behave naturally but instead try to guess expected answers or 
simply behave differently than in actual situations. This potential bias is present in this study. 
However, due to the fact that it concerns all participants and treatment groups this potential bias 
is held constant. Furthermore, as explained in chapter 4.2.5.2.4, there is no right or wrong or 
socially demanded answer in this study, also keeping the potential demand effect (Maines et 
al., 2006) at a low level. 
With the invitation, subjects got the option to choose one of several proposed time slots for 
participating in the experiment. Due to laboratory size restrictions, a maximum of 10 subjects 
could participate per experimental session in Augsburg and a maximum of 20 subjects could 





session. Subjects choose one session for participation according to their personal schedule and 
availability. The choice was independent of the respective treatment applied. Treatments were 
not revealed to subjects up-front. Subjects’ distribution to the sessions and treatments hence 
followed a random procedure. Table 13 provides an overview of location, dates, time slots, 
treatment groups and number of participants per session. 





Augsburg 25/01/17 14:00 – 16:00 9 1 
Augsburg 26/01/17 10:00 – 12:00 10 3 
Augsburg 26/01/17 14:00 – 16:00 5 2 
Augsburg 27/01/17 10:00 – 12:00 4 2 
Augsburg 27/01/17 14:00 – 16:00 4 4 
Augsburg 30/01/17 10:00 – 12:00 2 1 
Augsburg 30/01/17 14:00 – 16:00 4 4 
Augsburg 31/01/17 14:00 – 16:00 4 4 
St. Gallen 14/03/17 10:00 – 12:00 19 1 
St. Gallen 14/03/17 12:00 – 14:00 21 2 
St. Gallen 14/03/17 14:00 – 16:00 18 3 
St. Gallen 14/03/17 16:00 – 18:00 17 4 
St. Gallen 16/03/17 10:00 – 12:00 11 3 
St. Gallen 16/03/17 12:00 – 14:00 15 4 
St. Gallen 16/03/17 14:00 – 16:00 12 1 
St. Gallen 16/03/17 16:00 – 18:00 8 2 
St. Gallen 21/03/17 10:00 – 12:00 14 1 
St. Gallen 21/03/17 12:00 – 14:00 19 3 
Table 13: Overview of Conducted Sessions 
Although the distribution of subjects to treatment groups followed a random procedure 
selection biases might influence results. Subjects in one treatment group might differ from 
subjects in another treatment group regarding personal characteristics as, e.g., gender, age, and 
professional work experience among others. 71 women (36%) and 125 men (64%) participated 
in the study. The average age was 23.11 years. 107 participants (55%) were enrolled in a master 
program while 89 subjects (45%) were bachelor students. Subjects had on average 2.03 years 
of professional experience (internships included). These as well as further sample 





The different time slots per day can generate session effects. Subjects might be more tired and 
less concentrated during afternoon sessions compared to morning sessions. The variation in 
time slots within data collection for one treatment group addresses the potential maturation bias 
(cf. chapter 4.1.2). Furthermore, the change in type of tasks from study part 1 to study part 3 as 
well as the monetary incentives provided should limit a potential decrease in attention and 
motivation. Session effects can be controlled for in the statistical analysis. However, the 
maturation bias reflected for example in the individual level of hunger or thirst during a session 
cannot be eliminated at 100%. 
Each part of the study took approximately 30 minutes. This led to an overall duration of one 
experimental session of about 90 minutes. The limited duration of each part of the study as well 
as the laboratory situation kept potentially biasing time influences (cf. chapter 4.1.2) at a 
minimum. 
The following chapter provides an exemplary overview of the basic steps followed before, 
during and after one experimental session. This procedure was the same for each experimental 
session. 
4.3.3.2 Description of an Experimental Session 
In a first step, laboratory assistants and the experimenter46 prepare the laboratory. The 
preparation includes starting z-Tree or z-Leaf on the computers and building up partitioning 
walls between workspaces. The experiment does not involve any interaction between 
participants. Partition walls separated workspaces to make subjects focus on the study and their 
own answers and to keep the level of external influences (e.g., things happening outside the 
workspace) at the lowest level possible. Each workspace is equipped with blank sheets and 
pencils allowing subjects to take notes if needed. The laboratory assistants also prepare money 
for cash compensation. 
Subjects registered for a session automatically receive a reminder via e-mail to keep the rate of 
no-show at a minimum.47 When subjects enter the room, they first need to identify themselves. 
It is checked on an attendance list if they are registered for and hence allowed to take part in 
the study. Subjects afterwards directly receive the respective show up fee in cash (EUR 5.00 in 
Augsburg and CHF 10.00 in St. Gallen) as well as a user number. The user number serves to 
                                                 
46 The experimenter is the author of this thesis. 
47 In this study, only one registered participant did not show up at all. Three participants came late to the session 
to which they were registered for. The respective session had already started. Therefore, these students were 





enable an anonymous participation in the study. However, at the same time, it allows relating 
each subject to its corresponding final compensation generated in the study. Each subject 
randomly chose one of the available computer workspaces in the respective laboratory.  
The experimenter asks subjects to fill in a participation form in which subjects sign that they 
allow the anonymous usage of the data generated in the experiment for research purposes. The 
experimenter briefly introduces the experiment’s procedure. It is underlined that participation 
is voluntary and not linked to subjects’ grades or university success. Subjects are asked not to 
talk about the experiment with their fellow students who also might take part in the study at a 
later date. Instrumentation bias (cf. chapter 4.1.2) that could be generated by the experimenter 
himself is considered and held constant by using the same prepared notes for the introductory 
speech in each session. Furthermore, the same experimenter supervises all sessions to avoid 
biases related to a change in staff.  
Afterwards, the experimenter starts the experiment on the computers. Subjects first receive 
instructions on the study. These instructions specified that this study does not test for expert 
knowledge and that hence no right or wrong answers exist. It is underlined that all answers are 
anonymous. The anonymous data collection method enhances subjects’ willingness to provide 
answers, which truly corresponds to their actual attitudes and opinions. Furthermore, the 
compensation procedure is explained and the experimental currency is introduced. Afterwards 
subjects run through the three parts of the experiment (see chapters 4.2.2 to 4.2.5).  
As described in chapter 4.2.2.2, part 1 of the study contains five similar investment scenarios. 
It is thus probable that experiences subjects make in prior scenarios influence their investment 
decisions in subsequent scenarios. The potential confounding factor ‘testing’ (cf. chapter 4.1.2) 
is hence relevant but unproblematic in this study because prior experience is explicitly 
considered in the research model as the influence of prior outcome on subjective value and 
preferences. This effect is hence even intended. The experimental material provided in part 1 
of the study only differs in the manipulation of the independent variables prior outcome 
(gain/loss) and accounting method applied (conservative/neutral) between treatment groups. 
The material used in part 2 and 3 is identical across all participants. Potential biases stemming 
from differing materials used in treatment groups (instrumentation, cf. chapter 4.1.2) are thus 
limited by holding the material constant except for the manipulated variables.  
At the end of the study (i.e., at the end of study part 3), a random generator determines subjects’ 
final variable remuneration based on the procedure explained in chapter 4.3.2. After the last 





the partitioning walls, and collect the distributed material (blank sheets and pencils). In case 
participants showed interest in the study’s results, a brief summary of the results is provided 
via e-mail. 
The experimental mortality bias appears if participants terminate or even quit the experiment 
before having completed all tasks (cf. chapter 4.1.2). The influence of this potential 
confounding factor is negligible in this study. Students are informed about all relevant 
information regarding the experimental procedure up-front and voluntarily take part in the 
study. They know the duration of the experiment when enrolling for one session and explicitly 
include the session in their personal time schedule. In case of terminating the study up-front, 
they would have sunk costs (at least in time) when considering the effort made to come to the 
laboratory. The probability that subjects cancel their participation in a research project is higher 
for, e.g., internet surveys, which can be completed at home. Subjects can easily terminate the 
survey before having finished all tasks without any need of justification. All participants 
enrolled for taking part in this study completed the experiment.  
The data collected via the experiment is the basis for testing the hypotheses developed in 






 Empirical Results 
This chapter first presents main statistical evaluation methods that are used in this thesis to 
analyze the data collected in the experimental study. Secondly, main pre-test results are 
described before thirdly presenting the final study’s results. In a fourth step, this chapter 
summarizes main results. The chapter ends with addressing limitations of the study.  
5.1 Statistical Evaluation Methods 
The data collected in the experiment is analyzed to investigate if individuals value conservatism 
more highly than neutral accounting. If individuals show preferences for conservatism 
compared to neutral accounting, price quotations should differ across treatment groups. An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests for differences in means of a dependent variable between 
several treatment groups that are defined by one (one-way ANOVA) or more independent 
categorical variables (factors) (multi-factorial ANOVA). ANOVAs analyze differences in 
means between treatment groups by decomposing the respective dependent variable’s variance 
in a within-group and a between-group variance. A multi-factorial (e.g., two-way) ANOVA 
further splits the between-group variance of the dependent variable in the variance caused by 
the categorical variables (factors) and a potential interaction between them. The ANOVA 
finally compares between-group with within-group variances (cf., e.g., Backhaus et al., 2003).  
A valid application of an ANOVA demands the fulfillment of certain conditions (cf., e.g., 
Sedlmeier and Renkewitz, 2008; Field, 2013).  
 The dependent variable needs to be (at least) interval scaled.  
 Independent variables need to be categorical variables (that have not less than two-factor 
levels to be able to form at least two (unpaired) treatment groups that could be 
compared).  
 Observations of treatment groups need to be independent from each other.  
 The dependent variable needs to be normally distributed for each treatment group.  
 Treatment groups need to show homogeneous variances of the dependent variable. 
A common way to test for a normal distribution of the dependent variable in each treatment 
group is a statistical analysis approach by applying the Shapiro-Wilk-Test. The null hypothesis 
of the Shapiro-Wilk-Test states that the dependent variable is normally distributed in all 
treatment groups. If the test shows significant results, the dependent variable is hence not 
normally distributed across treatment groups (Field, 2013). The ANOVA is quite robust against 





commonly presume a normal distribution of the dependent variable in each treatment group if 
treatment groups are large enough. Respective accepted group size thresholds are N=20 or 
N=30 (cf., e.g., Studenmund, 2006).  
A common way to test for homogeneity of variances is the Levene-Test. The null hypothesis 
states that variances are equal. If the Levene-Test shows significant results, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances needs to be rejected (Field, 2013). An ANOVA also reacts quite 
robust to the violation of the criterion of homogeneity of variances if group sizes are large 
enough and approximately equal. If variances are not homogenous and treatment groups differ 
in size an ANOVA risks to generate biased results. In this case, it is recommended to use the 
Welch-Test, which leads to bias-adjusted F-Statistics (Welch, 1951; Field, 2013).  
If the ANOVA indicates significant differences in the dependent variable between treatment 
groups, it is rewarding to compare the means of the dependent variable between each pair of 
treatment groups. This allows getting further insights on where the detected differences exactly 
come from. An independent-samples t-test compares the means of a dependent variable 
between two unpaired treatment groups. A valid application of an unpaired t-test depends on 
the fulfillment of the same conditions that underlie a valid application of a multi-factorial 
ANOVA (cf. conditions listed above) (cf., e.g., Sedlmeier and Renkewitz, 2008).  
To test for moderator effects, regression models are applied. In the main analysis, the research 
model is estimated based on a Tobit regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The range of 
possible deviations of individuals’ price quotations from the respective rational value of the 
equity stake has an upper and a lower level. This means that the dependent variable is both left- 
and right-censored. A censored outcome variable can generate a ceiling or floor effect, which 
both need to be accounted for (McBee, 2010). If two subjects indicate a selling price leading to 
a selling price deviation from the rational share value that represents the upper or lower level 
of the possible range, both subjects’ selling price deviations are equal according to the range 
applied. However, their willingness to sell the equity stake might differ. The problem is that 
this potential difference cannot be defined due to the censored range. A Tobit regression solves 
this bias via estimating the regression model by considering the censoring of the outcome 
variable. It estimates a latent (unobserved) variable ŷ. The observed variable y equals the latent 
variable ŷ if y lies within the range determined by the upper and lower level of possible 
outcomes. Otherwise, y equals the constant threshold defined by the upper or lower level 





should be interpreted as the effect of the respective independent variable on the latent variable 
ŷ. 
The research model developed in this thesis is a moderated moderation model (cf. chapter 3.4). 
A moderated moderation is based on a three-way interaction that allows the interaction of an 
independent variable and a primary moderator to be dependent on a second moderator variable 
(Hayes, 2013). The hypothesized moderating effect of the accounting method applied (CONS) 
on the direct effect of prior outcome (LOSS) on price quotations (WTADEV) could hence be 
tested for its dependence on individuals’ degree of loss aversion (LARISK). In general, for a 
moderated moderation model, regression coefficients are estimated by using the following 
equation (Hayes, 2013, p. 307): 
𝑌  𝛽 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 𝛽 ∙ 𝑀 𝛽 ∙ 𝑊  𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑊  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀 ∙ 𝑊 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀 ∙ 𝑊 𝜀 
where: 
Y: Dependent Variable 
X: Independent Focal Predictor Variable directly affecting Y 
M: Independent Primary Moderator Variable 
W: Independent Secondary Moderator Variable 
XMW is the three-way interaction term, allowing the effect of M on the direct effect between 
X and Y to be dependent on W. As explained by Hayes (2013), the regression coefficients 
should be interpreted with caution. Due to the fact that most of them describe conditional 
effects, they cannot be interpreted as main or interaction effects as it is commonly done for 
ANOVA results. Only 𝛽  can be interpreted as the estimation of the three-way interaction 
(XMW). The coefficients of X, M, and W rather represent simple than main effects. These 
coefficients estimate the effect of the corresponding independent variable on the dependent 
variable when the other two independent variables are 0.48 In the same pattern, the coefficients 
of the two-way interactions estimate the corresponding interaction between two independent 
variables if the third independent variable is 0.49 Hayes (2013) further underlines that in case 0 
is not included in the range of values X, M, or W can take, the related coefficients will be 
meaningless. The author points out that one approach to make the interpretation of regression 
coefficients possible or easier is mean centering independent variables integrated in the 
                                                 
48 𝛽 , for instance, estimates the effect of X on Y when M and W are 0. 





regression. In case of mean centering, the regression coefficients represent conditional effects 
of, e.g., X on the dependent variable Y if the other variables (M and W) are at the sample mean 
(Hayes, 2013). 
To assess partial or the full influence of X, M, or W on Y, it is useful to focus on the respective 
relevant slope coefficients. In the above presented three-way interaction model, the effect of X 
on Y depends on M and W. By rewriting the above presented regression, the effect of X 
depending on M and W can be separated into its single components (cf. Hayes, 2013, p. 307): 
𝑌  𝛽 𝛽 𝛽 𝑊 ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 𝛽 𝑊 𝑀  ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀 𝛽 ∙ 𝑊  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀 ∙ 𝑊 𝜀 
The rearranged regression shows that X’s effect on Y depends on W and M (Hayes, 2013). For 
investigating partial and full effects of W on Y, the regression can be rearranged as follows:  
𝑌  𝛽 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀  𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀 𝛽 𝛽 𝑋 ∙ 𝑊  𝛽 𝛽 𝑋 𝑀  ∙ 𝑊 𝜀 
The intercept with respect to W therefore is equal to 𝛽 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀  𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀  and the 
slope is 𝛽 𝛽 𝑋  𝛽 𝑀 𝛽 𝑋𝑀  . Table 14 provides an overview of partial and full effects 
of X on Y as well as partial and full effects of W on Y represented by the corresponding slope 
coefficients, as it is implemented in chapter 5.3.3.3. 
DepVar = Y 
Independent 
Variable 
Partial Effect of X on Y if Full Effect of X on Y if 
 M and W  
are both at 0 
M increases by 
one unit and  
W is at 0 
M is at 0 and W 
increases by one 
unit 
M and  
W both increase by 
one unit 
X β1 β1 β4 ∗ M β1 β5 ∗ 𝑊 β1  β4 ∗ 𝑀
β5 ∗ 𝑊  
 β7 ∗ 𝑀 ∗ 𝑊  
Independent 
Variable 
Partial Effect of W on Y if Full Effect of W on Y if 
 X and M  
are both at 0 
X increases by 
one unit and  
M is at 0 
X is at 0 and M 
increases by one 
unit 
X and  
M both increase by 
one unit 
W β3 β3 β5 ∗ X β3 β6 ∗ 𝑀 β3  β ∗ 𝑋
β6 ∗ 𝑀  
 β7 ∗ 𝑋 ∗ 𝑀  





To control for multicollinearity, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are used in the present 
regression analyses. High VIF-values indicate correlation between regression terms. A critical 
VIF-threshold commonly used in literature is 10 (O’Brien, 2007). VIFs should hence be as low 
as possible but at least under 10 to keep multicollinearity problems at a minimum. 
Heteroscedasticity is accounted for by using robust standard errors in the regression analyses 
(White, 1980).  
5.2 Pretest Results 
The experiment was pretested in December 2016 in the experimental laboratory of the 
University of Augsburg with 27 doctoral students. Main pretest results are presented hereafter.50 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Pretest Data 
Pretest participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups. As described in 
chapter 4.2.2.2, subjects were asked to make an evaluation of an equity stake they hold in a firm 
in which they are invested after they had experienced a gain or a loss in the neutral or 
conservative accounting condition, respectively. Subjects’ valuation of the equity stake they 
hold in a firm is elicited by a second price auction procedure based on Becker et al. (1964)  
(cf. chapter 4.2.4.1). As explained in chapter 4.2.4.1, the deviations of subjects’ price quotations 
from the rational share value represent subjects’ willingness to accept a buy offer to sell their 
company share and are compared across treatment groups. A positive (negative) deviation of 
the price quotation from the rational share value indicates an overvaluation (undervaluation) of 
the equity stake.  
To test Hypothesis 1a, deviations of subjects’ price quotations from the rational economic value 
of their equity stake at the beginning of investment scenario 2 are analyzed (WTA30DEV). At 
this point in time, subjects have experienced a gain or loss under conservative or neutral 
accounting in investment scenario 1. This allows comparing project evaluation for both 
conservative and neutral accounting regimes in both gain and loss settings.  
Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics for the corresponding sample. 
                                                 
50 The experimental design and Pretest results have been presented in the form of a working paper at several 
international conferences and research seminars. Based on the feedback received at these occasions the 





N = 27  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
WTA30DEV 23.5556 33.69128 -75.00 75.00 
LOSS 0.4815 0.5092 0 1 
CONS 0.5185 0.5092 0 1 
LARISK 3.543 3.3077 0.22 12.00 
LATIME 1.019 0.208 0.738 1.762 
LATIMESOON 3.202 11.757 0.054 62.014 
RATOTAL 0.0862 0.2166 -0.40 0.72 
WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value (R&D 
project 3, t=0); LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary 
variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion under risk; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on 
prospects including a positive (negative) payment now (in one year); LATIMESOON is an aggregated measure of 
subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on prospects including a negative (positive) payment now (in one 
year); RATOTAL is an aggregated measure of subjects’ risk aversion (cf. Annex 4 for a detailed description of all 
variables including their measurement/coding) 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Pretest Data 
The mean deviation of price quotation from the rational share value of 21551 across the four 
treatment groups is 23.55 (WTA30DEV).52 Subjects seem to overvalue their share and include 
an option value for potential future positive developments not yet made explicit. Accounting 
regimes (CONS) and gain and loss (LOSS) settings both appear at a rate of about 50%. LARISK 
measures loss aversion under risk and is the aggregated measure of LARISK200 and LARISK50 
both measured based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) (Pearson correlation coefficient=0.8848,  
p-value=0.000, N=27). The average loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is 3.543. Three outliers 
take on extreme values above eight, which are eliminated in the regression analysis. LATIME 
measures subjects’ loss aversion over time based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013). LATIME is the 
aggregated measure of LATIME1 and LATIME2 (Pearson correlation coefficient=0.8628,  
p-value=0.000, N=27). LATIMESOON is the aggregated measure of LATIME3 and LATIME4 
(Pearson correlation coefficient=0.9998, p-value=0.000, N=27). Although correlation 
                                                 
51 At the beginning of investment scenario 2, subjects are invested in company B at the full amount of their initial 
equity endowment of $ 200 thousand. Company B has equity capital of $ 20M. Subjects’ equity stake thus 
represents 1% of the company’s equity. Company B invests $ 6M in a R&D project that yields $ 15M return in 
case of success, 0 otherwise. The probability of project success is 50%. Departing from the equity stake of $ 
200 thousand, subjects can experience either a decrease in equity of $ 60 thousand in case of project failure or 
an increase in equity of $ 90 thousand in case of project success. The rational economic value of subjects’ equity 
stake considering potential future developments from the R&D project thus equals: 0.5 * $ 140 thousand +  
0.5 * $ 290 thousand = $ 215 thousand. 
52 In the present experiment’s investment scenarios, all monetary amounts were presented to subjects with the 
indication thousands of $ (e.g., $ 200 thousand). For clarity and readability purposes, the data analysis is 





coefficients between LATIME and LATIMESOON are insignificant, the VIF for LATIME and 
LATIMESOON are above 10 when integrating both variables in the regression analysis. 
LATIMESOON does not show a significant effect on WTA30DEV. It is thus dropped in the 
regression analysis. RATOTAL is the aggregated measure of RAGAIN, RALOSS, and RAMIXED 
measured based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.7783, N=27). The average 
risk aversion (RATOTAL) is 0.0862. 
Table 53 (Annex 5) presents bivariate correlations between these variables. WTA30DEV is 
significantly correlated with both the accounting treatment (CONS) and the project outcome 
(LOSS). These univariate correlations are in line with the expectations and provide support for 
Hypothesis 1a. Based on Pearson correlation analysis, loss aversion under risk (LARISK) and 
loss aversion over time (LATIME) are significantly correlated (p-value=0.0572) but the 
correlation coefficient is below 0.5 (0.370). Both variables capture different aspects of 
individuals’ loss aversion and are both integrated in the regression analysis. Loss aversion under 
risk (LARISK) is also significantly correlated with risk aversion (RATOTAL) (p-value=0.011). 
This correlation is expected because risk and loss aversion are commonly considered as related 
but distinct phenomena (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Abdellaoui et al., 2013). The 
corresponding Pearson correlation coefficient is below 0.5 (0.483) indicating that both variables 
are reflecting different concepts. 
5.2.2 Univariate and Multivariate Analysis of Pretest Data 
As explained in chapter 3.3, loss aversion is deeply rooted in human beings (Chen et al., 2006). 
If people dislike being disappointed, they should prefer settings in which potential losses are 
considered upfront because these settings prevent people from having to bear losses in the future 
(Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). In this study, two different accounting settings are investigated: 
conservative accounting, which captures potential losses upfront while gains are only 
considered when they occur vs. neutral accounting, which captures both gains and losses only 
when they effectively occur. Due to individuals’ loss aversion, these settings potentially create 
different levels of subjective value with the conservative setting providing higher value relative 
to the neutral setting. 
To test Hypothesis 1a, the mean WTA30DEV is compared between the different treatment 
groups. Table 16 shows that overall, positive deviations of quoted prices from the rational share 
value (WTA30DEV) in the conservative treatment (mean 36.14) were significantly higher  






DepVar = WTA30DEV 
  CONSERVATIVE NEUTRAL  t-Statistic p-Value 






WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value 
(R&D project 3, t=0); ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 16: T-Test of WTA30DEV between the Conservative and the Neutral Condition 
In addition, on average positive deviations of quoted prices from the rational share value were 
significantly higher (T=2.481, p-value=0.0202) in the gain (mean 37.71) than in the loss  
(mean 8.31) treatment, across the two accounting groups (cf. Table 17). 
DepVar = WTA30DEV 








WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value 
(R&D project 3, t=0); ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 17: T-Test of WTA30DEV between the Gain and the Loss Condition 
These differences are consistent with the expectation based on Prospect Theory that 
experiencing a loss leads to disappointment resulting in a lower evaluation of the investment. 
The higher WTA30DEV found in the conservative scenario is consistent with Hypothesis 1a 
suggesting that conservatism avoids disappointment resulting from loss experience. 
To analyze the association between the accounting treatment and gains and losses, the 
corresponding means are compared in a Difference-in-Difference Analysis. Table 18 presents 





DepVar = WTA30DEV 
R²=0.40 














Diff 15.43 40.19 24.76  






WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share 
value (R&D project 3, t=0); ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 18: Difference-in-Difference Analysis Results for WTA30DEV 
In the neutral setting, subjects value the investment at a discount, compared to the gain setting 
(mean 30.00), when they have experienced a loss (mean -13.33). This difference is highly 
significant (T=-2.81, p-value=0.010). In the conservative setting, the valuation of the 
investment is lower in the loss setting (mean 26.86) than in the gain setting (mean 45.43), but 
the difference is not significant (T=-1.25, p-value=0.222). Most interestingly, while for the gain 
setting the deviations of the quoted prices from rational share value are only slightly lower 
under neutral accounting (mean 30.00) than under conservative accounting (mean 45.43) 
(difference not significant: T=1.04, p-value=0.308), WTA30DEV in the loss setting is 
significantly lower for neutral accounting (mean -13.33) compared to conservative accounting 
(mean 26.86). This difference is highly significant (T=2.61, p-value=0.016). The difference-in-
difference is not significant (T=1.16, p-value=0.258). In all settings except the LOSS setting 
under neutral accounting, subjects value their stake in the firm at a higher value than 215, which 
is the expected value of the project outcome without taking into account potential future 
additional projects. This indicates that subjects include an option value for potential future 
developments not yet made explicit. The fact that subjects who experienced a prior loss in the 
neutral condition (NEUTRAL-LOSS) evaluate their stake below the rational economic value of 
215 (mean deviation from rational share value -13.33), implies that they are accepting a 






To further analyze the joint influence of CONS and LOSS as well as other factors potentially 
affecting WTA30DEV, the following multiple regression model is applied: 
WTA30DEV= β0 + β1·LOSS + β2·CONS + β3·LOSS·CONS + 
β4·LARISK + β5·LATIME + β6·RATOTAL + ε 
where: 
WTA30DEV: Dependent variable representing the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their 
equity stake from the rational economic share value (Investment Scenario 2, 
R&D project 3, t=0) 
LOSS: Dummy variable equal to 1 for treatment group of loss experience, 0 otherwise
CONS: Dummy variable equal to 1 for treatment group of conservatism, 0 otherwise 
LARISK: Aggregated variable adapted from Abdellaoui et al. (2013) measuring the 
individual subject’s degree of loss aversion under risk calculated based on 
mixed outcome prospects 
LATIME Aggregated variable adapted from Abdellaoui et al. (2013) measuring the 
individual subject’s degree of loss aversion over time based on payment 
prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the 
future 
RATOTAL: Aggregated variable measuring the individual subject’s risk aversion based on 
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
Due to the fact that the dependent variable is censored, a Tobit Regression is applied for 
estimating the coefficients. The joint effect of both accounting treatment (CONS) and gain or 
loss experience (LOSS) is under investigation. As explained in chapter 3.4, a moderator effect 
of CONS on the direct effect between LOSS and WTA30DEV is assumed. Therefore, their 
interaction is integrated in the analysis. In addition, other factors potentially influence subjects’ 
company evaluation, such as their degree of risk and loss aversion (cf. chapter 4.2.5). To isolate 
the effect of the accounting treatment on the subject’s decisions, LARISK, LATIME, and 
RATOTAL are taken into account in the regression. Three observations of extreme values for 






WTA30DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS+ β2 CONS+ β3 LOSS*CONS + β4 LARISK + β5 LATIME + β6 RATOTAL + ε 
 Coefficient Robust
Standard error 
t-Statistic p-Value  
LOSS -50.73281 17.75473 -2.86 0.010 *** 
CONS 27.33735 12.89101 2.12 0.048 ** 
LOSS*CONS 29.75034 18.07967 1.65 0.177  
LARISK 1.104193 1.828808 0.60 0.554  
LATIME -14.13225 19.02447 -0.74 0.467  
RATOTAL 29.59488 32.31511 0.92 0.372  
Constant 32.10313 20.65715 1.55 0.138  
N                                  24  
F-Statistic                              4.74   
P-Value    0.0046 *** 
Pseudo R²    0.0996  
Log Pseudolikelihood     -103.74346  
Highest VIF                          5.32  
Tobit regression; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed t-test) 
Table 19: Tobit Regression Results for WTA30DEV 
The model is highly significant (p-value 0.0046; pseudo R2 0.0996). Results show that the 
interaction (CONS*LOSS) is not significant at conventional levels (29.75034; p-value 0.177). 
The coefficients of CONS (27.34; p-value 0.048) and LOSS (-50.73; p-value 0.010) are highly 
significant. LARISK, LATIME, and RATOTAL are not significant in the regression.  
Estimations of price quotations (covariates set to their sample mean) show that price quotations 
under conservative accounting are generally higher than under neutral accounting, and the 
decrease in value for losses is more pronounced under neutral than under conservative 
accounting. 
Taken together, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1a. They imply that prior losses 
and the related disappointment lead to valuation discounts under neutral accounting, while they 
are much lower under conservative accounting. Conservatism seems to be able to better 
accommodate subjects’ loss aversion and leads to overall higher project evaluation. The lower 
WTA30DEV found for neutral accounting implies that subjects evaluate valuable investment 
projects at a discount.  
To analyze Hypothesis 2a saying that subjects have an explicit preference for conservatism, 





only in their accounting treatment. At this point, participants have already experienced 
investment scenarios 1 to 4, i.e., gain and loss under both conservative and neutral accounting 
(cf. chapter 4.2.4.2). Overall, about half of the participants choose the conservative accounting 
treatment (mean 0.5185), which is not significantly different from a random allocation 
(T=0.1890, p-value=0.5742) (cf. Table 20).  
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value 
INVDEC 27 0.5185 0.097991 0.5091751 0.1890 0.5742 
H0: mean = 0.5 
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); ***p-value ≤ 0.01, 
**p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed t-test) 
Table 20: One-sample T-Test of INVDEC (Pretest)  
This implies that subjects have no conscious preference for conservative accounting. 
5.3 Main Study’s Results 
Analyzing pretest data is a first approach to examine if individuals do have preferences for 
conservative accounting. The results presented above provide evidence that conservatism is 
valued more highly than neutral accounting. Due to the fact that the pretest sample was small 
(N=27), results need to be interpreted with caution. To receive more valid results, it is important 
to examine individuals’ preferences for conservatism using a larger sample as has been done in 
the main experiment. This chapter presents the main study’s results.53 It first describes 
correlation analysis and the aggregation of single independent variable measures to one measure 
to identify final measures used in the main data analysis. Afterwards, descriptive statistics are 
presented and structural equality of treatment groups is examined before finally testing the 
hypotheses and conducting robustness check analyses.  
Dependent variables of interest in the main data analyses are price quotations in investment 
scenario 4 indicated for R&D projects 7 and 8 (WTA70DEV and WTA80DEV). All subjects 
evaluate R&D project 7 at the beginning of investment scenario 4. In case they sell their share 
during project 7, they do not have the possibility to evaluate project 8. That is why the sample 
for price quotations at the beginning of R&D project 8 is reduced. Correlation analyses and 
descriptive statistical analyses are thus run on both sample sizes (full sample: N=196; reduced 
sample: N=159). 
                                                 
53 The experimental design and main results have been presented in the form of a working paper at several 





5.3.1 Aggregation of Single Independent Variable Measures 
As described in chapter 4.2, several instruments are integrated in the experiment to measure the 
variables involved in the research model (cf. chapter 3.4). Some of these instruments result in 
more than one measure for the same construct. In these cases, it is useful to run correlation 
analyses between the resulting measures to investigate if they can be aggregated to one single 
measure. This chapter presents the correlation analyses’ results. As the main data analyses focus 
on two different sample sizes (full data sample: N=196; reduced data sample: N=159), 
correlation analyses are run for both sample sizes.  
If more than two items address the same construct, item reliability is measured by using 
Cronbach’s alpha. A commonly accepted threshold indicating high item reliability is 0.7 (Field, 
2013). A value of Cronbach’s alpha above 0.7 would hence indicate that the separate items 
measure the same construct and can be aggregated to one single measure. Several researchers 
point to the fact that instead of relying on commonly accepted alpha thresholds, values of 
Cronbach’s alpha need to be interpreted based on the specific underlying research  
(e.g., Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991). In certain scenarios, a value < 0.7 can hence be sufficient 
to assume item reliability. 
To identify correlations between two items, bivariate correlation analyses based on Pearson and 
Spearman are conducted. The Pearson correlation coefficient is a parametric statistic indicating 
if a linear relationship between two variables exists. Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a 
non-parametric test of correlation. Correlation coefficients lie between -1 and +1. -1 (+1) would 
indicate a perfect negative (positive) correlation: if one variable increases, the other variable 
decreases (increases) by a proportionate amount. 0 indicates that variables are uncorrelated: if 
one variable increases or decreases, the other variable stays the same. Correlation coefficients 
above a threshold of +0.5 or -0.5 indicate strong correlations (Field, 2013).  
Loss aversion under risk is calculated based on two different mixed prospects: (50, ½; -50) 
(LARISK50) and (200, ½; -200) (LARISK200) (cf. Table 7). A correlation analysis tests if both 
loss aversion measures can be aggregated to one single measure of individuals’ loss aversion 
under risk. Pearson correlation coefficients for the full subject sample (N=196) and for the 
reduced subject sample (N=159) show that both variables are highly correlated (0.759,  
p-value=0.000; 0.760, p-value=0.000). A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
to examine if there were differences in loss aversion coefficients due to the different mixed 
prospects applied ((50, ½; -50) and (200, ½; -200)). Results based on the full and the reduced 





loss aversion per subject (F=1.19; p-value=0.2757; F=1.06, p-value=0.3051). The aggregated 
measure of loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is calculated as 
LARISK = (LARISK50 + LARISK200)/2. 
Based on the four mixed prospects of the time setting (cf. Table 8), four values for individuals’ 
loss aversion over time are calculated (LATIME1, LATIME2, LATIME3, LATIME4). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the full (reduced) sample is alpha=0.249 (alpha=0.242) and indicates a 
low level of internal consistency between the four items. A common accepted threshold above 
which a variable aggregation is judged valid is 0.7. Therefore, the four items should not be 
aggregated to one measure. However, Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses show 
significant and high correlations between LATIME1 and LATIME2 (Spearman-Rho=0.754,  
p-value=0.000, N=196; Spearman-Rho=0.780, p-value=0.000; N=159) as well as LATIME3 
and LATIME4 (Pearson Correlation=0.917, p-value=0.000, N=196; Pearson Correlation=0.928, 
p-value=0.000, N=159). The confirmed bivariate correlations are strongly plausible considering 
the fact that LATIME1 and LATIME2 (LATIME3 and LATIME4) are calculated based on mixed 
prospects that contain a positive (negative) payment now and a negative (positive) payment in 
one year. Individuals’ loss aversion thus seems to differ for time prospect settings including 
negative payments now vs. including negative payments later. The aggregated measures 
LATIME and LATIMESOON are calculated as LATIME(LATIMESOON) =  
(LATIME1 3  + LATIME2 4 )/2). Related variables should hence be considered 
independently. LATIME is measured based on two prospects that both include a negative sure 
payment in one year and a positive sure payment now (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.1) while the 
immediate payment is negative and the delayed payment is positive for LATIMESOON. The 
structure of the prospects corresponding to LATIME reflects the experimental setting: subjects 
face the situation of a future potential loss if the R&D project fails (p=0.5). For this reason, 
LATIME is used in further analyses.  
It is further examined if loss aversion under risk and loss aversion over time can be aggregated 
or if both variables measure different constructs. Consistent with findings by Abdellaoui et al. 
(2013), Pearson correlation between LARISK and LATIMETOTAL is low and insignificant  
(-0.005, p-value=0.947, N=196; -0.003, p-value=0.965, N=159). LARISK and LATIME (0.053, 
p-value=0.457, N=196; 0.083, p-value=0.299, N=159) are also not significantly correlated. 
Similarly, the Pearson correlation between LARISK and LATIMESOON is low and insignificant 





not seem to be a constant phenomenon under risk and over time. Related variables should hence 
be considered independently as potentially confounding factors. 
A Pearson correlation analysis of the two loss aversion measures identified based on Wang et 
al. (2016) (LAWANG1, LAWANG2) shows that both measures are highly correlated (0.857,  
p-value=0.000, N=196; 0.859, p-value=0.000, N=159). They are thus aggregate to one single 
measure of loss aversion (LAWANG) calculated as LAWANG=(LAWANG1+LAWANG2)/2. 
A correlation analysis of the three risk aversion measures RAGAIN, RALOSS, and RAMIXED 
that are measured based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.2) shows a scale 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha) of 0.6161 (0.5216) for the full (reduced) sample 
suggesting considering each variable separately in the analysis. Bivariate Pearson correlation 
analyses run on the full and on the reduced sample document that correlations between all 
combinations of two out of the three variables are highly significant (p-values <0.001) but 
corresponding correlation coefficients are under 0.5 for both sample sizes. Based on these 
results, the three risk aversion measures are considered separately in the further analyses. 
A Pearson correlation analysis of the risk aversion measures RAGEN and RAFIN adapted from 
Dohmen et al. (2011) provides evidence that both variables are highly correlated (0.7334,  
p-value=0.000, N=196; 0.7284, p-value=0.000, N=159). Therefore, both measures are 
aggregated to one single construct (RAGENFIN) measured as RAGENFIN = (RAGEN + 
RAFIN)/2. 
A correlation analysis of the four items on risk aversion in investment contexts adapted from 
Weber et al. (2002) (RAWEBER1 to RAWEBER4) reveals that the four items cannot be 
aggregated to one single construct (Cronbach’s alpha=0.4052, N=196; Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.3989, N=159). It would also be possible to aggregate item 1 and 2 to generate a variable 
representing risk seeking behavior and to aggregate items 3 and 4 to create a variable 
representing risk averse investment behavior. A Pearson correlation analysis between items 1 
and 2 (0.3447, p-value=0.000, N=196; 0.4078, p-value=0.000, N=159) and items 3 and 4 
(0.2273, p-value=0.001, N=196; 0.2284, p-value=0.0038, N=159) shows that the respective 
items are significantly correlated but correlation coefficients are under 0.5. This would lead to 
a separate consideration of all four items as indicators for risk seeking or risk averse investment 
behavior. Due to their low validity in capturing risk attitudes, these four variables are dropped 
in the further analysis. 
The next chapter presents descriptive statistics of independent and dependent variables under 





5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Structural Equality of Treatment Groups 
Before examining if the collected data shows differences in price quotations across treatment 
groups, it is important to first verify if treatment groups are structurally equal regarding 
extraneous potentially influencing variables as, e.g., individual attitudes and demographics. As 
explained in chapter 4.3, subjects were randomly distributed to one of four treatment groups. 
This random allocation contributes to treatment groups’ structural equality but cannot guarantee 
it. It is thus verified statistically via Chi-square tests as well as one-way ANOVAs. As the main 
data analyses focus on two different sample sizes (full data sample: N=196; reduced data 
sample: N=159), structural equality of treatment groups is thus tested for both sample sizes. 
5.3.2.1 Independent Variables 
Table 54 (Annex 5) provides an overview of descriptive statistics on categorical variables and 
further indicates results of Pearson Chi-square tests on structural equality for the whole sample 
(N=196). These Chi-square tests indicate no significant difference in the frequencies across 
treatment groups for the variables GENDER (χ²=3.81, p=0.283), NATION (χ²=5.0356, 
p=0.539), MASTER (χ²=2.5553, p=0.465), CLUSTER (χ²= 2.41, p=0.879), SHARESP 
(χ²=3.2449, p=0.355), SHARESC (χ²=1.7812, p=0.619), SHARESF (χ²=0.7461, p=0.862), 
EXPFA2 (χ²=0.6688, p=0.881), ANALYSISAR (χ²=1.3485, p=0.718), MCQ1 (χ²=3.1547, 
p=0.368), and MCQ2 (χ²=4.7495, p=0.191). 
However, it shows a significant difference between treatment groups for EXPFA1 (χ²=7.9633, 
p=0.047). The relative amount of students who have already read or consulted financial reports 
is thus unequal across treatment groups. Pairwise Chi-square tests provide further evidence that 
this difference is significant between treatment groups 1 and 4 (χ²=4.1395, p=0.042) as well as 
treatment groups 3 and 4 (χ²=6.1420, p=0.013). The relative amount of students who have 
already dealt with financial reporting is smaller in treatment group 4 than in treatment groups 
1 and 3. In contrast, the four treatment groups are structurally equal regarding the relative 
amount of students who have already analyzed a company’s financial report (EXPFA2). 
Experience with active analysis of companies’ financial reports would probably more strongly 
influence individuals’ decision making than experience with pure reading or pure consultation 
of companies’ reports (EXPFA1). Based on this argument, the structural differences between 
treatment groups found for EXPFA1 should not bias individuals’ price quotations (WTADEV). 
Therefore, this difference is neglected in further analyses. 
Table 56 (Annex 5) illustrates descriptive statistics for all metric control variables for the full 





one-way ANOVAs are applied. Group sizes are larger than 30 (N≥30) allowing assuming 
normal distribution of the respective variable in each treatment group (cf. chapter 5.1). 
Homogeneity of variances is examined via the Levene-Test. In case variances differ between 
treatment groups, the Welch-Test provides more reliable insights on differences in means of 
the respective variable than the one-way ANOVA. Table 58 (Annex 5) provides an overview 
of the corresponding results. One-way ANOVAs indicate no significant differences in means 
across treatment groups for AGE (F=0.562, p-value=0.641), PROFEXP (F=0.821,  
p-value=0.484), EASY (F=0.163, p-value=0.921), RALOSS (F=0.515, p-value=0.673), 
RAMIXED (F=1.434, p-value=0.234), RAGNEEZY (F=1.642, p-value=0.181), RAGENFIN 
(F=0.684, p=0.563), and LAWANG12 (F=0.729, p-value=0.536).  
Homogeneity of variances between groups must be rejected for COMP (F=9.867,  
p-value=0.000), MOTIV (F=2.808, p-value=0.041), LARISK (F=2.546, p-value=0.057), and 
LATIME (F=0.513, p-value=0.002). In these cases, the WELCH-Correction tests for equality 
of means between groups. There are no significant differences in means for MOTIV (0.773,  
p-value=0.512), LARISK (0.310, p-value=0.818), and LATIME (0.743, p-value=0.529). 
However, results show significant differences in means between treatment groups for COMP 
(Welch=3.487, p-value=0.019), CLEAR (F=2.542, p-value=0.058), RAGAIN (F=2.575,  
p-value=0.055), and LAGAECHTER (F=2.234, p-value=0.086). To control for subjects 
understanding of the settings, participants judge the experimental scenarios and tasks regarding 
clarity (CLEAR) and understandability (COMP). The mean value for COMP and CLEAR is 
above 6.1 in each treatment group suggesting that subjects clearly understood the scenarios and 
tasks and therefore did not have any problems with answering the questions. These average 
scale values support the validity of the construct operationalization and the validity of empirical 
results that should not be biased by misunderstanding of tasks or questions or a too high level 
of task difficulty. The differences in means are thus negligible for both variables. RAGAIN and 
LAGAECHTER differ in means between treatment groups. Differences in risk and loss aversion 
could potentially drive the results. That is why they are integrated as control variables in the 
main regression analysis and robustness checks (cf. chapters 5.3.3.3 and 5.3.3.4).  
The same analyses are conducted for the reduced sample (N=159). Consistent to what has been 
found for the whole sample, Table 55 (Annex 5) shows a significant difference between 
treatment groups for EXPFA1 (χ²=11.725, p-value=0.008). As explained above, based on the 
fact that all treatment groups are structurally equal regarding the relative amount of subjects 





EXPFA1 should not bias the results. However, to control for its potential effect, the variable is 
integrated in a robustness check regression analysis (cf. chapter 5.3.3.4). Table 55 (Annex 5) 
further shows a significant difference in means for SHARESP (χ²=7.484, p=0.058). The 
percentage of subjects who have already owned shares in the past is lower for treatment groups 
3 and 4 compared to treatment groups 1 and 2. However, treatment groups are structurally equal 
regarding the percentage of subjects who currently own shares and who plan to buy shares in 
the future. To control for this potentially biasing effect, SHARESP is integrated in a robustness 
analysis as a control variable (cf. chapter 5.3.3.4). Table 55 (Annex 5) documents that treatment 
groups differ regarding gender (χ²=7.519, p=0.057). The percentage of women in treatment 
groups 1 and 2 is noticeably lower relative to treatment groups 3 and 4. Prior literature provides 
evidence for gender differences in risk taking behavior. Byrnes et al. (1999) conduct a meta-
analysis and document overall greater risk taking for male than female study participants. 
Charness and Gneezy (2012) assemble data from different studies that are based on the same 
investment game and confirm that female subjects show more risk aversion in investment 
settings than male subjects. Therefore, GENDER is integrated as an additional control variable 
in a robustness check regression analyses (cf. chapter 5.3.3.4). 
Table 57 (Annex 5) illustrates descriptive statistics for all metric control variables for the 
reduced sample (N=159). Table 59 (Annex 5) documents significant differences in means 
across treatment groups for COMP (Welch=4.234, p=0.008) and CLEAR (F=4.178, p=0.007). 
As explained above, departing from a 7-point Likert Scale, the means of both variables are 
higher than 6.0 across all treatment groups showing that tasks and questions were clearly stated 
and comprehensible. Based on this reasoning, these differences in means are neglected in the 
further analyses. 
5.3.2.2 Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables investigated in this study are deviations of individuals’ price quotations 
from rational share values in investment scenarios 1 to 4 (WTADEV) as well as individuals’ 
conscious choice between investment options made in scenario 5 (INVDEC). Table 21 presents 
the means of selling price deviations from the economic share value per project and treatment 
group. The price quotations considered in this analysis are measured in period t=0 for the first 
project of each scenario and in period t=2 for the second project of each scenario (i.e., at the 
beginning of each R&D project). Subjects have the possibility to sell their equity stake 
throughout the scenarios. As a result, treatment group sizes could vary in points in time other 
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WTA10DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 
1, R&D project 1, t=0; WTA20DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic 
share value in scenario 1, R&D project 2, t=2; WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from 
the rational economic share value in scenario 2, R&D project 3, t=0; WTA40DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of 
their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 2, R&D project 4, t=2; WTA50DEV is the deviation of 
subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 3, R&D project 5, t=0; 
WTA60DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 
3, R&D project 6, t=2; WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic 
share value in scenario 4, R&D project 7, t=0; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from 
the rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D project 8, t=2 (cf. Annex 4 for a detailed description of all variables 
including their measurement/coding) 
Table 21: Means of WTADEV across Scenarios and Treatment Groups 
Table 21 documents that subjects overvalue their equity stake across all scenarios and treatment 
groups. They hence seem to include an option value for potential future developments. Table 
21 further reveals an interesting pattern. The deviations of price quotations from the actual 
economic value of the share strongly increase within a scenario after a loss experience. This 
valuation pattern is consistent with findings by Thaler and Johnson (1990) presented in chapter 
3.1.7: individuals show risk seeking behavior after prior losses if future options provide the 
possibility to break even, i.e., the possibility to compensate prior losses with future gains. In 
the present experiment, subjects obviously indicate higher prices after having experienced a 
prior loss to avoid selling their equity stake. By staying invested, they still have the opportunity 
to compensate prior losses with potential future gains. Descriptive results hence provide 
supporting evidence for the break-even effect (cf. chapter 3.1.7). 
Table 22 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for price quotations (WTADEV) that are 






Variable  TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 Full Sample 
WTA30DEV N 56 38 58 44 196 
 Mean 16.50 20.39 13.57 25.02 18.30 
 Std. Dev. 25.77 26.45 26.34 24.72 26.00 
 Min. -75.00 -55.00 -65.00 -15.00 -75.00 
 Max. 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
WTA70DEV N 56 38 58 44 196 
 Mean 26.61 33.82 14.77 32.70 25.87 
 Std. Dev. 30.68 28.53 23.39 22.88 27.48 
 Min. -75.00 -55.00 -45.00 -14.00 -75.00 
 Max. 75.00 75.00 74.00 75.00 75.00 
WTA80DEV N 45 35 38 41 159 
 Mean 49.44 30.83 37.39 29.73 37.38 
 Std. Dev. 35.08 36.51 24.76 31.37 32.99 
 Min. -50.00 -100.00 -12.00 -100.00 -100.00 
 Max. 100.00 100.00 99.00 100.00 100.00 
WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 
2, R&D project 3, t=0; WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic 
share value in scenario 4, R&D project 7, t=0; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from 
the rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D project 8, t=2 (cf. Annex 4 for a detailed description of all variables 
including their measurement/coding) 
Table 22: Descriptive Statistics WTADEV (Final Experiment) 
The analysis is focused on three different price quotations. In a first step, it is interesting to 
analyze selling prices at the beginning of investment scenario 2 (R&D project 3, t=0; 
WTA30DEV). At this stage, subjects have experienced either a prior gain or a prior loss under 
conservative or neutral accounting in investment scenario 1. In a second step, it is interesting 
to investigate selling price differences in investment scenario 4 (WTA70DEV; WTA80DEV). At 
this point, subjects have already experienced R&D projects 1 to 6 that serve to make subjects 
encounter both accounting methods. 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 22 show that deviations of price quotations from the 
economic share value at the beginning of investment scenario 2 (WTA30DEV) are higher after 
a prior gain than after a prior loss (20.39 and 25.02 vs. 16.50 and 13.57). Descriptive results for 
WTA70DEV indicate that under neutral accounting, individuals value their investment at a 
discount compared to the other treatment groups: the mean of selling price deviations from the 
economic share value of treatment group 3 (14.77) is noticeably lower compared to the 
corresponding means of the other three groups (26.61, 33.82, and 32.70). Descriptive results 





a prior gain (49.44 and 37.39 compared to 30.38 and 29.73). They further seem to be higher 
under conservative than under neutral accounting after a prior loss.  
Table 23 adds descriptive statistics for the investment decision subjects make in investment 
scenario 5.  




N  56  38 58 44 196  




























































































INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if the investment decision is company Z (conservative option); RAND is a binary 
variable coded 1 if the investment decision was random; ACCMETH1 is a binary variable coded 1 if subjects consider the 
accounting method applied for R&D relevant for the investment’s profitability; ACCMETH2 is a binary variable coded 1 if 
subjects based their investment decision on the accounting method applied for R&D; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, 
*p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics and Chi-square Test results for Investment Decision  
The Pearson Chi-square test shows that treatment groups do not differ regarding the investment 
decision made in scenario 5 (χ²=4.427, p=0.219). Descriptive results provide first evidence that 
overall, more than half of all subjects chose the conservative rather than the neutral investment 
option (58.67%). Table 23 further indicates that for nearly 90% of all subjects the choice 
between option X and Z was not random (RAND). Approximately 64% of all subjects consider 
the accounting method relevant for the economic evaluation of the investments’ profitability 
(ACCMETH1) and 67% of all subjects deliberately made their investment decision based on 
the accounting method applied by the respective company (ACCMETH2).  
To refine the operationalization of subjects’ conscious preferences for conservative relative to 





chosen over the unchosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference; PREF). Table 24 
shows that preference mean (PREF) is above 4 (4.43) providing descriptive evidence that 
subjects’ choice reflects a medium to strong preference for one or the other option. 
Variable  TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 Full Sample 
PREF N 56 38 58 44 196 
 Mean 4.57 4.63 4.21 4.39 4.43 
 Std. Dev. 1.925 2.072 2.300 2.180 2.117 
 Min. 0 1 0 0 0 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
PREF is the strength of preference for the chosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference) 
Table 24: Descriptive Statistics for PREF  
5.3.3 Analysis of Hypotheses H1a and H1b 
The main data analysis is structured in several steps leading from univariate to multivariate 
analyses. At first, a one-way ANOVA is applied to investigate if price quotations differ across 
treatment groups. Afterwards, a two-way ANOVA is used to examine an interaction effect 
between prior outcome and accounting method applied on subjects’ price quotations as well as 
their main effects. In a third step, differences between treatment groups are further analyzed via 
independent-samples t-tests. To address the fact that treatment groups are not structurally equal 
on each variable (cf. chapter 5.3.2), a two-way interaction Tobit Regression is conducted 
integrating potential confounding factors. Finally, the research model developed in this thesis 
(cf. chapter 3.4) is tested via a Moderated Moderation Model.  
5.3.3.1 ANOVA and T-Test Results  
As described in chapter 5.1, a valid application of a one- or two-way ANOVA as well as of an 
unpaired t-test demands the fulfillment of certain conditions. The dependent variable needs to 
be measured on a continuous scale. The dependent variable under investigation in this study is 
subjects’ price quotation (WTADEV) measured at a ratio level. Hence, this criterion is fulfilled. 
Furthermore, independent variables need to be categorical on at least two-factor levels leading 
to the formation of (unpaired) treatment groups. This is the case in this study as accounting 
regime (CONS) and prior outcome (LOSS) are both considered on two-factor levels. 
Observations of treatment groups are independent from each other because in scenarios 1 to 4 
of part 1 of this study each participant is distributed to only one of the four treatment groups 





The condition of normal distribution of the respective dependent variable for each treatment 
group is tested via the Shapiro-Wilk-Test. The results of the Shapiro-Wilk-Test are presented 
in Table 25 (cf. Table 6 for Treatment Groups). 






WTA30DEV 1 56 0.909 0.000 *** No 
2 38 0.959 0.179  Yes 
3 58 0.968 0.133  Yes 
4 44 0.966 0.209  Yes 
WTA70DEV 1 56 0.958 0.049 ** No 
2 38 0.937 0.034 ** No 
3 58 0.976 0.297  Yes 
4 44 0.973 0.387  Yes 
WTA80DEV 1 45 0.956 0.087 * No 
2 35 0.908 0.006 *** No 
3 38 0.959 0.178  Yes 
4 41 0.939 0.029 ** No 
WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in 
scenario 2, R&D project 3, t=0; WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the 
rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D project 7, t=0; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation 
of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D project 8, t=2 (cf. Annex 4 for a 
detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding); ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, 
*p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 25: Shapiro-Wilk-Test of Normal Distribution of WTADEV 
ANOVAs and t-tests generally react quite robust against violations of the normal distribution 
of the dependent variable for each treatment groups. A normal distribution is assumed if group 
sizes are large enough. A common accepted threshold is N=30. This is given in the present 
study (cf. Table 25).  
The Levene-Test is applied to test for homogeneity of variances of the dependent variable 






















WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share 
value in scenario 2, R&D project 3, t=0; WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D project 7, t=0; WTA80DEV is the deviation 
of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4, R&D 
project 8, t=2 (cf. Annex 4 for a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding); 
***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 26: Comparison of Means of Dependent Variables across Treatments 
Table 26 shows that the Levene Statistic is insignificant for all three dependent variables. The 
condition of homogeneity of variances of the respective dependent variable across treatment 
groups is thus fulfilled.  
The next chapter discusses results generated by one-way and two-way ANOVA analyses.  
5.3.3.1.1 ANOVA Results 
Table 26 provides results of a one-way ANOVA. In contrast to the pretest, the final 
experiment’s data do not show any significant differences in means of selling price deviations 
from the rational share value that are indicated at the beginning of investment scenario 2 
(WTA30DEV, F=1.814, p-value=0.146) across treatment groups. However, treatment groups 
significantly differ in means of selling price deviations indicated in investment scenario 4, R&D 
project 7 (WTA70DEV, F=5.486, p-value=0.001) and R&D project 8 (WTA80DEV, F=3.343, 
p-value=0.021). 
In a next step, a two-way ANOVA is conducted to test for direct and interaction effects of the 
manipulated variables prior project outcome (gain vs. loss) and accounting method applied 
(conservative vs. neutral). The Levene-Test documented in Table 26 shows that the condition 
of homogeneity of variances of the dependent variable across treatment groups is fulfilled 
(R&D project 7: Levene Stat.=1.491, p-value=0.211; R&D project 8: Levene Stat.=1.727,  
p-value=0.164).  
Table 27 documents the two-way ANOVA’s between-subjects test results. These results 
provide evidence whether the two types of accounting method applied, the two types of prior 





influence deviations of price quotations from the rational economic share value in R&D project 
7. 
DepVar = WTA70DEV 
N=196 
 




F-Statistic p-Value  
Corrected 
Model 
11,623.49a 3 3,874.49 5.486 0.001 *** 
Intercept 138,375.46 1 138,375.46 195.924 0.000 *** 
CONS 1,990.79 1 1,990.79 2.819 0.095 * 
LOSS 7,509.79 1 7,509.79 10.633 0.001 *** 
CONS*LOSS 1,365.78 1 1,365.78 1.934 0.166  
Error 135,604.31 192 706.27      
Total 278,427.00 196        
Corrected 
Total 
147,227.81 195  
a. R²= 0.079 (Adjusted R² = 0.065)  
WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4, 
R&D project 7; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LOSS is a binary variable taking 
the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 27: Two-way ANOVA Results for WTA70DEV 
ANOVA-results document that the effect of prior outcome (LOSS) on price quotations is highly 
significant at the 1%-level (F=10.633, p-value=0.001). This result indicates that the type of 
prior project outcome, i.e., whether project outcome is a gain or a loss, has a significant effect 
on price quotations independent of the accounting method applied. The effect of the accounting 
method applied (CONS) is also significant but only at the 10%-level (F=2.819, p-value=0.095). 
This result suggests that the type of accounting method applied, i.e., conservative or neutral 
accounting, significantly affects price quotations independent of the type of prior project 
outcome. However, due to the low significance, this result needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Table 27 further shows that there is no statistically significant interaction between the factor 
levels of prior outcome and accounting method applied on price quotations for R&D project 7 





Table 28 presents two-way ANOVA results indicating whether the two types of accounting 
method applied, the two types of prior project outcome, and a potential joint effect of both 
variables’ factor levels significantly influence deviations of price quotations from the rational 
economic share value in R&D project 8. 
DepVar = WTA80DEV 
N=159 
 




F-Statistic p-Value  
Corrected Model 10,450.38a 3 3,483.46 3.343 0.021 ** 
Intercept 214,055.85 1 214,055.85 205.45 0.000 *** 
CONS 1,702.79 1 1,702.79 1.634 0.203  
LOSS 6,803.77 1 6,803.77 6.530 0.012 ** 
CONS*LOSS 1,181.92 1 1,181.923 1.134 0.288  
Error 161,495.21 155 1,041.91      
Total 394,154.00 159        
Corrected Total 171,945.59 158        
a. R² = 0.061 (Adjusted R² = 0.043)  
WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 
4, R&D project 2; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LOSS is a binary variable 
taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed 
test) 
Table 28: Two-way ANOVA Results for WTA80DEV 
Table 28 documents a highly significant effect for prior outcome (LOSS) on relative price 
quotations (F=6.530, p-value=0.012) while the accounting method applied (CONS) is 
insignificant in the model (F=1.634, p-value=0.203). Price quotations thus differ depending on 
the type of prior project outcome, independent of the accounting method applied. A prior gain 
thus differently influences price quotations compared to a prior loss. In contrast, price 
quotations do not differ between the two accounting methods, independent of prior project 
outcome. Conservative and neutral accounting thus do not differently influence price 
quotations. Table 28 further shows that there is no significant interaction effect between factor 






In summary, the conducted two-way ANOVAs do not find a significant interaction effect 
between the two types of prior project outcome and the two types of accounting method applied 
on price quotations. However, they provide strong evidence for a main effect of the type of 
prior outcome on subjects’ relative price quotations. The evidence for a main effect of the type 
of the accounting method applied is less strong.  
One-way ANOVA results presented above provide evidence for a difference in means of 
deviations of price quotations from the rational economic share value across the four treatment 
groups. However, it remains unclear where these differences exactly come from. The one-way 
ANOVA does not identify if differences in means exist across all four treatment groups, or if, 
for instance, differences only stem from one treatment group while the three other treatment 
groups are equal in means.  
The two-way ANOVA examines if differences in means of price quotations between treatment 
groups are influenced by the manipulated factor variables. Corresponding results reveal a main 
effect of the type of prior project outcome suggesting that price quotations differ between 
conditions of prior gain and conditions of prior loss. Evidence showing that the two types of 
accounting method applied differently influence price quotations is less strong. Results do not 
indicate an interaction effect between factor levels of the two manipulated variables. The 
adjusted R² of both two-way ANOVAs is very small (0.065 and 0.043 respectively) indicating 
that only 6.5% (4.3%) of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the respective 
model.  
The research model developed in this thesis (cf. chapter 3.4) is based on a three-way interaction 
between prior project outcome, accounting method applied, and individuals’ degree of loss 
aversion. The effect of the accounting method applied on the relation of prior project outcome 
and price quotations is assumed to be conditional on loss aversion. As explained in chapter 5.1, 
in a moderated moderation model the full effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variable partly depends on the two other variables. In case a three-way interaction reasonably 
reflects the true relation between the variables under investigation, a two-way interaction will 
thus not provide useful results. In the two-way ANOVA conducted in this chapter, the assumed 
moderating effect between the accounting method applied and loss aversion is neglected. This 
analysis is only interesting for examining if the accounting method applied already moderates 
the relation between prior project outcome and price quotations without considering loss 
aversion as a secondary moderator. However, based on the theoretically derived three-way 





an interaction effect between the different factor levels of the accounting method applied and 
prior project outcome. 
Although not providing evidence for an interaction effect, the ANOVAs conducted in this 
chapter detect differences in means of price quotations between treatment groups. To get further 
insights on where these differences in means of price quotations exactly come from, unpaired 
t-tests are conducted. T-test results can reveal between which treatment groups differences in 
means of price quotations exist and under which type of prior project outcome (gain vs. loss) 
and type of accounting method applied (conservative vs. neutral) price quotations are higher or 
lower respectively. Corresponding results are presented in the next chapter. 
5.3.3.1.2 T-Test Results 
Independent t-tests allow examining differences of the depending variable between each pair 
of treatment groups. Table 29 documents the results of a comparison of means of deviations of 
price quotations from the respective rational economic share value in investment scenario 4, 
R&D project 7 (WTA70DEV). 















































WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share 
value in scenario 4, R&D project 7; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 29: Levene Test and T-Test Results for WTA70DEV 
Treatment groups 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are in the expense (capitalizing) condition. Subjects in 
treatment groups 1 and 3 (2 and 4) experienced a prior loss (gain) (cf. Table 6). Table 30 





DepVar = WTA70DEV 






















WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic 
share value in scenario 4, R&D project 7; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 
(two-tailed test) 
Table 30: T-Test Results for WTA70DEV  
Table 30 documents that price deviations after a prior gain vs. after a prior loss do not differ 
significantly under conservative accounting (T=-1.150, p-value=0.253) whereas they differ 
significantly under neutral accounting (T=-3.869, p-value=0.000). Subjects in treatment group 
3 who experienced a prior loss, value their equity stake at a significantly lower price than 
subjects in treatment group 4 who experienced a prior gain (mean=14.77 vs. mean=32.70). 
Comparing treatment groups 1 and 3, it is noticeable that after a prior loss, subjects in the 
conservative condition value their equity stake significantly more highly than subjects in the 
neutral condition do (T=2.309, p-value=0.023). After a prior gain, subjects’ valuations of their 
equity stake do not differ significantly in both accounting conditions (T=0.196, p-value=0.845). 
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a, showing that subjects value conservatism more 
highly than neutral accounting.  
This is confirmed by an unpaired t-test comparing deviations of selling prices (WTA70DEV) of 
treatment groups 1 and 2 (conservative condition) with relative price quotations of treatment 
groups 3 and 4 (neutral condition). As documented in Table 31, under conservatism, price 
quotations are significantly higher than under neutrality (mean=29.52 > mean=22.51)  







DepVar = WTA70DEV 
  CONSERVATIVE NEUTRAL  t-Statistic p-Value 






WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in 
scenario 4, R&D project 7; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 31: T-Test of WTA70DEV between the Conservative and the Neutral Condition 
An independent t-test analyzing price quotations based on prior gains and losses reveals that 
prior outcome has a significant effect on future valuation. Table 32 shows that subjects value 
their equity stake significantly more highly after a prior gain than after a prior loss  
(mean=33.22 > mean=20.59) (Levene Stat.=0.662, p-value=0.417; T=3.252, p-value=0.001).  
DepVar = WTA70DEV 
  GAIN LOSS  t-Statistic p-Value 






WTA70DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in 
scenario 4, R&D project 7; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 32: T-Test of WTA70DEV between the Gain and the Loss Condition 
An analysis of price quotations indicated in scenario 4, project 8 (WTA80DEV) leads to the 
results presented in Table 33. 















































WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value 
in scenario 4, R&D project 8; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 





Treatment groups 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are in the expense (capitalizing) condition. Subjects in 
treatment groups 1 and 3 (2 and 4) experienced a prior loss (gain) (cf. Table 6). Table 34 
presents the corresponding t-test results in a 2x2-Design. 
DepVar = WTA80DEV 






















WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic 
share value in scenario 4, R&D project 8; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 
(two-tailed test) 
Table 34: T-Test Results for WTA80DEV 
Results show that price quotations after a prior loss differ significantly depending on the 
accounting method applied: subjects in the conservative condition value their equity stake more 
highly than subjects in the neutral condition (T=1.827, p-value=0.071). Table 34 further 
documents that in contrast to what has been found for WTA70DEV, price quotations are 
significantly higher after a prior loss than after a prior gain under conservative accounting 
(comparison of treatment group 1 and 2, T=2.313, p-value=0.023). This difference is also 
descriptively confirmed for neutral accounting, however being insignificant in this case 
(comparison of treatment group 3 and 4; mean=37.39 > mean=29.73; T=1.210, p-value=0.230).  
An unpaired t-test comparing deviations of selling prices under conservatism (TG1+2) and 
neutral accounting (TG3+4) reveals that price quotations are higher under conservative than 
under neutral accounting (mean=41.30 > mean=33.42) (cf. Table 35). However, these results 






DepVar = WTA80DEV 
  CONSERVATIVE NEUTRAL  t-Statistic p-Value 






WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in 
scenario 4, R&D project 8; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 35: T-Test of WTA80DEV between the Conservative and the Neutral Condition 
In contrast to what has been found for WTA70DEV, a t-test analysis of WTA80DEV based on 
prior gains and losses documents that subjects value their equity stake significantly more highly 
after a prior loss than after a prior gain (mean=43.93 > mean=30.24) (Levene Stat.=0.303,  
p-value=0.583; T=-2.664, p-value=0.009) (cf. Table 36).  
DepVar = WTA80DEV 








WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in 
scenario 4, R&D project 8; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 36: T-Test of WTA80DEV between the Gain and the Loss Condition 
As explained in chapter 5.3.2.2, these valuation patterns are consistent with deliberations on the 
break-even effect presented in chapter 3.1.7. At the beginning of investment scenario 4, when 
facing R&D project 7, there is no need to break even because subjects start every new scenario 
with an endowment of $ 200,000 (i.e., a fresh start, cf. chapter 4.2.2.2). As shown by Table 30, 
in this situation, prior gains lead to higher company overvaluation compared to prior losses and 
prior losses in a neutral setting lead to the lowest overvaluation. This is in accordance with 
Hypothesis 1a. However, Table 34 documents that at the beginning of R&D project 8 when 
subjects have experienced a prior gain or loss in R&D project 7, the overvaluation of the equity 
stake expressed by positive selling price deviations from the rational share value are higher 
after a prior loss than after a prior gain. 
This leads to the assumption that the break-even effect comes into play. Subjects who 
experienced a prior loss in R&D project 7 apparently indicate higher price quotations at the 
beginning of R&D project 8 than subjects who experienced a prior gain to avoid selling their 
share and thus keeping the opportunity to compensate prior losses with potential future gains 





positive deviations of price quotations from the rational share value are lower under neutral 
than under conservative accounting. This reflects Hypothesis 1a: subjects mentally better cope 
with a prior loss in the conservative than in the neutral setting leading to higher valuations of 
the investment under conservative accounting. Deviations of price quotations from the rational 
economic share value in R&D project 8 hence result from a combination of two effects: the 
possibility to break even and loss aversion leading to higher valuations under the conservative 
than the neutral accounting regime.  
Conversely, one could argue that subjects in the conservative condition who experienced a prior 
loss are more willing to break even than subjects who experienced a prior loss under neutral 
accounting leading to highest valuations under conservative accounting in cases of prior losses. 
However, this explanation contradicts findings from R&D project 7 (cf. Table 30) showing that 
after a prior loss subjects value their equity stake significantly more highly under conservative 
than under neutral accounting when there is no need to break even (T=2.309, p-value=0.023). 
The interpretation of price quotations made for R&D project 7 is based on the assumption that 
subjects do have experienced investment scenario 3 to its end and hence do have experienced a 
gain or loss in R&D project 6. However, as shown in Table 21, a noticeable amount of subjects 
have sold their equity stake during R&D project 5 and hence have not experienced R&D project 
6 at all. Therefore, the results based on data collected in R&D project 7 probably contain noise 
and should be interpreted with caution. However, prior experiences are clearly determinable for 
subjects who make a price quotation at the beginning of R&D project 8: they definitely 
experienced R&D project 7, which is part of the same investment scenario (i.e., investment 
scenario 4). Therefore, the multivariate analyses presented in the next two chapters focus on 
price quotations indicated at the beginning of R&D project 8 (WTA80DEV). 
5.3.3.2 Moderation Model Results 
Prior analyses show that price quotations are influenced by prior outcome (cf. chapter 
5.3.3.1.2). In case of a prior loss, subjects indicate higher price quotations compared to a prior 
gain. This increase in price quotations after prior loss experiences seem to be driven by subjects’ 
loss aversion reflected in the break-even effect: subjects indicate higher prices after a prior loss 
to stay invested and keep the chance to compensate prior losses with potential future gains. As 
argued in chapter 3, conservatism should better address individuals’ loss aversion than neutral 
accounting. That is why a moderation effect of conservatism on the relation between prior 
project outcome and price quotations is expected. This moderation represents one part of the 





model, the regression analysis conducted in this chapter is modeled as a two-way interaction 
between prior project outcome and accounting method applied. The two-way interaction 
analysis does not capture the full research model due to neglecting the secondary moderator. 
Corresponding regression results are thus only provided for interest and completeness purposes 
and are not used for testing the hypotheses developed in this thesis. The full research model is 
tested via a three-way interaction regression in the subsequent chapter 5.3.3.3.  
In this chapter, the following two-way interaction Tobit regression is run: 
WTA80DEV= β0 + β1∙LOSS + β2∙CONS + β3·LOSS·CONS + β4·LARISK + β5 ∙LATIME 
+ β6∙RAGAIN + β7∙RALOSS + β8∙RAMIXED + ε 
where: 
WTA80DEV: Dependent variable representing the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their 
equity stake from the rational economic share value in investment 
scenario 4, R&D project 8, t=2 
LOSS: Dummy variable equal to 1 for treatment group of prior loss experience, 
0 otherwise 
CONS: Dummy variable equal to 1 for treatment group experiencing conservatism, 
0 otherwise 
LARISK: Aggregated variable adapted from Abdellaoui et al. (2013) measuring the 
individual subject’s degree of loss aversion under risk calculated based on 
mixed outcome prospects 
LATIME: Aggregated variable adapted from Abdellaoui et al. (2013) measuring the 
individual subject’s degree of loss aversion over time based on payment 
prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in 
the future 
RAGAIN: Variable measuring the individual subject’s risk aversion in gain contexts 
based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
RALOSS: Variable measuring the individual subject’s risk aversion in loss contexts 
based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
RAMIXED: Variable measuring the individual subject’s risk aversion in mixed contexts 
based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
A moderator effect of CONS on the direct effect of LOSS on WTA80DEV is assumed. Therefore, 





as risk attitudes influence individuals’ investment behavior (cf. chapter 3.1). To isolate the 
effect of project outcome and the accounting method applied on subject’s company evaluation, 
loss aversion under risk (LARISK), loss aversion over time (LATIME) and risk aversion 
(RAGAIN, RALOSS, RAMIXED) are taken into account as control variables in the regression 
(cf. chapter 4.2.5). Three observations of extreme values for loss aversion under risk above 
eight are eliminated.  
A Pearson-Spearman correlation matrix of the regression variables is provided in Table 60 
(Annex 5). Bivariate correlations show that price quotations (WTA80DEV) are significantly 
positively correlated with prior project outcome (LOSS) while the correlation with the 
accounting treatment is insignificant. Table 60 (Annex 5) further shows a significant positive 
correlation between price quotations (WTA80DEV) and loss aversion under risk (LARISK) and 
loss aversion over time (LATIME), while it documents negative correlations between 
WTA80DEV and risk aversion in gain and loss settings (RAGAIN, RALOSS). Individuals’ loss 
aversion (risk aversion) hence seems to positively (negatively) influence individuals’ company 
valuation. Loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is significantly correlated with risk aversion 
(RAGAIN, RALOSS, RAMIXED). As explained in chapter 3.1.2, this correlation is expected 
because risk and loss aversion are commonly considered as related but distinct phenomena 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Abdellaoui et al., 2013). All corresponding correlation 
coefficients are below 0.5 indicating that risk and loss aversion variables are reflecting different 
concepts. Hence, all variables are kept in the regression analysis. 
Tobit regression results are documented in Table 37. Corresponding VIFs are under 10  








WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LOSS*CONS + β4 LARISK + β5 LATIME + β6 RAGAIN +  




t-Statistic p-Value  
LOSS 7.026964 6.343573 1.11 0.270  
CONS -1.658903 7.539446 -0.22 0.826  
LOSS*CONS 13.70999 9.753897 1.41 0.162  
LARISK 4.59674 4.031185 1.14 0.256  
LATIME 11.7508 4.768602 2.46 0.015 ** 
RAGAIN -44.65488 16.61026 -2.69 0.008 *** 
RALOSS -4.960283 15.96624 -0.31 0.756  
RAMIXED 0.2780812 20.65373 0.01 0.989  
Constant 24.38761 6.997483 3.49 0.001 *** 
Observations                      156  
F-Statistic                          4.71  
p-Value    0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²    0.0174  
Log Pseudolikelihood     -740.67014  
Highest VIF                       3.07  
Tobit regression; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test)  
Table 37: Two-way Interaction Tobit Regression Results (WTA80DEV) 
The model is highly significant (F=4.71, p-value=0.000). Results show that there is no 
significant interaction effect between prior project outcome and the accounting method applied 
on price quotations (t=1.41, p-value=0.162). Furthermore, neither the coefficient of prior 
project outcome (LOSS) nor the coefficient of the accounting method applied (CONS) is 
significant in the regression (t=1.11, p-value=0.270; t=0.22, p-value=0.826).  
In contrast, Tobit regression results provide evidence that individuals’ loss aversion over time 
(LATIME) is positively associated to individuals’ price quotations: in case loss aversion over 
time increases by one unit, price quotations would increase by $ 11,751 (all else equal). 
Individuals’ risk aversion in gain contexts (RAGAIN) is negatively related to individuals’ price 
quotations: price quotations would decrease by $ -44,655 if risk aversion in gain settings 
increases by one unit. Individuals thus tend to escape future risk (and secure prior gains or the 
status quo) by selling their equity stake at a lower price. LARISK, RALOSS, and RAMIXED are 





p-value=0.989). Based on this model, price quotations are mainly driven by loss aversion over 
time and risk aversion in gain contexts. 
In summary, consistent with findings from ANOVA and t-test analyses presented in chapter 
5.3.3.1, regression results do not provide evidence for a two-way interaction between prior 
project outcome and accounting method applied. Based on the theoretically derived three-way 
interaction model these findings are not surprising because the secondary moderator is 
neglected. As argued in chapter 3.4, the effect of prior outcome on price quotations should be 
moderated by the accounting method applied and this moderator effect should itself depend on 
individuals’ loss aversion, leading to a moderated moderation model (i.e., a three-way 
interaction; cf. Hayes, 2013). Results of the corresponding three-way interaction regression are 
presented in the next chapter. 
5.3.3.3 Moderated Moderation Model Results 
Regression results presented in the prior chapter do not provide evidence for an interaction 
effect between prior project outcome and accounting method applied on price quotations. This 
is consistent with ANOVA and t-test results presented in chapter 5.3.3.1. The two-way 
interaction was run considering individuals’ loss aversion under risk and loss aversion over 
time as control variables. Abdellaoui et al. (2013) show that individuals’ degree of loss aversion 
significantly differs under risk and over time. Correlation analyses conducted in this thesis 
confirm that loss aversion under risk and loss aversion over time measured based on Abdellaoui 
et al. (2013) are uncorrelated (cf. chapter 5.3.1). Loss aversion under risk and loss aversion over 
time should thus both be considered separately in the regression analysis. The experimental 
setting considers the time dimension by splitting R&D projects in several periods each 
representing one fiscal year. Because subjects’ equity value is influenced by the R&D projects’ 
development and outcome, subjects experience changes in equity in steps of fiscal years. 
However, the time delays are introduced on a hypothetical basis because the time spans subjects 
experience between changes in equity do not truly correspond to a period of one year. In 
contrast, the risk dimension is implemented under real conditions. The R&D projects’ 
probability of success or failure is 50% and the corresponding project outcome directly affects 
the value of subjects’ equity stake in the company. For this reason, the risk dimension is more 
present than the time dimension in the experimental setting. Based on these deliberations, 
individuals’ degree of loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is integrated as the secondary 






To analyze the full research model developed in this thesis (cf. chapter 3.4), the following 
moderated moderation model is applied:  
WTA80DEV= β0+β1·LOSS + β2·CONS + β3·LARISK + β4·LOSS·CONS + 
β5·LOSS·LARISK + β6·CONS·LARISK + β7·CONS·LOSS·LARISK +
β8·LATIME + β9·RAGAIN + β10·RALOSS + β11·RAMIXED + ε 
The moderated moderation analysis conducted is based on a Tobit regression. According to the 
research model, the accounting method applied (CONS) represents the primary moderator, 
while loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is the secondary moderator. The two-way interaction 
of CONS and LOSS is thus examined conditional on different levels of LARISK. Three 
observations of extreme values for LARISK above eight are eliminated.  
Table 61 (Annex 5) presents a Pearson-Spearman correlation matrix of the regression variables. 
Bivariate correlations document a significant positive correlation between price quotations 
(WTA80DEV) and prior project outcome (LOSS) while no significant correlation is found 
between price quotations and the accounting treatment (CONS). Table 61 (Annex 5) further 
shows a significant positive correlation between price quotations (WTA80DEV) and loss 
aversion under risk (LARISK) as well as loss aversion over time (LATIME), while it documents 
negative correlations between WTA80DEV and risk aversion in gain and loss settings (RAGAIN, 
RALOSS). Loss aversion under risk (LARISK) is significantly correlated with risk aversion 
(RAGAIN, RALOSS) but the correlation coefficients are below 0.5. 
For conducting the three-way interaction regression, the moderator variable LARISK is mean-
centered (cf. chapter 5.1) to facilitate the interpretation of the regression coefficients of the 
dummy variable LOSS as well as of corresponding interaction terms. As explained in chapter 
5.1, without mean centering, the coefficient of the focal predictor (LOSS) shows the effect of 
LOSS on the dependent variable WTA80DEV under the condition that the primary (CONS) and 
secondary (LARISK) moderator variables are 0 and all controls are held constant. In the present 
study, this interpretation of the regression coefficient β1 would not make sense because 
individuals’ degree of loss aversion under risk is always > 0 (i.e., 0 is not part of possible values 
of LARISK). For this reason, the variable LARISK is mean-centered. Subtracting the sample 
mean of LARISK from each LARISK observation (i.e., mean centering LARISK) leads to a mean 
of the mean-centered variable LARISK of 0. The interpretation of the regression coefficient β1 
is still conditioned on the mean-centered variable LARISK being 0 (this is different from its 





uncentered (=1.45). The interpretation of the regression coefficients of LOSS and its 
corresponding interaction terms is thus conditioned on CONS being 0 and LARISK being at its 
sample mean of 1.45. 
Table 38 provides the Tobit regression results. Reported VIFs are below 10  
(highest VIF = 3.07) indicating that multicollinearity is not of concern in this analysis. 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK +  
 β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8 LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + β10 RALOSS  
 + β11 RAMIXED + ε 
Variables Coefficient Robust
Standard Error 
t-Statistic p-Value  
LOSS 6.982352 6.07716 1.15 0.252  
CONS -1.945844 7.140317 -0.27 0.786  
LARISK -1.446784 4.566591 -0.32 0.752  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 9.478829 1.52 0.131  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 7.457482 1.77 0.078 * 
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 6.261025 2.51 0.013 ** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 9.770042 -2.07 0.040 ** 
LATIME 13.48979 3.972499 3.40 0.001 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 16.96173 -2.17 0.032 ** 
RALOSS -1.145277 16.08425 -0.07 0.943  
RAMIXED -9.655555 20.80126 -0.46 0.643  
Constant 23.18434 6.855398 3.38 0.001 *** 
N                                   156  
F-Statistic                            4.80   
P-Value    0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²     0.0218  
Log Pseudolikelihood    -737.31672  
Highest VIF                        3.07  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean centered; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 38: Three-way Interaction Tobit Regression Results (WTA80DEV) 
Table 38 documents that prior project outcome (LOSS) does not show a significant regression 
coefficient indicating that a change from prior gain to prior loss does not significantly influence 
price quotations (β1=6.98, T=1.15, p-value=0.252), all else equal. The same is true for a change 
from neutral to conservative accounting (CONS) (β2=-1.95, T=-0.27, p-value=0.786).  





(LARISK) (β3=-1.45, T=-0.32, p-value=0.752). However, regression results document 
significant coefficients for the control variables LATIME and RAGAIN. An increase in loss 
aversion over time (LATIME) by one unit increases price quotations by $ 13,490 (β8=13.490, 
T=3.40, p-value=0.001) (all else equal). In contrast, an increase in risk aversion (RAGAIN) by 
one unit decreases WTA80DEV by $ -36,826 (β9=-36.826, T=-2.17, p-value=0.032). Table 38 
further provides evidence for significant interaction effects when LARISK is involved. After a 
prior loss experience, an increase in loss aversion leads to a significant increase in price 
quotations by $ 13,220 (β5=13.2203, T=1.77, p-value=0.078). Under conservatism, an increase 
in loss aversion significantly increases price quotations by $ 15,686 (β6=15.68638, T=2.51,  
p-value=0.013). The significant and negative three-way interaction regression coefficient  
(β7=-20.19987, T=-2.07, p-value=0.040) documents that an increase in loss aversion in the 
condition of a prior loss experience under conservatism leads to a significant decrease in price 
quotations by $ -20,200. Summing up the three regression coefficients β5 β6 β7 = 8.70681 
indicates that the overall effect of LARISK is still positive. These interaction terms indicate that 
LOSS and CONS have an effect on price quotations when variations in LARISK are considered. 
Based on the research model developed in this thesis (cf. chapter 3.4), it is important to not only 
examine the effect of prior project outcome on price quotations if all else is equal but to also 
assess its effects on price quotations depending on conditions of the two moderator variables, 
i.e., investigating its partial and full effects. Prior project outcome is defined by the dummy 
variable LOSS taking the value of 1 in case of prior loss, 0 otherwise. The corresponding partial 
and full effects thus need to be interpreted as the discrete change from prior gain to prior loss.  
Table 14 presented in chapter 5.1 provides an overview of relevant slope coefficients useful for 
examining partial and full effects of an independent focal predictor variable X (LOSS) on a 
dependent variable Y (WTA80DEV) conditional on a primary moderator variable M (CONS) 
and a secondary moderator W (LARISK). In the present setting, the primary moderator variable 
CONS is a dummy variable coded 1 if the accounting method applied is conservative and 0 if 
it is neutral. It is thus interesting to analyse the effect of a change from prior gain to prior loss 
(LOSS=1) under the two accounting methods applied holding the level of risk aversion constant 
(i.e., examining partial effects of LOSS on price quotations). LARISK is a continuous variable 
that is mean-centered in the above presented Tobit regression. Results presented in Table 38 
are thus based on the mean-centered variable LARISK being at 0. Because the mean-centered 
variable is at 0, partial effects of a prior loss on price quotations are equivalent to its full effects 





 Partial Effect of LOSS on  
WTA80DEV if 
Full effect of LOSS on  
WTA80DEV if 
LARISK is  
at 0 
CONS is 0 CONS is 1 CONS is 0 CONS is 1 
Relevant β β1 β1 β4 ∗ 1 β1
β5 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾  
β1  β4 ∗ 1 
  β5 ∗ 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾











WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 
4, R&D project 8; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary 
variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion 
under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LARISK is mean-centered in this analysis, 
***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed test) 
Table 39: Partial and Full Effect of LOSS on WTA80DEV under Different Levels of LARISK 
Table 39 indicates that a prior loss leads to a significant increase in price quotations by $ 21,382 
(p-value=0.005) under conservatism while its effect is insignificant under neutral accounting. 
The full effect of prior loss on price quotations is reflected in the addition of corresponding 
regression coefficients. However, as documented in Table 39, this addition is not sufficient 
because as indicated by the significant regression coefficients of all interaction terms involving 
LARISK, the effect of a prior loss on price quotations seem to be dependent on LARISK. For 
this reason, the effect of a prior loss experience on price quotations is analyzed by varying the 
level of LARISK.  
The effect of LARISK on price quotations can be separated into its single components depending 
on the levels of the dummy variables LOSS and CONS. These components represent the 
intercept and the slope of the corresponding regression line defined by results presented in Table 
38 as follows. As explained in Chapter 5.1, the intercept with respect to W is equal to  
𝛽 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀  𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀  and the slope is 𝛽 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋  𝛽 ∙ 𝑀 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋 ∙ 𝑀  . To 
analyze the influence of changes in W=LARISK on price quotations, X=LOSS and M=CONS 
are varied interchangeably. Table 40 displays the intercepts and slopes that are obtained when 
setting X = LOSS = 0 or 1 and M = CONS = 0 or 1. Being independent of LARISK, control 
variables are unconsidered. Table 40 hence presents the corresponding results for both the 






LOSS=1 Intercept Slope 
CONS=0 30.166692 
β0 β1  
11.773516 
β3 β5  
CONS=1 42.620488 
β0 β1 β2 β4  
7.260026 
β3 β5  β6 β7  




β3 β5  
CONS=1 21.238496 
β0 β2  
14.239596 
β3 β6  
Table 40: Calculation of Intercept and Slope of Regression Lines based on LARISK for all conditions of LOSS and 
CONS  
Based on the intercept and slope parameters presented in Table 40, it is possible to calculate 
estimations of price quotations for different levels of loss aversion. To define a high, a medium 
and a low level of loss aversion under risk, one standard deviation (1.016878) is added 
(subtracted) to (from) the sample mean (1.446014). Due to the fact that LARISK is mean-
centered in the above presented analysis, one standard deviation is added (subtracted) from 0 
because 0 represents the sample mean if LARISK is mean-centered. Low loss aversion is thus 
represented by a level of -1.016878 and high loss aversion is defined by a level of 1.016878. 
Table 41 documents estimated price quotations for the three levels of loss aversion under all 
conditions of prior project outcome and accounting method applied. 
DepVar = WTA80DEV 
LOSS=1 
 CONS=0 CONS=1 
Low LARISK 18.1944626 35.23792728 
Medium LARISK 30.166692 42.620488 
High LARISK 42.1389214 50.00304872 
LOSS=0 
 CONS=0 CONS=1 
Low LARISK 24.6555428 6.7585641 
Medium LARISK 23.18434 21.238496 
High LARISK 21.7131372 35.7184279 
Table 41: Estimation of WTA80DEV for different Levels of LARISK 
Results presented in Table 41 suggest that consistent with Hypothesis H1a, after a prior loss 





(CONS=0) accounting setting for all levels of loss aversion under risk. Results further provide 
evidence for Hypothesis H1b, showing that after a prior loss (LOSS=1) under conservatism 
(CONS=1), price quotations are highest for individuals with a high level of loss aversion.  
Results further suggest that after a prior gain (LOSS=0), price quotations are higher under 
neutral accounting (CONS=0) than under conservative accounting (CONS=1) for individuals 
with a low level loss aversion. However, price quotations strongly increase under conservatism 
with increasing loss aversion. This finding documents that even after a prior gain valuations are 
higher under conservative than neutral accounting if loss aversion increases. Consistent with 
expectations, loss aversion under risk is the main moderator implying that results cannot be 
interpreted without its moderation impact. 
The three-way interaction regression was rerun by splitting the sample at the median of LARISK 
(1.162769) and mean-centering LARISK for the corresponding subsamples. Untabulated results 
confirm expectations that after a prior loss, price quotations are significantly higher under 
conservatism for subjects with high loss aversion, while results are insignificant for individuals 
with low loss aversion. However, by splitting the sample into two subsamples, only half of the 
observations are examined per regression analysis (N=78) reducing the validity and the 
informative value of the corresponding results.  
5.3.3.4 Robustness Checks 
Several sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine the robustness of the results generated 
by the moderated moderation Tobit regression. In a first step, alternative measures of the 
secondary moderator loss aversion and the control variables for risk aversion are used in the 
regression. Secondly, additional control variables are integrated in the regression. Thirdly, the 
regression is run on the data collected in St. Gallen while data collected in Augsburg is removed 
from the sample. In a fourth step, subjects who wrongly answered one or both manipulation 
check questions (MCQ1 and MCQ2) are removed from the sample. Finally, an OLS instead of 
a Tobit regression is used to test the moderated moderation model. 
The secondary moderator in the research model under investigation is individuals’ loss aversion 
under risk (LARISK). The corresponding measure applied in the main analysis is an aggregation 
of two loss aversion measures that are calculated based on the final negative payment of two 
mixed outcome prospects matching subjects’ certainty equivalent of 0: (50, ½; -50) (LARISK50) 
and (200, ½; -200) (LARISK200) (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.2). Correlation analyses show that the 





5, Table 61). For robustness check purposes, the main Tobit regression is run by replacing the 
aggregated measure of loss aversion under risk by its single components (LARISK50 and 
LARISK200). Both variables are mean-centered. Three (four) extreme values for LARISK50 
(LARISK200) above eight are removed from the sample. Table 63 (Table 64) (Annex 5) presents 
results generated based on LARISK50 (LARISK200). Consistent with the main analysis, the 
coefficient of the three-way interaction is negative and still (but less) significant in both models 
(p-values=0.085 and 0.087). Levels and signs of interaction related coefficients are similar to 
the main analysis besides the coefficient of the respective measure of loss aversion under risk: 
in contrast to the main analysis, loss aversion under risk itself is significant in both models and 
shows higher coefficients. Two-way interactions are only significant for LARISK200. Results 
of LARISK200 more strongly reflect the main analysis’ results than LARISK50.  
Two other instruments measuring individuals’ degree of loss aversion in risky choices are 
applied for robustness check purposes (cf. chapter 4.2.5.2.3). The first instrument is adapted 
from Wang et al. (2016) and asks subjects to indicate the minimum amount of gain that needs 
to be offered by a two-outcome lottery (p=0.5) to make them willing to participate in the lottery 
if the involved loss amount is known up-front. The resulting gain-loss ratio represents the loss 
aversion index (LAWANG; cf. chapter 5.3.1). Five observations of extreme values of loss 
aversion above eight are removed from the sample. Results presented by Table 65 (Annex 5) 
provide evidence for a highly significant three-way interaction (p-value=0.001). It is noticeable 
that compared to the results of the main regression analysis the three-way interaction coefficient 
is this time positive. Furthermore, contrary to the main analysis, the coefficients of both two-
way interaction terms involving loss aversion show negative signs both being insignificant. 
The second additional instrument measuring loss aversion under risk is adapted from Gächter 
et al. (2010). Subjects indicate for six different mixed lotteries (p=0.5) if they would accept or 
reject it. The amount of the potential gain is the same in each lottery whereas potential losses 
vary. The gain-loss ratio resulting at the point when people switch from playing the lottery to 
rejecting it represents subjects’ loss aversion index (LAGAECHTER, cf. chapter 4.2.5.2.3). 
Table 66 (Annex 5) presents results of the corresponding regression analysis. The three-way 
interaction has a positive coefficient that is not significant in this analysis. Also two-way 
interactions involving loss aversion are insignificant and differ in levels and signs compared to 
the main analysis. Based on this model, price quotations are associated to LATIME and RAGAIN 





The fact that applying alternative measures of the secondary moderator leads to differing results 
is not surprising if taking into account results of bivariate correlation analyses presented in 
Table 61 (Annex 5). LARISK is not at all correlated to LAWANG or LAGAECHTER: for the 
corresponding pairs of loss aversion measures correlation coefficients are very low and 
insignificant. Although LAWANG and LAGAECHTER are significantly correlated, regression 
results differ in the three-way interaction being only significant under LAWANG. Regression 
and correlation analyses’ results suggest that the more developed loss aversion measure adapted 
from Abdellaoui et al. (2013) and the very simple loss aversion measures applied by Gächter et 
al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2016) seem to capture different concepts. 
The risk aversion measures based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) (RAGAIN, RALOSS, RAMIXED) 
are replaced by the following alternative measures of risk aversion to check for robustness of 
results: RAGENFIN and RAGNEEZY. RAGENFIN is an aggregated risk aversion measure 
adapted from Dohmen et al. (2011) (cf. chapter 4.2.5.2.2) that is based on individuals’ self-
reported risk attitudes in general as well as financial contexts. RAGNEEZY is adapted from 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) measuring risk aversion via individuals’ investment in a two-
outcome lottery (cf. chapter 4.2.5.1.3). Table 67 and Table 68 (Annex 5) present the 
corresponding Tobit regression results. Compared to the main analysis, results based on 
RAGENFIN do not show noticeable changes in levels, signs or significance of coefficients while 
the three-way interaction is no longer significant under the analysis based on RAGNEEZY. 
Under RAGNEEZY, CONS has a positive coefficient, however, still being insignificant. The 
signs of the controls RAGENFIN and RAGNEEZY differ compared to risk measures used in the 
main analysis: coefficients of the risk aversion measures in the main analysis have negative 
signs while RAGENFIN and RAGNEEZY positively influence price quotations. This change in 
signs is consistent with the variables’ inverse coding: higher values of RAGENFIN and 
RAGNEEZY represent risk seeking behavior while higher values of RAGAIN, RALOSS, 
RAMIXED represent risk averse behavior. Bivariate correlation analyses fit to these results  
(cf. Table 62, Annex 5): correlations between RAGENFIN or RAGNEEZY and RAGAIN, 
RALOSS, RAMIXED are negative and highly significant. The large and positive significant 
coefficient of RAGNEEZY suggests that this measure has a strong impact on price quotations if 
all other variables are held constant: more risk seeking positively affects price quotations. This 
makes sense since higher price quotations allow staying invested and participating in 





Structural equality analyses conducted for the reduced sample (N=159) show that treatment 
groups differ regarding GENDER, SHARESP, and EXPFA1 (cf. Table 59, Annex 5). These 
variables are integrated as additional controls in the main Tobit regression. Corresponding 
results are provided in Table 69 (Annex 5). Compared to the main analysis, results do not show 
noticeable changes in signs, levels or significance of coefficients. 
In the main analysis, data collected in St. Gallen is merged with data collected in Augsburg to 
enlarge the sample. To check for robustness of result, data from Augsburg is eliminated from 
the sample. Table 70 (Annex 5) presents regression results run on the data collected in St. Gallen 
(N=122). The three-way interaction is still significant, but at the 10% level. The interaction 
between LOSS and CONS is significant (p-value=0.044) while the interaction between LOSS 
and LARISK is no longer significant. The coefficient of CONS is larger compared to the main 
regression but still insignificant. Results do not show further noticeable changes in signs, levels, 
or significance of interaction-related coefficients. 
A further robustness check is run by excluding participants from the sample who wrongly 
answered manipulation check questions. Table 71 (Annex 5) provides corresponding results. It 
is shown that the three-way interaction is still but less significant (p-value=0.066).  In this 
model, contrary to the main analysis, the coefficient of LARISK is positive but it is still 
insignificant. The interaction between LOSS and LARISK shows a smaller regression coefficient 
compared to the main model being no longer significant at conventional levels.  
The main analysis is based on a Tobit regression that considers that dependent variable 
(WTA80DEV) is left and right censored. For robustness check purposes, an OLS regression is 
applied. Table 72 (Annex 5) shows the corresponding results. The OLS and the Tobit regression 
generate very similar results.  The three-way interaction is still significant, but at the 10% level. 
OLS estimates might be biased due to not considering variable censoring. 
In summary, results are robust when using the single instead of the aggregated measures of 
LARISK, applying additional controls, reducing the sample to data collected in St. Gallen, 
removing subjects from the sample who wrongly answered manipulation check questions and 
running an OLS instead of a Tobit regression. The change in measures of risk aversion does not 
extremely affect results under RAGENFIN and RAGNEEZY, although the three-way interaction 
is no longer significant when controlling for RAGNEEZY. The robustness analyses document 
that results noticeably differ depending on the measure of loss aversion applied: although the 






to the one in the main analysis. The measure of loss aversion being the secondary moderator in 
the research model hence seems to be crucial. As has been explained above, loss aversion 
measures applied in this study are not correlated. They seem to capture different concepts 
leading to opposing results. The incentive compatible measure of loss aversion under risk 
(LARISK) calculated based on Abdellaoui et al. (2013) is one of the most complex and far 
developed ones currently applied in research. Therefore, corresponding results are considered 
more comprehensive than results generated through the simple loss aversion measures 
LAWANG and LAGAECHTER. 
The next chapter presents data analyses for testing Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
5.3.4 Analysis of Hypotheses H2a and H2b 
Investment scenarios 1 to 4 are designed to let subjects experience all four different treatments 
in order to prepare them for an informed choice they are asked to make in investment scenario 
5. To test for subjects having explicit preferences for conservative over neutral accounting  
(cf. Hypotheses 2a and b), subjects are asked in scenario 5 to choose in which of two firms they 
want to invest their endowment of $ 200,000. The firms are identical except for the accounting 
method applied for R&D. Subjects make the choice after having experienced scenarios 1 to 4, 
that is, project gain and loss under both conservative and neutral accounting. The investment 
decision (INVDEC) is modelled as a binary variable taking the value of 1 if subjects chose the 
company applying conservative accounting and the value of 0 if subjects choose the company 
using neutral accounting. Rationally, subjects should be indifferent between both investment 
options. Indifference would lead to both options being chosen equally often. However, as 
argued in this study, loss aversion is assumed to be that deeply rooted in human beings that 
experience does not fully mitigate individuals’ endogenous preferences for conservatism in 
accounting. This should materialize in company Z being chosen more often than company X. 
Consistent with expectations, a one-sample t-test presented in Table 42 documents that overall 
participants choose the conservative accounting treatment more often than the neutral option 
(mean 0.5867). The mean is significantly different from a random allocation (p-value=0.0148). 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value 
INVDEC 196 0.5867 0.03526 0.4936 2.4597 0.0148** 
H0: mean = 0.5 
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); ***p-value 
≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed t-test) 





This implies that subjects have a conscious preference for conservative accounting. To analyze 
if subjects’ choice between the two companies is not random but based on true preferences 
subjects tick on a 7-point Likert Scale how much they prefer the chosen over the unchosen 
option (1=not at all; 7=very much). Table 43 shows the corresponding mean and standard 
deviation.54 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 
PREF 187 4.647 0.1407 1.9242 
PREF is the strength of preference for the chosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference) 
Table 43: Descriptive Statistics for PREF (Final Experiment) 
Table 44 presents the number of subjects per Likert-Scale-Point. 
DepVar=PREF   
Likert-Scale Point Absolute Number 
of Subjects
(N=187) 
Percentage of  
Subjects 
(N=187) 
1 = No Preference 22 0.12 
2 15 0.08 
3 10 0.05 
4 17 0.09 
5 51 0.27 
6 40 0.21 
7 = Strong Preference 32 0.17 
PREF is the strength of preference for the chosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference) 
Table 44: PREF per Scale-Point 
The 7-point scale allows dividing the answers in rather low preferences (categories 1 to 3) and 
rather high preference (categories 5 to 7) for the respective treatment chosen. This leads to the 
insights that 25% of subjects have rather no or only weak preferences for one or the other 
treatment, 9% have medium preferences for the respective treatment chosen and 65% of 
subjects have rather strong preferences for the chosen over the unchosen option. Hence, nearly 
2/3 of the sample of subjects has explicit preferences for the option chosen. 
To verify conscious preferences for one or the other accounting treatment, subjects are further 
asked to indicate if their choice was random (RAND), if they think that the accounting method 
                                                 
54 Due to a technical issue, Z-Tree did not save nine subjects’ z-Leaf entries for PREF. Hence, nine observations 





applied is relevant for the economic evaluation of the investment options (ACCMETH1), and if 
their choice between option X and option Z was deliberately based on the accounting method 
applied (ACCMETH2). The three variables are binary variables with the coded answer Yes=1 
and No=0. The following table documents corresponding results. 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value 
RAND 196 0.107 0.0221 0.3100 -17.737 0.000*** 
ACCMETH1 196 0.6377 0.03442 0.4818 4.0022 0.000*** 
ACCMETH2 196 0.6734 0.03358 0.4701 5.1656 0.000*** 
H0: mean = 0.5       
RAND is a binary variable coded 1 if the investment decision was random; ACCMETH1 is a binary variable coded 1 
if subjects consider the accounting method applied for R&D relevant for the investment’s profitability; ACCMETH2 
is a binary variable coded 1 if subjects based their investment decision on the accounting method applied for R&D; 
***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed Test) 
Table 45: One-Sample T-Test RAND, ACCMETH1, ACCMETH2 
Table 45 provides supportive evidence for the above described result that subjects have true 
preferences for the treatment chosen because the very small mean of RAND (0.107) indicates 
that choices were not at all random (175 subjects ticked ‘No’, while only 21 subjects ticked 
‘Yes’). The variable ACCMETH1 captures if subjects think that the accounting method applied 
is relevant for the economic evaluation of the investment options. Table 45 shows that the 
majority of subjects considers the accounting method applied as relevant for the economic 
evaluation of the investment options (mean=0.6377; 71 participants ticked ‘No’ while 125 
subjects ticked ‘Yes’). Table 45 further documents that the majority of participants based their 
investment decision deliberately on the accounting method applied (ACCMETH2) 
(mean=0.6734; 64 subjects ticked ‘No’, 132 subjects ticked ‘Yes’). Preferences could hence be 
influenced by (erroneous) economic evaluations of the investment options instead of being 
solely dependent on individuals’ loss aversion. 
In summary, the above presented results support Hypothesis 2a arguing that subjects have 
conscious preferences for conservative over neutral accounting. However, the answers provided 
do not fully reveal why subjects prefer conservative compared to neutral accounting. Economic 
evaluation of the investment options could potentially come into play (cf. Table 45). Loss 
aversion is a psychological phenomenon influencing individuals’ judgment and decision 
making behavior (cf. chapter 3.1). However, people do not necessarily deliberately think about 
being loss averse. It is considered an unconscious phenomenon (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009). 





problematic. To examine if loss aversion could be the reason for subjects’ explicit preferences 
for conservatism it is analyzed if rather subjects with higher degrees of loss aversion than 
subjects with lower degrees of loss aversion prefer conservative to neutral accounting. 
The median of loss aversion under risk (LARISK) based on the whole subject sample (N=196) 
is 1.175903. This value is used to split the sample and separate subjects with lower degrees of 
loss aversion (LARISK≤1.175903) from subjects with higher degrees of loss aversion 
(LARISK>1.175903). The generation of these two subsamples allows examining if rather 
individuals with higher degrees of loss aversion show preferences for the conservative option 
than subjects with lower degrees of loss aversion (H2b). 
Table 46 provides descriptive statistics of the investment decision per subsample. 
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INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); LARISK is an aggregated 
measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed 
t-test) 
Table 46: Descriptive Statistics and Structural Equality of INVDEC between two LARISK-Subsamples  
It is documented that in both subsamples more subjects chose the conservative than the neutral 
option. The percentage of subjects who chose the conservative investment option is greater in 
the sample group characterized by higher degrees of loss aversion (61.22% > 56.12%). A 
Pearson Chi-square test does not reveal structural differences regarding the investment decision 
between both groups. 
Additional analyses are conducted for both subgroups separately. Table 47 documents that 
subjects with low degrees of loss aversion do not show explicit preferences for the conservative 
accounting option. The mean of the binary variable INVDEC is not significantly different from 






DepVar=INVDEC        
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value  
Low LARISK 98 0.5612245 0.0503853 0.4987888 1.2151 0.2273  
High LARISK 98 0.6122449 0.0494715 0.4897433 2.2689 0.0255 ** 
H0: mean = 0.5  
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); LARISK is an aggregated 
measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 
(two-tailed t-test) 
Table 47: Investment Decision of Low and High Loss Aversion Subsample 
However, Table 47 further documents that subjects with high degrees of loss aversion show 
explicit preferences for the conservative investment option. The sample mean is significantly 
different from 0.5 (p-value=0.0255) and greater than 0.5, confirming that the conservative 
option has been chosen significantly more often than the neutral option. A comparison of 
INVDEC sample means of both subsample groups reveals that overall group means are not 
significantly different from each other (T=-0.7225, p-value=0.4708). 
Examining the strength of preferences per subsample group, it is shown that means are not 
significantly different (T=-0.5725, p-value=0.5676). A separate analysis of both subsamples 
provides evidence that for the low loss aversion group the mean strength of preference is not 
significantly different from a medium level of 4 (T=1.5599, p-value=0.1220) while for the high 
loss aversion group the strength of preferences is significantly higher than 4 (T= 2.5292,  
p-value=0.0130) (cf. Table 48). 
Table 48: Strength of Preference for Chosen Option of Low and High Loss Aversion Subsample 
Dividing the full sample into three subsamples based on LARISK terziles and comparing the 
investment decision made in scenario 5 between the three groups leads to the results 
documented in Table 49. 
 
DepVar=PREF        
Group N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value  
Low LARISK 98 4.346939 0.2224049 2.201696 1.5599 0.1220  
High LARISK 98 4.520408 0.2057605 2.036925 2.5292 0.0130 ** 
H0: mean = 4  
PREF is the strength of preference for the chosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference);  LARISK is an 






Table 49: Comparison of INVDEC between Low, Medium and High Loss Aversion Subsample 
Table 49 shows that subjects with high loss aversion chose the conservative investment option 
significantly more often than the neutral option (mean=0.646; p-value=0.0172), while the 
means of INVDEC for subgroups with medium or low levels of loss aversion are not 
significantly different from 0.5 (p-values=0.2675 and 0.4644). Comparing means of INVDEC 
across the three subgroups does not reveal significant differences between groups (χ²=1.4924, 
p-value = 0.474). 
Results found for the strength of preferences tabulated in Table 50 indicate that subjects with 
medium or high loss aversion show strong preferences for the investment option chosen. Means 
are significantly different from 4 indicating a medium level of strength of preference  
(p-values = 0.0529 and 0.0591). The mean of PREF of the subgroup of subjects with low levels 
of loss aversion is not significantly different from 4 (p-value = 0.2847). A one-way ANOVA 
does not document significant differences in means of PREF across the three subgroups  
(F = 0.25; p-value = 0.7808). 
Table 50: Comparison of PREF between Low, Medium and High Loss Aversion Subsample 
The moderated moderation analysis conducted in chapter 5.3.3.3 is based on a reduced sample 
(N=156; observations of subjects who did not experience the beginning of R&D project 8 as 
DepVar=INVDEC        
Group N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-value  
Low LARISK  66 0.5454545 0.0617606 0.5017452 0.7360 0.4644  
Medium LARISK  65 0.5692308 0.061898 0.4990375 1.1185 0.2675  
High LARISK 65 0.6461538 0.0597703 0.4818833 2.4453 0.0172 ** 
H0: mean = 0.5  
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, 
*p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed t-test) 
DepVar=PREF        
Group N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value  
Low LARISK  66 4.287879 0.2668692 2.168056 1.0787 0.2847  
Medium LARISK  65 4.538462 0.2730498 2.201398 1.9720 0.0529 * 
High LARISK 65 4.476923 0.2481738 2.000841 1.9217 0.0591 * 
H0: mean = 4  
PREF is the strength of preference for the chosen option (1=no preference; 7=strong preference);  LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, 





well as subjects with loss aversion (LARISK) above 8 are eliminated). It is thus interesting to 
analyze subjects’ investment decision in scenario 5 based on the reduced sample. Table 51 
shows that individuals chose the conservative option significantly more often than the neutral 
option (p-value=0.0245). These results do not differ compared to the analysis run on the full 
sample (N=196). 
Variable N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value 
INVDEC 156 0.5897436 0.0395088 0.4934643 2.2715 0.0245** 
H0: mean = 0.5 
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); 
***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.10 (two-tailed t-test) 
Table 51: One-sample T-Test INVDEC (N=156) (Final Experiment) 
The reduced sample is split into three subsamples based on LARISK terziles. Results of a 
comparison of the investment decision made in scenario 5 between the three groups are 
documented in Table 52. 
Table 52: Comparison of INVDEC between Low, Medium and High Loss Aversion Subsample (N=156) 
Consistent with findings for the whole sample, Table 52 shows that subjects with high loss 
aversion chose the conservative investment option significantly more often than the neutral 
option (mean=0.7308; p-value=0.0000). Means of INVDEC for subgroups with medium or low 
levels of loss aversion are not significantly different from 0.5 (p-values=0.4107 and 0.7845). 
Comparing means of INVDEC across the three subgroups reveals that differences in means 
between groups that are driven by the high loss aversion group are significant at a 5%-level 
(χ²=7.0476; p-value = 0.029). 
In summary, the above presented findings generated by analyzing subsamples separately 
provide supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2b saying that conscious preferences for 
DepVar=INVDEC        
Group N Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. t-Statistic p-Value  
Low LARISK  52 0.4807692 0.0699622 0.5045046 -0.2749 0.7845  
Medium LARISK  52 0.5576923 0.0695464 0.501506 0.8296 0.4107  
High LARISK 52 0.7307692 0.0621108 0.4478876 3.7154 0.000 *** 
H0: mean = 0.5  
INVDEC is a binary variable coded 1 if investment decision is company Z (conservative option); LARISK is an aggregated 






conservatism are more pronounced for subjects showing higher degrees of loss aversion than 
for subjects with lower degrees of loss aversion. However, differences in means of INVDEC 
between subsamples are only statistically significant for the reduced sample. 
5.4 Summary of Results 
A one-way ANOVA analysis conducted in chapter 5.3.3.1 provides evidence for differences in 
means of price quotations between treatment groups. To get further insights on where these 
differences come from, unpaired t-tests are conducted. T-test results for price quotations made 
for R&D project 7 (WTA70DEV) document that price quotations are significantly higher under 
conservative than under neutral accounting. It is further revealed that subjects evaluate their 
equity stake significantly higher after a prior gain than after a prior loss. When investigating 
price quotations for R&D project 8 (WTA80DEV), results show that after a prior loss experience 
deviations of price quotations from the rational share value are significantly higher under 
conservative than under neutral accounting. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, processing a prior 
loss seems to be more comfortable in the conservative than in the neutral setting leading to 
higher valuations of the investment under conservative accounting. Evaluation patterns further 
reflect the break-even effect presented in chapter 3.1.7. At the beginning of R&D project 8 
when subjects have experienced a prior gain or a prior loss in R&D project 7, overvaluations 
of the equity stake expressed by positive selling price deviations from the rational share value 
are higher after a prior loss than after a prior gain. Induced by the break-even effect, subjects 
who experienced a prior loss in R&D project 7 aim at staying in the game and keeping the 
possibility to break even in R&D project 8 by indicating higher selling prices.  
A multivariate analysis testing a moderation model based on an interaction effect between prior 
project outcome and the accounting method applied on price quotations (cf. chapter 5.3.3.2) 
documents that the interaction effect is not significant at conventional levels. Regression 
coefficients of prior project outcome and accounting method applied are insignificant. Price 
quotations seem to be mainly driven by individuals’ loss aversion over time as well as subjects’ 
risk aversion in gain settings. These results do not support the hypotheses derived in this study. 
However, this is little surprising because the two-way interaction analysis does not capture the 
full research model because it neglects the secondary moderator. 
A three-way interaction regression is conducted (cf. chapter 5.3.3.3) to test the moderated 
moderation model developed in this thesis (cf. chapter 3.4). Consistent with Hypothesis H1a, 
results confirm that after a prior loss experience, valuations are higher under conservatism than 





Hypothesis H1b, showing that after a prior loss under conservatism price quotations are highest 
for individuals with a high level of loss aversion. It is further revealed that even after a prior 
gain valuations are higher under conservative than neutral accounting if loss aversion increases. 
Consistent with expectations, loss aversion serves as the main moderator implying that results 
cannot be interpreted without its moderation impact. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b state that subjects explicitly prefer conservative relative to neutral 
accounting and that these preferences are more pronounced for subjects with high degrees of 
loss aversion compared to subjects with low levels of loss aversion. Results presented in chapter 
5.3.4 provide supporting evidence. Analyzing subjects’ investment decision in scenario 5 across 
the full subject sample reveals that the conservative option has been chosen significantly more 
often than the neutral option. Individuals thus show explicit preferences for conservative 
compared to neutral accounting. Overall, the strength of these preferences is at a medium to a 
high level: 65% of subjects have indicated a strength of preference above 4.  
By dividing the full sample into two subsamples of low and high loss averse participants it is 
documented that both subsample groups descriptively show preferences for conservative 
accounting: in both subsample groups the conservative investment options was chosen more 
often than the neutral option. These preferences are confirmed statistically for the high loss 
aversion group whose mean on the binary variable INVDEC is higher and significantly different 
from 0.5 while the investment choice is not significantly different from 0.5 in the low loss 
aversion group. The strength of preferences is statistically above medium level for the 
subsample of higher loss aversion while it is not significantly different from medium level for 
subjects with low loss aversion. Consistent results are found when splitting the sample into 
three subsamples characterized by low, medium, and high loss aversion. Subjects in the group 
of high levels of loss aversion show explicit preferences for conservative accounting: they chose 
the conservative accounting option significantly more often than the neutral option. In contrast, 
choices are not significantly different from 0.5 for the medium and low level loss aversion 
subsamples. These results support Hypothesis 2b confirming that preferences for conservatism 
are more pronounced for subjects with higher loss aversion. 
Subjects’ unconscious preferences for conservatism revealed in investment scenarios 1 to 4 are 
consistent with their explicit preferences for conservatism shown in investment scenario 5. As 
explained in chapter 4.1.4, in case within-subjects results consistently reflect between-subjects 
results, subjects’ judgments in the between-subjects design are consistent with their intentions 





In general, results should always be interpreted by considering potential limitations of the 
underlying study that might reduce the study’s internal or external validity (cf. chapter 4.1.3). 
The next chapter presents limitations of the present experimental study.  
5.5 Limitations  
The design of the experiment not only induces valuations based on the accounting method 
applied but also on prior project outcome. Subjects’ desire to break even after a prior loss may 
interfere with their company valuation based on the accounting treatment. However, this does 
not negatively affect the general evidence provided for an impact of the accounting method 
applied on company valuation depending on individuals’ loss aversion and project outcome. 
The use of business students at bachelor and master level as proxies for individual investors 
could have introduced noise in the results and limit their generalizability (i.e., its external 
validity). Researchers argue that the usefulness and validity of the application of students as 
proxies for real investors or managers is highly context dependent. In case the study demands 
previous knowledge related for example to the experience and tasks of real managers or 
investors, students are considered inappropriate proxies for these roles. Student subjects are 
judged appropriate when no particular knowledge is required and general cognitive abilities are 
addressed (Libby et al., 2002). Libby et al. (2002) advise to recruit subjects who fit to the study’s 
goal and suggest avoiding taking overly sophisticated participants for economic reasons. The 
usage of student subjects is common in laboratory experiments. In experimental research on 
nonprofessional investor behavior, MBA students are frequently used as proxies for 
nonprofessional individual investors (e.g., Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Frederickson and 
Miller, 2004). The present study does not require any particular knowledge or experience in 
accounting or finance. Additionally, the underlying theory builds on psychological phenomena 
applying to all human beings in general: loss aversion has been shown to be intrinsic to every 
individual (cf. chapter 3.3). Furthermore, the tasks involved in this study are not overly 
complex. For these reasons, business students at bachelor and master level are considered 
appropriate proxies for nonprofessional investors in this study. The noise introduced by student 
subjects should be weak. 
It could be possible that students prefer conservative or neutral accounting because they learnt 
during their studies that one or the other accounting method provides more decision useful or 
more reliable information to stakeholders (cf. chapter 2.1 for an overview of benefits and costs 
of conservative and neutral accounting). Both accounting methods are addressed in accounting 





their benefits and costs. Due to the fact that both methods have strengths and weaknesses, 
students should not be biased up-front by their studies’ content. 
Another factor that could bias the results would be limited effort invested by subjects in thinking 
about the case and their judgments and choices. Information processing effort can be 
ameliorated by introducing incentives as, for example, a performance-contingent compensation 
for participation. This concern is addressed in this study by not only providing participants with 
a show-up fee but also by incentivizing them to take the task seriously by paying out a variable 
compensation dependent on subjects’ choices and project outcome (cf. chapter 4.3.3). An 
artificial currency (experimental $) is used in the experiment to create monetarily realistic 
investment amounts that would have been impossible by using a real currency as Euros or Swiss 
Francs. The variable compensation is converted from experimental currency to real currency 
and paid out immediately after the end of the experimental session. Providing incentives keeps 
the bias of non-effort in information processing to a minimum. 
In case the experiment takes long time, a reduced effort in information processing can also stem 
from subjects becoming tired in the course of the study. The present experiment takes about 90 
minutes. It is thus rather long. The study is divided into three parts, each taking approximately 
30 minutes. The task diversity contributes to subjects’ effort and concentration. Subjects were 
informed about the length of the study up-front when they signed in for participation. They 
were thus mentally prepared to the duration of the study. Furthermore, data shows that subjects 
were highly motivated to fulfill all tasks (mean of MOTIV = 6.65), which also contributes to 
their effort and attention. The bias of tiredness and lack of concentration should only have little 
impact on results. 
The experiment models an investment scenario that refers to real world investment situations. 
However, to a certain extent, the experimental setting remains artificial. The time gap between 
the R&D projects’ periods in investment scenarios 1 to 5 is very short. In reality, time lags 
between project investment and project outcome and hence individuals’ real world investment 
decisions based on company valuation would be much larger. In the experiment, individuals do 
not have much time to mentally process and digest the impact that the respective accounting 
method applied has on their equity. Subjects’ judgments could thus differ from how they would 
value their equity stake in reality. However, differences in subjects’ valuation found in the 
experiment that are due to different accounting methods applied should rather be stronger if the 
time lag is larger (i.e., if it is closer to reality). In this study, it is argued that individuals perceive 





t=2 they can only experience a positive or no change in equity under conservatism. Project 
failure is thus not directly linked to an equity reduction. In contrast, under neutral accounting 
the initial payment and project return are integrated making subjects face a gain vs. loss 
situation in t=2. It is argued that subjects perceive an equity reduction due to project failure in 
t=2 rather as a loss than as an investment (cf. chapter 3.4). If the time lag between R&D 
investment and project outcome is larger, the differing perceptions should be strengthened: the 
longer the investment dated back to the past the more strongly subjects should perceive a gain 
vs. loss situation under neutral accounting. The shortened time lag should not introduce much 
noise in the results that should rather become stronger than weaker in a real world situation. 
The limitations discussed above mainly concern the results’ generalizability (i.e., the 
experiment’s external validity). They should be considered when interpreting the study’s 
findings. The next chapter concludes on the results by addressing their implications and points 






 Conclusion and Future Research 
Recent literature argues that individuals have endogenous preferences for conservatism in 
accounting (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009; Nagar et al., 2016). No empirical evidence for this 
claim exists. ‘Conservatism’s effects on financial users are driven by its effects on the financial 
statements. An understanding of how users make decisions in light of specific financial 
statement effects would be beneficial to the literature’ (Ruch and Taylor, 2015, p. 35). This 
thesis adds insights to this topic by considering the role of individuals’ endogenous preferences 
in the analysis of financial statement users’ reactions to different accounting methods that have 
different financial statement effects. Drawing on findings from behavioral and psychological 
literature, this thesis provides first experimental insights on individuals’ endogenous 
preferences for conservative accounting. Results show that individuals indeed have preferences 
for conservatism. From an economic point of view, it is more efficient to defer potential losses 
to the future than considering them up-front due to interest earnings effects. On the contrary, 
considering potential losses up-front better addresses individuals’ intrinsic loss aversion. This 
thesis provides evidence for unconscious preferences for conservative accounting after prior 
loss experiences. When exposed to losses, conservative accounting seems to accommodate 
investors’ loss aversion better than neutral accounting leading to a more positive investment 
evaluation. Individuals with high degrees of loss aversion also prefer conservatism after prior 
gain experiences while subjects with low levels of loss aversion prefer neutral accounting. 
Subjects do also express explicit, conscious preferences for conservatism compared to 
neutrality in accounting. These explicit preferences are more pronounced for individuals with 
high levels of loss aversion. Results imply that neutral accounting can have detrimental effects 
on investors, causing them to undervalue investment options and withdraw from valuable 
investment opportunities too early. 
These findings shed light on the implications of the current standard setting focus on neutrality 
in accounting. Since 2010, the concept of conservatism is no longer part of the current 
framework to the IFRS. Neutrality is introduced by the standard setters into the IFRS’ 
framework with the aim of providing financial statement users with more decision useful 
information. In view of this thesis’s findings, from an addressee’s perspective, the current 
envisaged approach to reintegrate prudence in the framework seems to be useful. However, 
standard setters changed the definition of prudence (Wagenhofer, 2014) and still judge the 
concept of asymmetric prudence as not being compatible with neutral accounting information. 





Focusing on managers’ behavior, recent evidence suggests that the elimination of conservatism 
from regulatory frameworks may lead to undesired economic consequences (cf. chapter 2.1.3 
and 2.1.4). Conservatism is shown to mitigate managers’ self-interested over- or 
underinvestment decisions. Eliminating conservatism from regulatory frameworks could hence 
reduce firm investment efficiency (cf., e.g., García Lara et al., 2016). Focusing on investors’ 
behavior, eliminating asymmetric prudence from regulatory frameworks can lead to undesired 
economic consequences as investors’ lower willingness to pay for neutral accounting. 
Investors’ intrinsic preferences should be deliberately considered in standard setting to avoid 
that those good intentions of providing more decision useful information through neutral 
accounting result in undesired investor behavior, as e.g., company undervaluation and early 
withdrawal from investments. 
This thesis’s results also contribute to the R&D accounting literature that investigates the 
usefulness of capitalizing intangible investments. It has been shown that capitalizing R&D 
expenditures is value relevant to investors (cf., e.g., Aboody and Lev, 1998; Ciftci and Zhou, 
2016). This study suggests that from an individual’s endogenous preference perspective 
expensing can be more beneficial than capitalizing R&D expenditures when considering 
individuals’ related investment decisions depending on individual levels of loss aversion. 
Results of this thesis also contribute to prior literature on measuring individuals’ risk and loss 
aversion. As explained in chapters 4.2.5.1.1 and 4.2.5.1.2, the instruments for measuring risk 
attitudes as well as loss aversion over risk and under time applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
are replicated in this study by adapting them to the present experiment’s setting. Main results 
are consistent with what has been found by Abdellaoui et al. (2013): loss aversion differs in 
settings under risk and over time and is thus context- and framing-dependent. It is further 
confirmed that individuals show risk aversion in gain settings and risk seeking behavior in loss 
settings. The most pronounced risk averse behavior is found in mixed settings (cf. chapter 
4.2.5.1.2). Further instruments for measuring risk and loss aversion have been applied in this 
study for robustness check purposes (cf. chapters 4.2.5.1.3, 4.2.5.2 and 5.3.3.4). Bivariate 
correlation analyses indicate that correlations between the different measures of loss aversion 
are very low and insignificant (cf. Table 61, Annex 5). Bivariate correlations found for the 
different measures of risk aversion applied in this study (cf. Table 62, Annex 5) are documented 
to be mostly significant revealing correlation coefficients at medium level. The inexistent 





measuring loss aversion that are currently applied in research not necessarily capture the same 
concepts and hence could lead to differing or even contradicting results. 
This thesis opens several directions for future research. As stated by Nagar et al. (2016), 
conservatism often serves as a contracting argument considering information asymmetry 
between parties. Their model is based on the assumption that information asymmetry patterns 
are the most crucial driver of endogenous preferences. The endogenously created demand for 
conservatism is said to be stronger when information asymmetry between counterparts is high 
and trust between parties is low. Nagar et al. (2016, p. 4) argue that ‘when users of financial 
reports are placed in settings where they know more, the gain-loss asymmetry in their 
preference declines, as does the resulting demand for conservatism’. Therefore, mechanisms 
reducing information asymmetry between for example managers and investors should induce a 
change in investor preferences expressed by a reduced demand for accounting conservatism. 
Following this line of argumentation, it would be interesting to analyze if the neutrality 
approach in standard setting should be accompanied by mechanisms reducing information 
asymmetry and enhancing trust between parties to better fit to individuals’ endogenous 
preferences for asymmetric verification of gains and losses. Neutrality in accounting might 
demand more information disclosure under conditions of risk and uncertainty to avoid 
undesirable economic consequences as, e.g., investors’ lower willingness to pay for neutral 
accounting. 
In this thesis, the accounting for R&D expenditures provides the context to test the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 3. R&D accounting is one example allowing contrasting conservative and 
neutral accounting methods because both are applicable under IAS 38 (expensing vs. 
capitalizing R&D). To rule out that the results generated in this study are R&D context specific, 
it would be interesting to conduct a comparable study using different accounting settings such 
as fair value accounting. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyze if the findings hold in a large cross-cultural 
setting. Cultural differences may have an influence on the preferences for conservative vs. 
neutral accounting, since it has been shown that the degree of loss aversion varies with culture 
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Annex 2: Measurement Method applied by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) 
Annex 2.1: Prospect Evaluation under Risk 
(𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦) is a prospect that provides a monetary amount 𝑥 with a probability 𝑝, and a monetary 
amount 𝑦 with a probability 1 𝑝.   
Preferences over prospects are expressed by a utility function 𝑈  defined over monetary 
amounts and by probability weighting functions, 𝜔  for gains and 𝜔  for losses. 𝑟 indicates 
that the utility function relates to risky prospects. 
A risky prospect (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦) is evaluated as: 𝜋 𝑈 𝑥 𝜋 𝑈 𝑦),  
where  𝜋 𝜔  𝑝  and 𝜋 𝜔  1 𝑝  for mixed prospects and  𝜋 𝜔  𝑝  and  
𝜋 1 𝜔  𝑝 , 𝑖 , , for gain and loss prospects. 
 
Annex 2.2: Prospect Evaluation under Time 
𝑥, 𝑡; 𝑦  denotes a temporal prospect that pays 𝑥 at time point 𝑡 and 𝑦 now 𝑡 0 . 
Preferences over prospects are expressed by a utility function 𝑈  defined over monetary 
amounts and by discount functions, 𝜏  for gains and 𝜏  for losses. 𝑡 indicates that the utility 
function relates to temporal prospects.  
A temporal prospect 𝑥, 𝑡; 𝑦  is evaluated as: 𝑈 𝑦 𝜏 𝑡 𝑈 𝑥 ,    𝑖 ,  
 
Annex 2.3: Sign-Dependent Utility Function for Risk and Time 
The sign-dependent utility function 𝑈 , 𝑗 𝑟, 𝑡, is composed of a loss-aversion coefficient 𝜆  
and a basic utility function 𝑢 : 
𝑈 𝑥
𝑢 𝑥 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 0,
𝜆 𝑢 𝑥 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 0,







Annex 2.4: Three Step Measurement Method of 𝒖𝒋 and 𝝀𝒋 
Step one and step two serve to derive the utility parameters 𝑢 and 𝑢  and the probability 
weighting parameters 𝜋  and 𝜋 as well as the discount parameters 𝜏 and 𝜏 . 
𝐺  (𝐺  is a subject’s certainty (present) equivalent in gain contexts that equals 𝑥, 𝑝  ; 𝑦  or 
𝑥, 𝑡  ; 𝑦  respectively. 
𝐿  (𝐿 ) is a subject’s certainty (present) equivalent in loss contexts, i.e., the amount that equals 
𝑥, 𝑝  ; 𝑦  or the amount received now that equals 𝑥, 𝑡 ; 𝑦  respectively. 
The third step combines the derived utility for gains and losses to calculate loss aversion 
parameters. For risk, a gain 𝐺∗  is selected. 𝐿∗ is the loss that produces indifference between 
receiving 0 for sure and the prospect 𝐺∗ , 𝑝 ; 𝐿∗ .  
For time, a gain 𝐺∗  is selected. 𝐿∗ is the loss that produces indifference between receiving 0 for 
sure and the temporal prospect 𝐺∗ , 𝑡 ; 𝐿∗ . 
 Assessed 
Quantity 
Indifference Regression equation 
Step 1: 
Utility gains 
Risk: 𝐺  
 
Time: 𝐺  
𝐺 ~ 𝑥, 𝑝 ; 𝑦  
 
𝐺 ~ 𝑥, 𝑡 ; 𝑦  
𝐺 𝑢 𝜋 𝑢 𝑥 𝑢 𝑦
𝑢 𝑦  
𝐺 𝑢 𝜏 𝑢 𝑥 𝑢 𝑦  
Step 2: 
Utility losses 
     𝐿  
 
     𝐿  
𝐿 ~ 𝑥, 𝑝 ; 𝑦  
 
𝐿 ~ 𝑥, 𝑡 ; 𝑦  
𝐿 𝑢 𝜋 𝑢 𝑥 𝑢 𝑦
𝑢 𝑦   
𝐿 𝑢 𝜏 𝑢 𝑥 𝑢 𝑦  
Step 3: 
Loss aversion 
     𝐿∗ 
     𝐿∗ 
𝐺∗ , 𝑝 ; 𝐿∗ ~0 
𝐺∗ , 𝑡 ; 𝐿∗ ~0 
𝜆 𝜋 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝜋 𝑢 𝐿∗) 







Annex 2.5: Exponential Specifications for 𝒖𝒋 and 𝒖𝒕  
Regression equations presented in Annex 2.4 are estimated by nonlinear least squares using the 
following exponential specifications for 𝑢  and 𝑢 . Outcomes are scaled by the highest absolute 
value in a specific task 
|  |
. 
 𝑢 𝑥/|𝑥  | 
/|  | 
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 0
 /|  | 
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 0






Annex 3: Post Experimental Questionnaire55 
Manipulation Check Questions  
(MCQ1, MCQ2) 
Bitte beurteilen Sie nachfolgende Aussagen: 
 
Wenn ein Unternehmen im Geschäftsjahr t=1 in ein 
Entwicklungsprojekt investiert und dabei alle entstehenden 
Entwicklungskosten aktiviert, reduziert sich das Eigenkapital des 
Unternehmens durch das Entwicklungsprojekt im Geschäftsjahr der 
Investition (t=1) nicht. 
 
  O Wahr 
  O Falsch 
 
General Risk Attitude – Dohmen et al. (2011)  
(RAGEN) 
Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobereiter Mensch oder 
versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden?  
Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 1 bedeutet: "gar nicht 
risikobereit" und der Wert 7: "sehr risikobereit". 
Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen. 
 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
Risk Attitude in Financial Contexts – Dohmen et al. (2011)  
(RAFIN) 
Wie schätzen Sie sich persönlich ein: Sind Sie bei finanziellen Fragen ein risikobereiter 
Mensch oder versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden? 
Bitte kreuzen Sie ein Kästchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 1 bedeutet: "gar nicht 
risikobereit" und der Wert 7: "sehr risikobereit" 
Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Einschätzung abstufen. 
 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
                                                 
55 The experimental material was provided in German. Annex 3 presents the original PEQ without translation into 
English.  
Wenn ein Unternehmen im Geschäftsjahr t=1 in ein 
Entwicklungsprojekt investiert und dabei alle entstehenden 
Entwicklungskosten als Aufwand verbucht, reduziert sich das 
Eigenkapital des Unternehmens durch das Entwicklungsprojekt im 
Geschäftsjahr der Investition (t=1). 
 
  O Wahr 





Risk Attitude – Weber et al. (2012)  
(RAWEBER1 to RAWEBER4) 
Bitte geben Sie für jede der folgenden Aussagen an, wie wahrscheinlich Sie jeder dieser 
Aktivitäten oder Verhaltensweisen nachgehen würden. 
Geben Sie dafür gemäß folgender Skala ein Rating von 1 bis 7 an: 
 
1 = Es ist ausgeschlossen, dass ich ... 
2 = Es ist sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass ich ... 
3 = Es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass ich ... 
4 = Es ist fraglich, ob ich ... 
5 = Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass ich ... 
6 = Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass ich ... 
7 = Es ist sicher, dass ich ... 
 
 ... 10% meines jährlichen Einkommens in einen moderat 
wachsenden Investment Fonds investieren würde. 
 
O 1  O 2  O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7  
 
 ... 5% meines jährlichen Einkommens in eine hoch spekulative 
Aktie investieren würde. 
 
O 1  O 2  O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
 ... 5% meines jährlichen Einkommens in eine konservative Aktie 
investieren würde. 
 
O 1  O 2  O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
 ... 10% meines jährlichen Einkommens in Staatsanleihen 
(Schatzanweisungen) investieren würde. 
 









Loss Aversion – Wang et al. (2016)  
(LAWANG1, LAWANG2, LAWANG) 
In den beiden nachfolgend dargestellten Lotterien beträgt die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Sie 
Geld gewinnen oder Geld verlieren, jeweils 50%. Der in den Lotterien potenziell eintretende 
Verlust ist jeweils aufgeführt. 
Bitte geben Sie nun für jede der beiden Lotterien den minimalen Betrag für EUR56 X bzw. 
EUR Y an, zu dem Sie bereit wären, an der jeweiligen Lotterie teilzunehmen. 
 
Lotterie 1 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit: Verlust in Höhe von EUR 25 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit: Gewinn in Höhe von EUR X 
 
Damit ich an der Lotterie teilnehmen würde, sollte der Gewinn X mindestens ________ 
betragen. 
Ihre Eingabe für X:  
 
Lotterie 2 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit: Verlust in Höhe von EUR 100 
50% Wahrscheinlichkeit: Gewinn in Höhe von EUR Y 
 
Damit ich an der Lotterie teilnehmen würde, sollte der Gewinn Y mindestens ________ 
betragen.  










                                                 
56 In the experimental sessions conducted in St. Gallen, monetary amounts used in the instruments adapted from 





Loss Aversion – Gächter et al. (2010)  
(LAGAECHTER) 
Sie werden nun vor die Wahl gestellt, an nachfolgend beschriebenen Lotterien teilzunehmen. 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass aus der Lotterie ein Gewinn bzw. ein Verlust resultiert, beträgt 
jeweils 50%.  
Bitte geben Sie an, an welchen Lotterien Sie teilnehmen würden.  
"Ja" bedeutet hierbei, dass Sie die Lotterie spielen würden.  
"Nein" bedeutet, dass Sie eine Teilnahme an der Lotterie ablehnen würden.  
 



































                                                 
57 In the experimental sessions conducted in St. Gallen, monetary amounts used in the instruments adapted from 





Comprehensibility of the Tasks  
(COMP, CLEAR, EASY, MOTIV) 
 
Bitte bewerten Sie die nachfolgenden Aussagen auf einer Skala von 1 = "stimme überhaupt 
nicht zu", bis 7 = "stimme voll zu": 
 
Die Szenarien der Studie waren klar dargestellt 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
Die Fragestellungen waren deutlich formuliert 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
Es war nicht schwer, die gestellten Fragen zu beantworten 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
Ich war motiviert, alle Fragen wahrheitsgetreu zu beantworten 
Ihre Eingabe:   O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4  O 5  O 6  O 7 
 
 









(GENDER, AGE, NATION, PROFEXP, MASTER, CLUSTER) 
Bitte machen Sie nachfolgend einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person. Zur Erinnerung: Alle 
Informationen werden anonym erfasst und können nicht mit Ihrer Person in Verbindung 
gebracht werden!   






Wie viele Jahre Berufserfahrung 
haben Sie? (z.B. durch Praktika, 
Werkstudententätigkeit, 




Haben Sie ein Studium erfolgreich abgeschlossen und somit schon 




Wenn Sie bereits ein Studium abgeschlossen haben, geben Sie nachfolgend bitte den 
entsprechenden Studiengang sowie den erworbenen Abschluss an (z.B. B.A. HSG Major 
BWL58). Lassen Sie das Feld andernfalls bitte leer. 
 
 
Welchen Studiengang studieren Sie aktuell und mit welchem Abschluss schließt dieser Stu-





                                                 
58 In the PEQ version used in Augsburg, examples correspond to courses of studies offered by the University of 
Augsburg.  






Im wievielten Fachsemester studieren Sie in Ihrem aktuellen Studiengang?  
Wenn Sie in einem Bachelorstudiengang studieren, zählen Sie bitte die Assessmentsemester 
dazu. Wenn Sie in einem Masterstudiengang studieren, geben Sie bitte nur die Fachsemester 
an, die sich auf Ihren Master beziehen und rechnen keine Bachelorsemester dazu.) 
 
Welcher inhaltliche Fachbereich bildet im Rahmen Ihres aktuellen Studiums für Sie Ihren 
persönlichen Studien- bzw. Interessensschwerpunkt? (z.B. Marketing; Rechnungslegung; 
Controlling; Steuern; etc.). 
 
 
Share Ownership  
(SHARESC, SHARESP, SHARESF, EXPFA1, EXPFA2, ANALYSISAR) 
 















Haben Sie sich jemals schon mit der Finanzberichterstattung von 
Unternehmen beschäftigt (Jahresabschlüsse konsultiert, 




Haben Sie jemals schon die Finanzberichterstattung von 













Annex 4: Overview of Variables Involved in the Analyses 
 
Variable Description Measurement/Coding 
ACCMETH1 In investment scenario 5, subjects 
indicate if they consider the accounting 
method applied for R&D expenditures 
to be relevant for the economic 
evaluation of the investments’ 
profitability. 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise 
ACCMETH2 In investment scenario 5, subjects 
indicate if they made their investment 
decision based on the accounting 
method applied for R&D expenditures. 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise 
AGE Subject’s age in years Self-reported metric variable 
ANALYSISAR Subjects indicate if they feel confident 
in using/analyzing annual reports 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise 
CLEAR Subjects indicate whether questions 
and tasks were clearly stated. 
7-point Likert Scale (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree) 
CLUSTER Subject’s major field of studies Self-reported information trans-
formed into categorical variable 
taking the value of 0 if major field of 
studies is accounting/finance, 1 if it 
is strategy, and 2 if it is others 
COMP Subjects indicate whether the scenarios 
were comprehensible. 
7-point Likert Scale (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree) 
CONS Accounting Method applied for R&D 
expenditures 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if conservatism is applied, 0 
otherwise 
EASY Subjects indicate whether it was easy 
to answer the questions asked in the 
experiment. 
7-point Likert Scale (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree) 
EXPFA1 Subjects indicate if they have already 
considered financial reports (e.g., 
annual reports, analysts’ reports, etc.) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise 
EXPFA2 Subjects indicate if they have 
experience in analyzing of financial 
reports (annual reports, analysts’ 
reports, etc.) 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise 
GENDER Subjects’ gender Dummy variable that takes the value 






INVDEC Subjects’ investment decision in 
investment scenario 5 
Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subject choses the 
conservative investment option 
(company Z), 0 otherwise (company 
X) 
LAGAECHTER Subjects’ degree of loss aversion 
derived from subjects’ indications for 
six different mixed lotteries (p=0.5) if 
they would accept or reject it. The 
amount of the potential gain is the 
same in each lottery whereas potential 
losses vary (gain = EUR (CHF) 6; loss 
= EUR (CHF) 2 to 7). 
Gain-loss ratio resulting at the point 
when subjects switch from playing 
the lottery to rejecting it 
LARISK Subjects’ degree of loss aversion under 
risk calculated based on aggregating 
LARISK50 and LARISK200 
LARISK= 
(LARISK50+LARISK200)/2 
LARISK50 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion under 
risk calculated based on final negative 
payment of mixed outcome prospect 
(50, 1/2; -50) matching a certainty 
equivalent of 0 
𝜆 𝜋 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝜋 𝑢 𝐿∗
(cf. Annex 2) 
LARISK200 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion under 
risk calculated based on final negative 
payment of mixed outcome prospect 
(200, 1/2; -200) matching a certainty 
equivalent of 0  
𝜆 𝜋 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝜋 𝑢 𝐿∗
(cf. Annex 2) 
LATIME Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on aggregating 
LATIME1 and LATIME2 
 
LATIME= (LATIME1+LATIME2)/2 
LATIME1 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on final negative 
payment of two-payment prospect (-
200, 1 year; 200) matching a present 
equivalent of 0  
𝜆 𝜏 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝑢 𝐿∗) 
(cf. Annex 2) 
LATIME2 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on final negative 
payment of two-payment prospect (-
50, 1 year; 50) matching a present 
equivalent of 0 
𝜆 𝜏 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝑢 𝐿∗) 
(cf. Annex 2) 
LATIME3 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on final negative 
payment of two-payment prospect 
(200, 1 year; -200) matching a present 
equivalent of 0 
𝜆 𝜏 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝑢 𝐿∗) 





LATIME4 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on final negative 
payment of two-payment prospect (50, 
1 year; -50) matching a present 
equivalent of 0 
𝜆 𝜏 𝑢 𝐺∗ /𝑢 𝐿∗) 
(cf. Annex 2) 
LATIMESOON Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on aggregating 
LATIME3 and LATIME4 
LATIMESOON= 
(LATIME3+LATIME4)/2 
LATIMETOTAL Subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time calculated based on aggregating 




LAWANG Subjects’ degree of loss aversion based 




LAWANG1 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion 
derived from subjects’ indication of a 
minimum amount of gain necessary to 
make them willing to participate in a 
lottery involving a potential loss of 
EUR (CHF) 25 (p=0.5) 
LAWANG1 Ratio = Subject’s 
indicated amount of gain/25 
LAWANG2 Subjects’ degree of loss aversion 
derived from subjects’ indication of a 
minimum amount of gain necessary to 
make them willing to participate in a 
lottery involving a potential loss of 
EUR (CHF) 100 (p=0.5) 
LAWANG2 Ratio = Subject’s 
indicated amount of gain/100 
LOSS Prior R&D project’s outcome  Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if prior project outcome is a 
loss, 0 otherwise 
MASTER Subjects’ level of studies Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subjects are at master level, 0 
otherwise 
MCQ1 Manipulation Check Question 1 Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subjects identify statement as 
true, 0 otherwise 
MCQ2 Manipulation Check Question 2 Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subjects identify statement as 
true, 0 otherwise 
MOTIV Subjects indicate whether they were 
motivated to answer all questions 
truthfully. 
7-point Likert Scale (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree) 
NATION Subjects’ nationality Self-reported information trans-
formed into categorical variable 
taking the value of 0 if nationality is 





PREF Strength of subjects’ preference for the 
chosen over the unchosen investment 
option in investment scenario 5 
7-point Likert Scale (1=no 
preference; 7=strong preference) 
PROFEXP Subjects’ professional experience in 
years 
Self-reported metric variable 
RAFIN Subjects’ risk attitude in financial 
situations 
7-point Likert Scale (1=not at all risk 
taking; 7= very risk taking) 
RAGAIN Subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings RAGAIN= (EVi-CEi)/σi  
for all gain prospects i 
RAGEN Subjects’ risk attitude in general 7-point Likert Scale (1=not at all risk 
taking; 7=very risk taking) 
RAGENFIN Subjects’ risk preferences based on an 
aggregation of RAGEN and RAFIN 
RAGENFIN=(RAGEN+RAFIN)/2 
RAGNEEZY Subjects’ risk attitude measured based 
on the ratio between part of equity 
individuals are willing to invest in a 
certain mixed outcome lottery 
(probability of gaining 2.5 times 
invested amount=1/3; probability of 
losing investment=2/3) and full 
amount of equity owned  
RAGNEEZY=Invested amount of 
equity/full amount of equity owned 
RALOSS Subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings RALOSS= (EVi-CEi)/σi  
for all loss prospects i 
RAMIXED Subjects’ risk aversion in mixed 
settings 
RAMIXED= (EVi-CEi)/σi  
for all mixed prospects i 
RAND Subjects specify if their choice 
between option X and Z in investment 
scenario 5 was random. 
Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subjects choice was random, 0 
otherwise 
RATOTAL Subjects’ risk aversion calculated 
based on aggregating RAGAIN, 
RALOSS, and RAMIXED 
RATOTAL = (RAGAIN + RALOSS + 
RAMIXED)/3 
RAWEBER1 Subjects’ risk attitude measured based 
on subjects’ indications regarding how 
likely they would invest 10% of their 
personal equity in a moderately 
growing investment fund 
7-point Likert Scale (1=very 
unlikely; 7=very likely) 
RAWEBER2 Subjects’ risk attitude measured based 
on subjects’ indications regarding how 
likely they would invest 5% of their 
personal equity in a very risky share 
 
 
7-point Likert Scale (1=very 





RAWEBER3 Subjects’ risk attitude measured based 
on subjects’ indications regarding how 
likely they would invest 5% of their 
personal equity in a conservative share 
7-point Likert Scale (1=very 
unlikely; 7=very likely) 
RAWEBER4 Subjects’ risk attitude measured based 
on subjects’ indications regarding how 
likely they would invest 10% of their 
personal equity in government bonds 
7-point Likert Scale (1=very 
unlikely; 7=very likely) 
SHARESC Subjects indicate if they currently own 
shares  
Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is ‘Yes’, 0 
otherwise 
SHARESF Subjects indicate if they plan to buy 
shares in the future 
Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is ‘Yes’, 0 
otherwise 
SHARESP Subjects indicate if they owned shares 
in the past 
Binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the answer is ‘Yes’, 0 
otherwise 
TG Treatment group subjects are 
distributed to 
Categorical variable taking the value 
of 1 to 4 (2x2 experimental design) 
WTADEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of an 
equity stake they own in a company 
from the rational economic share value 
WTADEV = subjects’ price quotation 
for the equity stake they own in a 
company – corresponding rational 
economic share value 
WTA10DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 1 (R&D project 1, t=0) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA10DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 1 at t=0 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA20DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 1 (R&D project 2, t=2) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA20DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 1 at t=2 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA30DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 2 (R&D project 3, t=0) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA30DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 2 at t=0 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA40DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 2 (R&D project 4, t=2) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA40DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 2 at t=2 







WTA50DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 3 (R&D project 5, t=0) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA50DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 3 at t=0 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA60DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 3 (R&D project 6, t=2) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA60DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 3 at t=2 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA70DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 4 (R&D project 7, t=0) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA70DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 4 at t=0 
– corresponding rational economic 
share value 
WTA80DEV Deviation of subjects’ valuation of the 
equity stake they own in investment 
scenario 4 (R&D project 8, t=2) from 
the rational economic share value 
WTA80DEDV = subjects’ price 
quotation for the equity stake they 
own in investment scenario 4 at t=2 







Annex 5: Tables  
Table 53: Pearson-Spearman Correlation Matrix for Pretest Analysis  
 
N = 27 
Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. 
 WTA30DEV CONS LOSS LARISK LATIME LATIMESOON RATOTAL 





















































































WTA30DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value 
(R&D project 3, t=0); CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LOSS is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; LARISK is an aggregated measure of 
subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion over time based on prospects including a positive (negative) payment now (in one year); LATIMESOON 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on prospects including a negative 
(positive) payment now (in one year); RATOTAL is an aggregated measure of subjects’ risk aversion; a detailed 
description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, 







Table 54: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Chi-square Test Results for Categorical 
Variables (Full Sample) 
 




N  56 38 58 44 196  
































































































































































































































































































































GENDER is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subject is a woman; NATION is a categorical variable 
taking the value of 0 if nationality is German, 1 if it is Suisse, and 2 otherwise; MASTER is a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if subjects are at master level; CLUSTER is a categorical variable taking the value of 0 if 
major field of studies is accounting/finance, 1 if it is strategy, and 2 otherwise; SHARESP is a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if subjects owned shares in the past; SHARESC is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 
if subjects currently own shares; SHARESF is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects plan to own 
shares in the future; EXPFA1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects considered annual reports in 
the past; EXPFA2 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects have experience in analyzing annual 
reports; ANALYSISAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects feel confident in analyzing annual 
reports; MCQ1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects identify manipulation check statement 1 
as true; MCQ2 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects identify manipulation check statement 2 as 
true; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; 






Table 55: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Chi-square Test Results for Categorical 
Variables (Reduced Sample) 
 




N  45 35 38 41 159  





































































































































































































































































































































GENDER is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subject is a woman; NATION is a categorical variable 
taking the value of 0 if nationality is German, 1 if it is Suisse, and 2 otherwise; MASTER is a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if subjects are at master level; CLUSTER is a categorical variable taking the value of 0 if 
major field of studies is accounting/finance, 1 if it is strategy, and 2 otherwise; SHARESP is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 if subjects owned shares in the past; SHARESC is a binary variable that takes the value 
of 1 if subjects currently own shares; SHARESF is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects plan to 
own shares in the future; EXPFA1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects considered annual 
reports in the past; EXPFA2 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects have experience in analyzing 
annual reports; ANALYSISAR is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects feel confident in analyzing 
annual reports; MCQ1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects identify manipulation check 
statement 1 as true; MCQ2 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects identify manipulation check 
statement 2 as true; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in 






Table 56: Descriptive Statistics for Interval or Ratio Scaled Variables by Treatment 
Group (Full Sample) 
 
Variable  TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 Full Sample 
 N 56 38 58 44 196 
AGE Mean 23.30 22.65 23.20 23.13 23.11 
 Std. Dev. 2.922 1.962 2.476 2.298 2.480 
 Min. 19 19 19 19 19 
 Max. 34 27 30 27 34 
PROFEXP Mean 1.928 1.894 2.379 1.840 2.035 
 Std. Dev. 1.895 1.752 2.412 1.737 2.003 
 Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 9 7 15 7 15 
COMP Mean 6.660 6.710 6.275 6.454 6.510 
 Std. Dev. 0.5144 0.459 1.005 0.761 0.754 
 Min. 5 6 3 4 3 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
CLEAR Mean 6.375 6.605 6.155 6.431 6.367 
 Std. Dev. 0.905 0.547 0.913 0.695 0.815 
 Min. 3 5 3 4 3 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
EASY Mean 6.053 5.973 5.913 5.977 5.979 
 Std. Dev. 1.085 1.026 1.064 1.088 1.061 
 Min. 2 2 3 3 2 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
MOTIV Mean 6.660 6.657 6.431 6.568 6.571 
 Std. Dev. 0.580 0.668 1.094 0.661 0.797 
 Min. 5 4 2 5 2 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
RAGAIN Mean 0.149 0.051 0.159 0.116 0.126 
 Std. Dev. 0.242 0.164 0.189 0.189 0.204 
 Min. -0.951 -0.540 -0.272 -0.245 -0.951 


























RALOSS Mean -0.103 -0.088 -0.061 -0.076 -0.082 
 Std. Dev. 0.190 0.170 0.173 0.205 0.185 
 Min. -0.968 -0.647 -0.549 -0.495 -0.969 
 Max. 0.281 0.218 0.281 0.656 0.656 
RAMIXED Mean 0.148 0.128 0.170 0.089 0.138 
 Std. Dev. 0.202 0.174 0.211 0.213 0.203 
 Min. -0.303 -0.239 -0.262 -0.224 -0.303 
 Max. 0.672 0.513 0.939 0.778 0.939 
RAGNEEZY Mean 0.181 0.180 0.115 0.207 0.167 
 Std. Dev. 0.247 0.206 0.180 0.249 0.223 
 Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 1 1 0.75 1 1 
RAGENFIN Mean 3.893 4.026 3.681 3.818 3.839 
 Std. Dev. 1.186 1.185 1.198 1.239 1.199 
 Min. 2 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 
 Max. 6 6 6 6 6 
LARISK Mean 4.778 1.692 1.839 1.695 2.618 
 Std. Dev. 25.092 1.270 3.106 1.891 13.541 
 Min. 0.368 0.414 0.227 0.117 0.117 
 Max. 188.991 5.988 24.396 10.809 188.991 
LAWANG Mean 2.201 2.684 2.157 2.770 2.410 
 Std. Dev. 1.907 4.220 1.553 2.615 2.587 
 Min. 0.465 1 0.2 0.4 0.2 
 Max. 12.5 27 10 15 27 
LAGAECHTER Mean 1.792 1.509 1.817 1.856 1.759 
 Std. Dev. 0.674 0.487 0.786 0.650 0.680 
 Min. 0.857 0.857 1 1 0.857 
 Max. 3 3 6 3 6 
LATIME Mean 1.085 0.891 0.902 0.917 0.956 
 Std. Dev. 0.937 0.248 0.171 0.401 0.557 
 Min. 0.001 0.418 0.566 0.322 0.001 
 Max. 6.407 1.913 1.459 2.884 6.407 
AGE is subjects’ age in years; PROFEXP is subjects’ professional experience in years, COMP is subjects 
indication if scenarios were comprehensible (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); CLEAR is subjects 
indication if questions and tasks were clearly stated (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); EASY is subjects 
indication whether it was easy to answer the questions (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); MOTIV is 
subjects’ indication whether they were motivated to answer all questions truthfully (1=strongly disagree, 





loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; RAGNEEZY is subjects’ overall risk attitude 
measured based on individuals’ willingness to invest in a certain mixed outcome lottery; RAGENFIN is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ overall risk attitude and their risk attitude in financial situations (1=not at all 
risk taking; 7=very risk taking); LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk 
calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LAWANG is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion based on the gain/loss ratio that makes subjects willing to participate in a certain lottery; 
LAGAECHTER is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ willingness to participate 
in six different lotteries; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based 
on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; a detailed 






Table 57: Descriptive Statistics for Interval or Ratio Scaled Variables by Treatment 
Group (Reduced Sample) 
 
Variable  TG1 TG2 TG3 TG4 Full Sample 
 N 45 35 38 41 159 
AGE Mean 23.400 22.600 23.132 23.098 23.081 
 Std. Dev. 3.056 1.943 2.549 2.354 2.533 
 Min. 19 19 19 19 19 
 Max. 34 27 30 27 34 
PROFEXP Mean 1.933 1.629 2.316 1.829 1.931 
 Std. Dev. 1.959 1.308 1.905 1.787 1.776 
 Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 9 5 9 7 9 
COMP Mean 6.778 6.743 6.211 6.463 6.553 
 Std. Dev. 0.420 0.443 1.119 0.778 0.768 
 Min. 6 6 3 4 3 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
CLEAR Mean 6.467 6.629 6.026 6.415 6.384 
 Std. Dev. 0.815 0.547 0.915 0.706 0.786 
 Min. 3 5 3 4 3 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
EASY Mean 6.133 5.971 5.842 5.902 5.968 
 Std. Dev. 0.968 1.043 1.128 1.091 1.052 
 Min. 2 2 3 3 2 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
MOTIV Mean 6.667 6.714 6.237 6.610 6.559 
 Std. Dev. 0.603 0.622 1.283 0.628 0.839 
 Min. 5 4 2 5 2 
 Max. 7 7 7 7 7 
RAGAIN Mean 0.113 0.074 0.143 0.125 0.115 
 Std. Dev. 0.239 0.133 0.183 0.189 0.193 
 Min. -0.951 -0.112 -0.201 -0.246 -0.951 


























RALOSS Mean -0.107 -0.076 -0.093 -0.073 -0.088 
 Std. Dev. 0.203 0.146 0.167 0.212 0.185 
 Min. -0.969 -0.388 -0.549 -0.496 -0.969 
 Max. 0.281 0.219 0.281 0.656 0.656 
RAMIXED Mean 0.102 0.133 0.181 0.094 0.125 
 Std. Dev. 0.168 0.153 0.221 0.216 0.193 
 Min. -0.303 -0.163 -0.262 -0.224 -0.303 
 Max. 0.596 0.439 0.940 0.778 0.939 
RAGNEEZY Mean 0.177 0.190 0.124 0.214 0.176 
 Std. Dev. 0.255 0.211 0.197 0.254 0.232 
 Min. 0 0 0 0 0 
 Max. 1 1 0.75 1 1 
RAGENFIN Mean 4.000 4.057 3.565 3.854 3.871 
 Std. Dev. 1.196 1.199 1.203 1.231 1.211 
 Min. 2 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 
 Max. 6 6 6 6 6 
LARISK Mean 5.396 1.568 2.135 1.730 2.829 
 Std. Dev. 28.002 1.046 3.794 1.950 15.019 
 Min. 0.368 0.696 0.426 0.117 0.117 
 Max. 188.991 5.392 24.397 10.809 188.991 
LAWANG Mean 2.290 2.775 2.149 2.792 2.493 
 Std. Dev. 2.023 4.387 1.787 2.705 2.823 
 Min. 0.55 1 0.2 0.4 0.2 
 Max. 12.5 27 10 15 27 
LAGAECHTER Mean 1.708 1.519 1.789 1.841 1.720 
 Std. Dev. 0.637 0.491 0.873 0.641 0.679 
 Min. 0.857 0.857 1 1 0.857 
 Max. 3 3 6 3 6 
LATIME Mean 1.039 0.905 0.907 0.915 0.946 
 Std. Dev. 1.652 0.250 0.189 0.415 0.433 
 Min. 0.001 0.418 0.566 0.322 0.001 
 Max. 4.138 1.913 1.459 2.884 4.138 
AGE is subjects’ age in years; PROFEXP is subjects’ professional experience in years, COMP is subjects 
indication if scenarios were comprehensible (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); CLEAR is subjects 
indication if questions and tasks were clearly stated (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); EASY is subjects 
indication whether it was easy to answer the questions (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); MOTIV is 
subjects’ indication whether they were motivated to answer all questions truthfully (1=strongly disagree, 





settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; RAGNEEZY is subjects’ overall risk attitude 
measured based on individuals’ willingness to invest in a certain mixed outcome lottery; RAGENFIN is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ overall risk attitude and their risk attitude in financial situations (1=not at all 
risk taking; 7=very risk taking); LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk 
calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LAWANG is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion based on the gain/loss ratio that makes subjects willing to participate in a certain lottery; 
LAGAECHTER is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ willingness to participate 
in six different lotteries; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based 
on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; a detailed 










































































































AGE is subjects’ age in years; PROFEXP is subjects’ professional experience in years, COMP is subjects 
indication if scenarios were comprehensible (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); CLEAR is subjects 
indication if questions and tasks were clearly stated (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); EASY is 
subjects indication whether it was easy to answer the questions (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); 
MOTIV is subjects’ indication whether they were motivated to answer all questions truthfully (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree); RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk 
aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; RAGNEEZY is subjects’ 
overall risk attitude measured based on individuals’ willingness to invest in a certain mixed outcome lottery; 





situations (1=not at all risk taking; 7=very risk taking); LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss 
aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LAWANG is an aggregated measure of 
subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on the gain/loss ratio that makes subjects willing to participate in a 
certain lottery; LAGAECHTER is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ 
willingness to participate in six different lotteries; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree 
of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative 
payment in the future; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided 










































































































AGE is subjects’ age in years; PROFEXP is subjects’ professional experience in years, COMP is 
subjects indication if scenarios were comprehensible (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); CLEAR 
is subjects indication if questions and tasks were clearly stated (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); 
EASY is subjects indication whether it was easy to answer the questions (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree); MOTIV is subjects’ indication whether they were motivated to answer all questions 
truthfully (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree); RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed 
settings; RAGNEEZY is subjects’ overall risk attitude measured based on individuals’ willingness to 





risk attitude and their risk attitude in financial situations (1=not at all risk taking; 7=very risk taking); 
LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed 
outcome prospects; LAWANG is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on 
the gain/loss ratio that makes subjects willing to participate in a certain lottery; LAGAECHTER is a 
measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ willingness to participate in six 
different lotteries; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time 
based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; 
a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; 






Table 60: Correlation Matrix (Two-way Interaction Tobit Regression) 
 
N = 154, Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. 
 WTA80DEV LOSS CONS LARISK LATIME RAGAIN RALOSS RAMIXED 

















































































































WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable 
taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an aggregated 
measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk 
aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description 






Table 61: Correlation Matrix Loss Aversion (Three-way Interaction Tobit Regression) 
N = 156, Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. 
 WTA80DEV LOSS CONS LARISK LATIME LARISK200 LARISK50 LAWANG LAGAECHTER RAGAIN RALOSS RAMIXED 









































































































































































































































































WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is 
a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME is an aggregated 
measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; LARISK200 is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss 
aversion under risk calculated based on subjects’ certainty equivalents for the following mixed outcome prospect: (200, 1/2; -200); LARISK50 is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk calculated 
based on subjects’ certainty equivalents for the following mixed outcome prospect: (50, 1/2; -50); LAWANG is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on the gain/loss ratio that makes 
subjects willing to participate in a certain lottery; LAGAECHTER is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ willingness to participate in six different lotteries; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk 
aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided 





Table 62: Correlation Matrix Risk Aversion (Three-way Interaction Tobit Regression) 
N = 156, Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. 
 WTA80DEV LOSS CONS LARISK LATIME RAGAIN RALOSS RAMIXED RAGENFIN RAGNEEZY GENDER SHARESP EXPFA1 

























































































































































































































































































































WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value 
of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment 
prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; RAGENFIN 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ overall risk attitude and their risk attitude in financial situations (1=not at all risk taking; 7=very risk taking); RAGNEEZY is subjects’ overall risk attitude measured based on individuals’ willingness to invest in a 
certain mixed outcome lottery; GENDER is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subject is a woman; SHARESP is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects owned shares in the past; EXPFA1 is a binary variable that takes the value 





Table 63: Regression Results LARISK50 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK(50) + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK(50) + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK(50) + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK(50) + β8 LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10 RALOSS + β11 RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 LARISK LARISK50 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  5.08511 0.87  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -2.874653 -0.38  
LARISK(50) -1.446784 -0.32  -11.90805 -3.40 *** 
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  12.81032 1.32  
LOSS*LARISK(50) 13.2203 1.77 * 8.336094 1.03  
CONS*LARISK(50) 15.68638 2.51 ** 11.91176 1.41  
LOSS*CONS*LARISK(50) -20.19987 -2.07 ** -22.8914 -1.73 * 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 17.19843 3.46 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -56.19463 -3.10 *** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  -32.45631 -1.83 * 
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  38.60295 1.94 * 
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 14.83682 1.94 * 
N                                156  156  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  5.10  
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0191  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -737.98712  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  3.34  
Tobit regression; LARISK(50) is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LARISK50 
is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk calculated based on subjects’ certainty equivalents for 
the following mixed outcome prospect: (50, 1/2; -50); LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of 
loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment 
in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; 
RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description of all variables including their 






Table 64: Regression Results LARISK200 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK(200) + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK(200) + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK(200) + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK(200) + β8 LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10 RALOSS + β11 RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 LARISK LARISK200 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  5.25014 0.86  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -4.762326 -0.64  
LARISK(200) -1.446784 -0.32  -6.005544 -2.53 ** 
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  16.22804 1.65  
LOSS*LARISK(200) 13.2203 1.77 * 11.0324 3.02 *** 
CONS*LARISK(200) 15.68638 2.51 ** 9.251162 2.74 *** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK(200) -20.19987 -2.07 ** -14.97093 -1.72 * 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 15.23805 3.49 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -47.51506 -2.97 *** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  -12.03432 -0.84  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  14.92959 0.87  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 19.97736 2.97 *** 
N                                156  155  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  4.71  
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0205  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -734.7917  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  3.03  
Tobit regression; LARISK(200) is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; 
LARISK200 is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion under risk calculated based on subjects’ certainty 
equivalents for the following mixed outcome prospect: (200, 1/2; -200); LATIME is an aggregated measure of 
subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and 
a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk 
aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description of all 
variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, 







Table 65: Regression Results LAWANG 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK(LAWANG) + β4 LOSS·CONS +  
β5 LOSS·LARISK(LAWANG) +  β6 CONS·LARISK(LAWANG) +  
β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK(LAWANG) + β8 LATIME + β9 RAGAIN +  
β10 RALOSS + β11 RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 LARISK LAWANG 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  7.037979 1.11  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -3.939851 -0.53  
LARISK(LAWANG) -1.446784 -0.32  3.569517 1.57  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  14.1608 1.49  
LOSS*LARISK(LAWANG) 13.2203 1.77 * -3.313145 -1.09  
CONS*LARISK(LAWANG) 15.68638 2.51 ** -4.620476 -1.22  
LOSS*CONS*LARISK(LAWANG) -20.19987 -2.07 ** 17.08624 3.25 *** 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 9.988817 2.38 ** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -54.49575 -3.95 *** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  -12.23032 -0.96  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  4.242331 0.28  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 26.32383 3.84 *** 
N                                156  154  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  6.26  
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0262  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -724.08139  
Highest VIF                                     3.07  3.08  
Tobit regression; LARISK(LAWANG) is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their 
equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 
if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; 
LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome 
prospects; LAWANG is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on the gain/loss ratio that 
makes subjects willing to participate in a certain lottery; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of 
loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment 
in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; 
RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description of all variables including their 








Table 66: Regression Results LAGAECHTER 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK(LAGAECHTER) + β4 LOSS·CONS + 
 β5 LOSS·LARISK(LAGAECHTER) + β6 CONS·LARISK(LAGAECHTER) + 
 β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK(LAGAECHTER) + β8 LATIME + β9 RAGAIN +  
β10 RALOSS + β11 RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 LARISK LAGAECHTER 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  6.385931 1.01  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -3.455341 -0.41  
LARISK(LAGAECHTER) -1.446784 -0.32  0.9409011 0.13  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  14.29763 1.39  
LOSS*LARISK 
(LAGAECHTER) 13.2203 1.77 
 
* 0.6712699 0.08 
 
CONS*LARISK 
(LAGAECHTER) 15.68638 2.51 
 




-20.19987 -2.07 ** 13.97869 0.83  
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 10.59769 1.97 * 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -41.73734 -2.94 *** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  -14.63129 -1.08  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  14.81263 0.96  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 23.20882 3.05 *** 
N                                156  159  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  4.15  
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0178  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -754.49575  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  3.05  
Tobit regression; LARISK(LAGAECHTER) is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation 
of their equity stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the 
value of 1 if prior project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is 
applied; LARISK is an aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome 
prospects; LAGAECHTER is a measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion based on subjects’ willingness to 
participate in six different lotteries; LATIME is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over 
time based on payment prospects that contain a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; 
RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED 
is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed description of all variables including their 






Table 67: Regression Results RAGENFIN 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  (β9  RAGENFIN) + β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  7.173822 1.17  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -1.143609 -0.15  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  -2.94897 -0.68  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  12.34616 1.26  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 16.06687 2.37 ** 
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 15.66179 2.29 ** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -21.76764 -2.25 ** 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 13.67704 2.77 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 **    
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07     
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46     
RAGENFIN    4.350548 2.01 ** 
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 0.7768852 0.08  
N                                156  156  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  5.18   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0197  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -738.93071  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  4.72  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; 
RAGENFIN is an aggregated measure of subjects’ overall risk attitude and their risk attitude in financial situations 
(1=not at all risk taking; 7=very risk taking); a detailed description of all variables including their 








Table 68: Regression Results RAGNEEZY 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  (β9  RAGNEEZY) + β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  10.61157 1.72 * 
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  1.391077 0.19  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  -3.535677 -0.81  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  10.39469 1.08  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 15.58129 1.92 * 
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 14.64049 2.23 ** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -16.72905 -1.53  
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 15.30205 3.04 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 **    
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07     
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46     
RAGNEEZY    48.75044 3.75 *** 
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 5.422923 0.79  
N                                156  156  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  5.36   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0292  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -731.73919  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  2.74  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; 
RAGNEEZY is subjects’ overall risk attitude measured based on individuals’ willingness to invest in a certain 
mixed outcome lottery; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in 







Table 69: Regression Results GENDER, SHARESP, EXPFA1 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + (β12GENDER) + (β13SHARESP) + (β14EXPFA1) + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  8.041343 1.27  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -0.0755078 -0.01  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  -1.896572 -0.41  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  13.72865 1.45  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 12.60416 1.67 * 
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 16.86718 2.68 *** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -20.19555 -2.04 ** 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 12.53129 3.26 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -41.32887 -2.52 ** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  3.987241 0.24  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  -11.07515 -0.55  
GENDER    6.713135 1.16  
SHARESP    -0.8292485 -0.15  
EXPFA1    -2.396017 -0.30  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 24.13922 2.49 *** 
N                                156  156  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  4.05   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0230  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -736.46181  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  6.86  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; GENDER 
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subject is a woman; SHARESP is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if subjects owned shares in the past; EXPFA1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if subjects 
considered annual reports in the past; a detailed description of all variables including their measurement/coding is 





Table 70: Regression Results Sample St. Gallen 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 Full Sample St. Gallen 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  4.048756 0.53  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -8.756895 -0.98  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  -0.1947025 -0.04  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  22.86961 2.04 ** 
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 16.53606 1.56  
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 15.44603 2.46 ** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -22.46176 -1.82 * 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 13.04173 3.43 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -39.15507 -2.02 ** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  13.47144 0.74  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  -21.75602 -0.91  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 30.21698 3.74 *** 
N                                156  122  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  4.75   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0245  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -573.55362  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  2.98  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed 
description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, 








Table 71: Regression Results Manipulation Check Questions Correctly Answered 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 Full Sample MCQ correct 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  6.19018 0.93  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -3.810707 -0.44  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  3.410841 0.97  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  18.77483 1.65  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 1.549762 0.22  
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 21.81207 2.74 *** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -19.45522 -1.85 * 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 14.72589 3.19 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -23.78292 -1.23  
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  0.7713735 0.04  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  -2.465984 -0.09  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 17.77213 2.56 *** 
N                                156  115  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  5.06   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218  0.0270  
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672  -541.29517  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  3.02  
Tobit regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed 
description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, 








Table 72: OLS Regression Results LARISK 
 
WTA80DEV = β0 + β1 LOSS + β2 CONS + β3 LARISK + β4 LOSS·CONS + β5 LOSS·LARISK + 
  β6 CONS·LARISK + β7 LOSS·CONS·LARISK + β8  LATIME + β9 RAGAIN + 
  β10  RALOSS + β11  RAMIXED + ε 
DepVar= WTA80DEV 
 Tobit OLS 
Variables Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
LOSS 6.982352 1.15  7.246979 1.18  
CONS -1.945844 -0.27  -1.698822 -0.24  
LARISK -1.446784 -0.32  -1.548124 -0.33  
LOSS*CONS 14.39964 1.52  13.9938 1.46  
LOSS*LARISK 13.2203 1.77 * 12.51248 1.63  
CONS*LARISK 15.68638 2.51 ** 13.19811 2.48 ** 
LOSS*CONS*LARISK -20.19987 -2.07 ** -17.2817 -1.87 * 
LATIME 13.48979 3.40 *** 13.18004 3.27 *** 
RAGAIN -36.82603 -2.17 ** -36.72637 -2.15 ** 
RALOSS -1.145277 -0.07  -3.006994 -0.18  
RAMIXED -9.655555 -0.46  -5.622375 -0.28  
Constant 23.18434 3.38 *** 22.41989 3.32 *** 
N                                156  156  
F-Statistic                                      4.80  5.18   
p-Value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Pseudo R²  0.0218    
Log pseudolikelihood -737.31672    
R²   0.1892  
Root MSE   30.883  
Highest VIF                                   3.07  3.07  
Tobit/OLS regression; LARISK is mean-centered; WTA80DEV is the deviation of subjects’ valuation of their equity 
stake from the rational economic share value in scenario 4; LOSS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if prior 
project outcome is a loss; CONS is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if conservatism is applied; LARISK is an 
aggregated measure of subjects’ loss aversion under risk calculated based on mixed outcome prospects; LATIME 
is an aggregated measure of subjects’ degree of loss aversion over time based on payment prospects that contain 
a positive payment now and a negative payment in the future; RAGAIN is subjects’ risk aversion in gain settings; 
RALOSS is subjects’ risk aversion in loss settings; RAMIXED is subjects’ risk aversion in mixed settings; a detailed 
description of all variables including their measurement/coding is provided in Annex 4; ***p-value ≤ 0.01, 
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